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Abstract 
Trading strategies and their implementation into portfolios  
By: Rayan Husseini 
This thesis examines how to implement financial statement analysis to form some 
investment ideas. Specifically, we are looking at strategies such as value (going long on stocks 
with a high F-score and short on stocks with a low F-score),  and a momentum strategy going long 
on stocks that have an increase in return on equity (ROE). 
Findings suggest that we are able to generate excess returns even after controlling for 
risks and recommend that the understanding of financial statement can help investors to form 
investment decisions and give a competitive edge over other investors in the market. There are a 
few lessons that investors can learn from the findings of this thesis. Value investors should focus 
on value firms. Momentum investors should pursue an investment strategy among firms with an 
improvement in return on equity. They could also benefit from forming a portfolio based on both 
investment ideas, which should protect them from economic downturn and offer an interesting 
portfolio.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Value investing has been a constant investment tool in the development of investment 
strategies; since local and international investors are becoming more sophisticated it is not 
surprising to see the wake of a growing use of stock picking in financial markets. Following the 
extension of the seminal work of Benjamin Graham and David Dodd (1934) with the use of 
financial ratios equities have become a popular way to make return out of a portfolio.  
In this context of this wide use of financial statement by market participants, providing 
the best investment tool could give a competitive edge over other investors and has become even 
more crucial. In fact, with the reliable investment approach it is possible to derive an interesting 
portfolio.  
Due to the poor global economic environment, stock prices are affected by downward 
changes, however in practice those investors or market participants who can reliably identify 
value traps by picking winners rather than potentially bankrupt company will profit from their 
superior forecasting ability.  
The work on Piotroski(2000) is not new but we intend in this thesis to provide a refresher 
by updating the back testing and offer a new application of the f-score by analysing its impact on 
some common strategies more specifically we form a market neutral portfolio. 
Our analysis contribute to the literature by incorporating the f-score on a market neutral 
strategy and applying the f-score to any kind of companies after pursing a financial check’s as 
opposed to Piotroski’s proposition to incorporate the financial health checks on a universe of low 
price-to-book stocks, therefore we believe that we contribute to the literature by updating the 
back testing and apply the F-score to a broader set of investable universe and analysing its impact 
on a variety of simple strategies.  
Also we created a migration table where investor is able to see whether a stock is staying 
in his portfolio from one year to another. Also among the different strategies we were looking at 
different investment horizons.  Accordingly, the rational of this thesis is to investigate the 
predictive power of the f-score but also the combination of a momentum strategy looking at the 
ROE as an investment tool, from both statistical and a performance point of view we examined 
the use of forming a long and a short portfolio by going long stocks rated within 7 to 9 and 
shorting stocks rated within 0 to 3. The results of the different portfolio are outperforming the 
benchmark.  
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Additionally, we examined which criterion was more relevant than another something 
that has not been done before and one of our major contributions in the literature.  
Using data from 1991 to 2012, we developed the F-score, the strategy was then tested 
using different period’s horizon a 3-month, 6-month and a 12-month investment horizons. 
Despite the fact that we do not account for transaction costs, most portfolio retain produced 
positive returns. The long-short strategy appears to be the best portfolio despite during pre-crisis 
time a high drawdown due to the fact that we are losing on both side of the market. Another 
conclusion from our results is that during crisis time our portfolio is performing really well due to 
high performances and in terms of forecasting accuracy.  
Overall, we depart from existing work in several respects. First, we developed a new back 
testing approach applying the strategy on different portfolios; secondly we apply a new 
momentum strategy using ROE as an investment strategy something that has not been done in 
the past. A recent development in the literature has been the application of the f-score as a 
market neutral portfolio.  
This thesis is organized as follows chapter one provides the motivation for value 
investing, chapter two gives some insights on the use of Piotroski’s model in the current 
environment, chapter three describe the statistics, chapter four look at implementing a market 
neutral strategy and finally chapter five provides investors with a new momentum strategy which 
involves looking at Return-on-Equity.  
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Chapter one – The motivation for 
value investing 
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1.1 The history of value investing 
 
This chapter explores some of the shared views on the nature of value investing; 
academicians and practitioners may be surprised by the degree of overlap in the perspectives. 
The timelessness of their views is striking, and some of their research is very applicable to the 
current environment. Value investing undoubtedly started with the ideas on investment that 
Benjamin Graham and David Dodd began teaching at Columbia Business School in 1928 and 
commenced to apply throughout their 1934 text, Security Analysis, by developing financial ratios 
from the accounting record of companies as a key element of investment decisions. Since then, 
value investing has been compared to an investment paradigm where technologies and science 
interact with ideas.  
By definition, value investing relies on selecting stocks that trade for less than their 
intrinsic values. Graham and Dodd (1934) describe those kinds of purchases as: “Investment 
commitments where the buyer is making a well-considered and legitimate commitment in an 
enterprise with an attractive future letting his private enthusiasm run away with his judgment” 
(p.368, Security Analysis). Also, Graham and Dodd (1934) said: “Traditionally the investor has 
been the man with the patience and the courage of his convictions” (p.15, Security Analysis).  
If an analyst is convinced that a stock is worth more than its value then he pays for it; this 
kind of strategy can be done with two possible techniques: buying at a time when the market is 
low or finding individual stocks which are undervalued and are available even at times when the 
market is not low. Therefore, the strategy can be described as buying stock at a depressed level 
and selling stocks when the market is over-optimistic. The margin of safety was at the very heart 
of Graham’s approach to investing (the significance resides in the difference between prices on 
the one hand and indicated or appraised value on the other. Equally, the growth stock also known 
as glamor stock refers to company whose earnings are expected to grow at an above-average rate 
relative to the market, this approach may provide some form of margin of safety to investors as 
the future prospects are conservatively made and provided it shows a satisfactory margin in 
relation to the price paid); the term describes a price well below its intrinsic value, the price a 
fully informed sophisticated investor would pay for the company.  
Substantial work supporting the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been done over 
the years. Efficient Market Hypothesis signifies that security prices fully reflect all available 
information and will immediately adjust to reflect market expectations. However, a number of 
anomalies have been found which question the validity of the efficient market hypothesis; some 
  
23 
 
of these anomalies are related to the relationship between earnings and returns while others 
seems to be purely market based. Hence, we will try to give some insights into those anomalies.  
Before discussing the anomalies it conveys to present to give some brief insights into the 
Capital Asset Pricing model, the CAPM offers powerful predictions about how to measure risk and 
the relation between expected return and risk. Unfortunately, the CAPM reflect theoretical 
failings; we begin our discussion on the Markowitz efficient frontier, which argues that investors 
would optimally hold a mean variance efficient portfolio with the highest expected return for a 
given level of variance. Following the development of the Markowitz portfolio model, several 
authors considered the implications of assuming the existence of a risk-free asset, an asset with a 
zero variance; this achievement is generally attributed to William Sharpe (1964), who re-
examined the Markowitz (1959) work by showing that investors have homogeneous expectations 
and optimally hold mean-variance efficient portfolios. Consequently, in the absence of market 
friction the portfolio will be a mean variance efficient portfolio. Lintner (1965) derived similar 
theories; the author tested the problem in order to optimise a portfolio held by risk-adverse 
investors (under which conditions stocks will be held long or short in an optimal portfolio, even 
when risk premiums are negative/positive). Thus, the literature also refers to the Sharpe-Lintner-
Mossin (SML) capital asset pricing model.  
An investor may want to attain a higher expected return in exchange for accepting higher 
risk; in consequence, Reinganum (1981) appraised that either the simple one period capital asset 
pricing model is miss-specified or that capital markets are inefficient – such as portfolios based on 
firms’ size or price to earnings experience different average returns than those predicted by the 
CAPM. 
Because all investors want to invest in the risky portfolio, Fama and French (1995) 
provided an extensive literature review on long-term market inefficiencies and why markets are 
displaying anomalies. Furthermore, Fama and French (2008) dissected anomalies that are not 
explained by the capital asset pricing theory. 
 
1.1.1 Price to earnings 
Several studies have examined the relationship between price to earnings ratio and stock 
returns. It has been suggested that low price to earnings stocks which is define as price over 
earnings per share will outperform high price to earnings stocks. The rational behind 
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outperforming is that P/E is a variant of a contrarian strategy based on buying losers and shorting 
winners. Investor’s will pay more for a high P/E.  
To begin with, Basu (1977) demonstrated that low price to earnings stocks tend to 
outperform high price to earnings stocks using securities in the New York Stock Exchange and the 
American Stock Exchange. Firms were ranked annually based on the price to earnings and size 
effect as of 1st January and put into one of five equally weighted portfolios; the results suggested 
that a portfolio of low price to earnings stocks will lead to higher absolute return and better 
adjusted risk than a high price to earnings stocks portfolio over the period April 1957 to March 
1971. Traditionally, the price to earnings ratio is used as a measure of stock price relative to 
earnings, providing investors with a valuation metric: a high price to earnings would mean that 
investors are willing to pay more for company earnings compared to stocks with lower price to 
earnings.  
In the same manner, Jaffe et al. (1989) examined the relation between stock return and 
the effects of size and price to earnings over the period 1951 to 1986, suggesting that the price to 
earnings and size effect is significant over the study period. Reinganum (1981) appraised that the 
price to earnings effect disappears when size is simultaneously considered, implying that the price 
to earnings and value anomaly proxy for the same set of factors is missing from the specification 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Ibbotson and Riepe (1997) in their paper stated that investors will be able to achieve a 
market-adjusted return of 13.3% when screening stock based on price to earnings ratio. In 
another endeavour, Dreman and Berry (1995) suggested that earnings surprise might be affected 
in a positive or a negative way when looking at stock price reaction to analyst consensus earnings 
surprised by comparing their empirical work on high and low P/E.  
Results stated that analyst errors in forecasted earnings surprises have an asymmetrical 
impact on high and low price to earnings stocks. These findings were certainly not in line with the 
findings of DeBont and Thaler (1985), who do not find significant results suggesting that analyst 
earnings forecast errors occur substantially more in low price to earnings than in high price to 
earnings. Accordingly, Doukas et al. (2004) studied the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
effects implying that stocks with greater disagreement earn higher returns and found greater 
disagreement among value stocks than on growth stocks partly due to higher risk in value stocks. 
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Also, Dreman and Berry (1995) tested whether stocks are fully priced after an earnings surprise1 
and suggested that value stocks are mispriced by investors.  
Similarly, as part of their analysis of the role small minus big (SMB)2 and high minus low 
(HML)3 play in the return generating process, Fama and French (1993) examined the behaviour of 
a broad sample of stocks grouped into quintile portfolios by their price to earnings ratio on a 
yearly basis over the period from July 1963 to December 1991. Fama and French (1993) found 
that returns are related to risk characteristics like size, earnings/price, cash flow, book to market 
equity and because these patterns are not explained by the capital asset pricing model, they are 
called anomalies. 
One potential source of market inefficiency is the inappropriate market responses to 
information. Inappropriate responses to information implicit in the price to earnings ratios are 
believed to be caused by exaggerated investors’ expectations regarding growth in earnings and 
dividends. Thus, optimistic information regarding growth in earnings can be reflected in price to 
earnings ratios, with over-optimistic reaction leading to high price to earnings and over-
pessimistic expectations leading on average to low price to earnings. Price to earnings (PE) is in 
consequence a variant of a contrarian strategy based on buying losers and shorting winners. The 
industry revealed recently that nearly 80% of analysts choose the forward PE as their preferred 
valuation method. A consequence of a better or lower expected earnings surprise can in fact be 
linked to an appropriate response to information. 
In summary, performance measures indicated that low price to earnings stocks 
experience superior abnormal risk-adjusted return relative to the market, whereas high price to 
earnings have relatively inferior risk-adjusted return relative to the market.  
1.1.2 Size effect 
There is some significant evidence that size is part of the premise of value investing. 
Indeed, several authors have examined the impact of size measured by the market value on risk- 
                                                          
1
 Positive surprises for low price to earnings firms result in significantly above market returns; the impact is 
however to a lesser extent the same on high price to earnings firms. Similarly, negative impact on high price 
to earnings firms is perceived by the market as a greater impact than on low price to earnings firms due to 
the implication of the stocks’ expectation among investors. 
 
2
 The return to a portfolio of small stocks less the return to a portfolio of large stocks. 
 
3
 The return to a portfolio of high book to market stocks less the return to a portfolio of low book to market 
stocks. 
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adjusted returns. The theory suggests that small firms consistently experience significantly higher 
returns than big firms.  
 For instance, Banz (1981) scrutinized a size effect in stock returns implying that stock 
with low market capitalization should outperform stock with high capitalization. In fact, Banz 
(1981) have presented strong evidence that small firms earn abnormally high risk-adjusted 
returns by comparison to large firms. Chan et al. (1991) examined the cross-section return on 
Japanese stocks and one of the four variables was the size effect appraising that small stocks 
achieve higher returns than large stocks. Similarly, Chan and Chen’s (1991) main concern was why 
small capitalization stocks earn higher returns than large size companies and suggest that this is 
due to the characterization of the risk. In other words, firms might be exposed differently to risk 
factors in the sense that their stock prices react more sensitively to changes in the economy and 
they are less likely to survive in high economic conditions. As an example, firms that are less 
efficient and have higher costs of production are less likely to react to changes in technology. 
Zarowin (1990) stated that the tendency for losers to outperform winners is due to the 
size effect4 since losers tend to be smaller than winners. Recently, Zhang (2006) argued that 
stocks that are small and have a low analyst following exhibit higher evidence of mispricing. 
In summary, firm size is a major efficient market anomaly. Size effect must be considered 
in any event study as this factor has been proven to account for the risk measurements.  
1.1.3 Book to market effect 
There is some evidence that the book to market ratio5 can help investors to earn 
abnormal returns.  
Rosenberg et al. (1985) found a significant positive relationship between book to market 
and returns and has evidenced that such strategy is against the efficient market hypothesis. 
Similarly, Lakonishok et al. (1994) demonstrated that the strategy consisting of buying low book 
to market has a lower average return than simply buying high book to market. 
Chan et al. (1991) came upon the same strong relationship when looking at the Japanese 
market6: firms with high book to market outperform firms with low book to market. In addition, 
                                                          
4
 Fama and French (1992) argued that the cross section of stock returns could be explained by three risk 
factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book to market equity. 
 
5
 This ratio relates the book value of equity and the market value of the same equity. Book value per share 
= Shareholder’s equity – Preferred stocks/ Average outstanding common shares. 
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Chan and Chen (1991) found that firms the market judges to have poor prospects – signalled by a 
firm with low stock prices and high ratios of book to market – have higher returns than firms with 
strong prospects. Later on, Chen and Zhang (1998) confirmed that firms with high book to market 
indeed exhibit significantly low earnings, higher financial leverage, more earnings uncertainty, 
and are more likely to cut dividends compared to low book to market firms. Identically, Capaul et 
al. (1993) elucidated and analyzed the return earned by a portfolio7 whose investor is holding 
high price to book ratio against a portfolio where the investor is holding low price to book ratio, 
and once again results are in line with previous findings.  
Strong support for this ratio was provided by Fama and French (1992), who examined the 
relationship between market beta, size, price to earnings, leverage and book to market in the 
cross section of average stock returns, demonstrating that, used alone, the variables’ size, price to 
earnings, leverage and book to market have explanatory power. In fact, they have proved the 
relationship between book to market and average return to be strong and positive and 
highlighted the importance that risk across stocks is multidimensional. Their suggestion was to 
define the size effect as a proxy for one dimension and market equity (ME) plus the book to 
market (BE/ME) ratio as another proxy for risk. In a similar attempt, Lewellen (1999) provided 
further information on the risk and characteristics behind book to market by focusing on building 
a portfolio of book to market ratio to see whether it predicts time variation in the expected 
returns and further if those returns can be explained by a risk factor. The results were consistent 
with the idea that a strong relationship between book to market and returns can be found at a 
fixed point in time.  
Moreover, Berk et al. (1999) looked at the change in firms’ risk throughout time by 
investigating variables such as book to market and size, which appear to be economically 
interpretable characteristics of the firms. Similarly, Cooper (2006) stated that low book to market 
firms are less sensitive to economic conditions and have lower systematic risk; thus, investors 
should be conscious that low book to market firms have lower beta against the market. Despite 
the fact that there is no consistent risk factor between high and low book to market firms as 
spotlighted by Daniel and Titman (1997), Rosenberg et al. (1985) argued that investors who are 
buying long high book to market firms and shorting low book to market firms will achieve an 
                                                                                                                                                                               
6
 Chan et al. (1991) examined the cross-section return on Japanese stocks using four different variables: 
earnings yield, size, book to market ratio and cash flow yield. Portfolios were formed on the basis of the 
four variables and significance was found among the four variables when an investor is trying to achieve 
higher returns in the Japanese market. 
7
 Results were compared across six countries over the period January 1981 to June 1992 and suggest the 
existence of a value growth factor in each country.  
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average monthly return of 0.36% during a 12-month window, even after taking into account the 
size effect across the portfolio. In addition, Fama and French (1992) stated that on average 
returns rise from 0.30% when forming a portfolio of low book to market (BE/ME) to 1.83% for a 
high book to market portfolio.  
In summary, studies that have used publicly available ratios to predict future stock 
returns and have provided evidence in conflict with the efficient market hypothesis represent an 
interesting challenge to the notion of rational markets, as factors that should impact on returns – 
also called systematic risk – are not efficient, whereas a book to market ratio seems to be capable 
of capturing future returns.  
1.1.4 Reversal effect  
In addition to studies supportive of the use of ratios to predict overall stock market 
returns, many other studies were supportive of the view that, over the long term, extreme 
performances on stock returns tend to reverse. Stocks that have performed best in the recent 
past seem to underperform the rest of the market, while stocks that appear to have the worst 
performance in the recent past seem to offer above average returns.  
In essence, DeBont and Thaler (1985) advocated that value stocks perceived as 
underperforming stocks subsequently reverse to outperform the market and prior winners 
subsequently underperform the market. Lakonishok et al. (1994) said: “Value strategies might 
produce higher returns because they are contrarian to naïve strategies followed by other 
investors” (p.1542, Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk).  
Additionally, Rosenberg et al. (1985) inspected a specific return reversal strategy which 
consists of buying stocks with lagging specific return in the previous month where they expect the 
return to be reversed in the following months. “The strategy calculates the difference between 
the investment return for the previous month on the stock and a fitted value for the return based 
upon common factors in the stock market in the previous month” (p.48, Persuasive Evidence of 
Market Inefficiency).   
Likewise, Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) made evident that investors can benefit 
from shorter-term reversals return; in fact, investors who are able to distinguish stocks that have 
performed poorly in the previous week or month can benefit from a contrarian strategy and 
generate subsequent returns. Similarly, Dissanaike (2002) find a reversals effect when dissecting 
past stock market losers in the FTSE 100, with a tendency for past losers to outperform past 
winners.  
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Investors are therefore wondering whether the reversal effect can account for the risk 
taken. According to Debont and Thaler (1985), value stocks are fundamentally more risky than 
growth stocks and the compensation for outperforming can be described as compensation for 
risk taken. Petkova and Zhang (2005) found evidence that value stocks exhibit higher risk in bad 
times whereas growth stocks are riskier than value stocks in good times. “In bad times, value 
firms are burdened with more unproductive capital, finding it more difficult to reduce their 
capital stocks than growth firms do, the dividends and returns of value stocks will hence co-vary 
more with economic downturns. In good times, growth firms invest more and face higher 
adjustment costs to take advantage of economic conditions” (p.68, Is Value Riskier Than 
Growth?).  
Therefore, the asymmetric beta dispersion between value and growth results from the 
asymmetry in capital adjustment, allowing investors to benefit from a reversal effect when 
selecting stocks.  
1.1.5 Cash yield effect  
Several studies had made evident that a strategy that buys companies with high yield 
relative to low yield securities will earn subsequent returns.  
As suggested by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), there is a positive but non-linear 
relationship between expected return and dividend yield. According to Chan et al. (1991), the 
return difference between two extreme groups that buy high and low cash flow yield leads to 
higher returns. “Since firms are reluctant to cut dividends, a substantial reduction is a clear signal 
of a firm with cash problems” (p.1468, Structural and Return Characteristics of Small and Large 
Firms). Also, Miller and Scholes (1982) found that the relationship between common stock 
returns and dividend yield can be attributable to the knowledge that the firm will declare any 
dividends.  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) described the change in the dividend rate as: “A change in 
the market price would not be incompatible with irrelevance to the extent that it was merely a 
reflection of what might be called the informational content of dividends. That is, where a firm 
has adopted a policy of dividend stabilization with a long established and generally appreciated 
target pay-out ratio investors have good reasons to interpret a change in the dividend rate as a 
change in management’s views of future profit prospects for the firm” (p.430, Dividend Policy, 
Growth, and the Valuation of Shares). In other words, investors should be indifferent as to 
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whether a firm pays dividends or retains cash, since this should just translate directly into future 
dividends for the investor.  
Those investors who suggest that dividend yield is an important component in stock 
return have explained the variation in stock prices by comparing the ability of forecasted 
dividends and forecasted abnormal earnings. Bernard (1995) found that dividends explain 29% of 
the variations in stock prices whereas 68% is explained by the cross section of book value and 
earnings forecasts.  
Bernartzi et al. (1997) examined the earnings performance of US firms that changed their 
dividends over the period 1979 to 1991 and reported a strong correlation between lagged and 
contemporaneous dividend and earnings change. They found that change in dividend cannot 
really predict future changes in earnings.  
In summary, the reasoning from those studies is that when dividend yield is high it implies 
that investors are expecting or requiring a high return on stocks. This has been proven to be more 
frequent during a poor economic environment when investors perceive higher risk for investment 
and require a high rate of return. Thus, it has been suggested that if you invest during this risk-
averse period you will experience above average returns.  
1.1.6 January effect  
Several studies that do not support the efficient market hypothesis have found December 
trading volume abnormally high for stocks that decline during the previous year and significant 
abnormal returns during January for those loss stocks. Hence, empirical evidence suggests that 
markets perform well during the month of January.  
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) searched the January market effect as a value strategy, 
suggesting that this effect results in high January returns for depressed stocks by analyzing 
whether the January anomaly is related to price effect or to firm size effect, and revealed that low 
share price stocks earn abnormal returns in January before tax transactions cost. Jaffe et al. 
(1989) considered the period 1951 to 1968 in their study, and revealed the difference between 
January and other months to be that price to earnings appears to be significant only in January. 
Other studies have shown that the small size firm effect occurs entirely in January, more 
precisely in the first two weeks of January. Please refer to Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983). 
Can we really take into account the January effect as those literatures are quite old but we 
believe that the January anomaly is still significant in our market? Recently Cooper et al. (2006) 
contributed to the literature by saying that the January effect is a good indicator for the stock 
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market return of the rest of the year and demonstrated strong evidence that the January effect 
does exist.  
It can be concluded that, because of transaction costs, arbitrageurs should not eliminate 
the January tax-selling anomaly.  
1.1.7 IPOs 
During the past few years, several studies have observed the long-run returns on initial 
public offerings (IPOs)8 and indicated that investors are facing some form of under-pricing when 
forming an investment. In other words, investors who acquire the stock after the initial 
adjustment do not experience abnormal returns.  
Loughran and Ritter (1995) expressed their concern that firms issuing equity earn lower 
than average returns in the future three to five years than non-issuing firms with similar 
characteristics. Also, they viewed whether firms issuing stock via an initial public offering and 
seasoned equity offering have been a poor investment for investors. The results showed that 
firms subject to issuing via an IPO or a seasoned equity offering (SEO)9 underperform firms non-
issuing for five years after the offering date. “Since most SEOs occur after a period of high returns, 
we address whether the poor subsequent performance is merely a manifestation of long-term 
return reversals” (p.24, The New Issues Puzzle).   
Loughran and Ritter (1997) explained that the operating performance of issuing firms 
displays substantial improvement prior to the equity offerings, but then deteriorates. They found 
that many of the issuing firms have an improvement in profitability before the offering and face a 
decline of profitability after the offering. However, Ikenberry et al. (1995) demonstrated that the 
average abnormal return for a four-year buy and hold strategy based on the announcements of 
open market share repurchases can earn 12.1% for the period 1980-1990. For value stocks the 
average abnormal return is 45.3% because of undervaluation; the repurchasing is more likely to 
be significant; and they hypothesized that the markets treat repurchase announcement with 
scepticism.  
Finally, Brav et al. (2000) reported that the outperformance following a seasoned equity 
offering is more significant among small growth firms and suggest that the outperformance is the 
result of size and value effects in returns.  
                                                          
8
 Initial public offering is a type of public offering where shares of stock in a company are sold on a 
securities exchange for the first time. 
 
9
 Seasoned equity offering is a new equity issue by an already publicly traded company. 
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Thus, investors can form investment decisions based on IPO and SEO.  
1.2 The momentum strategy in the market efficiency 
1.2.1 Macroeconomic momentum 
This part of the chapter will try to describe all the different momentum strategies applied 
in the literature. Momentum in stock returns refers to the tendency of stocks that have 
performed well (poorly) to continue to perform well (poorly).  
Levy (1967) claimed that investors who buy stocks at the current price that are 
subsequently higher than the average stock price realized over the past 27 weeks are able to 
benefit from abnormal returns. Likewise, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) considered a strategy that 
buys stocks based on their returns over the past first, second, third and fourth quarters, 
suggesting that stocks that generate higher than average returns in one period also generate 
higher than average returns in the following period. The momentum effect is presumably the 
strongest evidence against the market efficiency hypothesis. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) found a momentum effect and propounded the view that 
momentum strategies yield to superior returns by providing further proof based on their past 
findings, such as whether momentum strategies continue to be profitable for investors. They 
concluded that, while the performance of individual stocks is highly unpredictable, portfolios of 
best-performing stocks in the recent past period appeared to outperform other stocks which 
were lagging in the past period, and argued that the momentum effect presumably represents 
the strongest evidence against the market efficiency hypothesis. Jegadeesh and Titman attribute 
this effect to the fact that investors under-react to the release of firm-specific information – a 
cognitive bias.  
It is for these reasons that momentum has attracted academicians wishing to understand 
the principles of this strategy. Perhaps the momentum strategy is a multifactor explanation of 
asset-pricing anomalies. For illustration, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) decided to analyze the 
source of momentum strategy as described by common factors and firm-specific information; 
they were followed by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), who have asserted the importance of 
common factors and firm-specific information as sources of momentum profit. 
Fama and French (1996) have asserted that a momentum strategy’s profitability cannot 
be explained by its unconditional factor exposure: “A momentum strategy may spuriously appear 
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to earn abnormal returns if it tends to load heavily on a factor when exposure to that factor 
requires a high return” (p.49, Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies).  
Thus, Griffin et al. (2003) appraised that macroeconomic variables can explain the 
momentum returns and suggested that macroeconomic risks that are driving momentum returns 
are country specific; see also Rouwenhorst (1998)10. 
On the other hand, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) stated that common factors are 
related to macroeconomic events that are related to the business cycle of a company. In fact, the 
authors used variables such as dividend yield, default spread, yield on three-month T-bills and 
term structure spread to assess momentum strategy, revealing that macroeconomic variables are 
important in determining the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. Similarly, Liu and 
Zhang (2008) considered the relationship between macroeconomic risk, factor pricing and 
momentum profits, implying that higher growth rate of industrial production can help to explain 
the cross section of returns and momentum returns. For instance, they said: “Winners have 
higher future growth rate of dividend investment and sales than losers and that the duration of 
the expected growth spread matches roughly that of momentum” (p.3, Momentum Profits, 
Factor Pricing, and Macroeconomic Risk). Likewise, they found important cross-sectional variation 
in higher growth rate of industrial production among different industry portfolios; for example, 
cyclical industries such as consumer durables and energy have large and positive higher growth 
rate of industrial production whereas health care and utility have negative higher growth rate of 
industrial production.  
In summary, macroeconomic shocks might account for the momentum anomaly. 
1.2.2 Overreaction  
Several tests have considered whether investors overreact to information displayed by 
the market.  
Barberis et al. (1998) presented a study into investor sentiment regarding how investors 
form their belief and proposed that investors can earn positive returns by taking advantage of 
under-reaction and overreaction without carrying more risk. The model appears to be relevant 
statistically and consistent with experimental evidence. On the other hand, Zarowin (1990) 
studied stock market overreaction by investigating the overreaction phenomenon among 
                                                          
10
 Rouwenhorst (1998) has explored the sources of return variation in emerging markets, “If the return 
factors in a group of relatively isolated markets are the same as those found in developed markets, it 
becomes more likely that the factors are fundamentally related to the way in which investors set prices in 
financial markets around the world”(p.1440, International Momentum Strategies). 
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investors and by reinvestigating the tendency discovered by DeBondt and Taler (1987) for losers 
over a past three-year period to outperform winners over the same period. Similarly, LaPorta et 
al. (1997) claimed evidence of overreaction in growth stocks and value stocks when assessing 
accounting variables and found that an investor can earn subsequent returns by betting against 
an overreaction. Moreover, Dissanaike (1997) considered the stock market overreaction 
hypothesis as to whether or not investors overreact to information due to over-optimism or 
pessimism. Additionally, Chan (1988) inspected a contrarian investment strategy consisting of 
buying past losers and shorting past winners. The strategy is formulated on the basis that 
investors overreact to information and in consequence winners tend to be overvalued and losers 
undervalued. Also, Conrad and Kaul (1993) argued that the overreaction effect might be 
explained by factors such as bid-ask biases, infrequent trading and time-varying risk. Also, Fama 
and French (1996) advised that their three risk factor model can account for the overreaction 
evidence among investors but not for under-reaction.  
Chan (2003)11 focused on the impact of news on stock market momentum and reversion. 
He found that stocks with news exhibit momentum while stocks without news do not. Thus, if 
investors overreact to news, past stock market losers should become winners and inversely 
winners become losers.  
Recently, Tetlock (2007) expressed and developed a new approach to quantify qualitative 
information by showing that the pessimism expressed in a daily news column from, for example, 
The Wall Street Journal can have significant downward pressures on prices of the stock indices 
and found also that an increase in the use of negative words relative to prior stories predicts 
larger negative shocks to future earnings. 
Also, the author demonstrated by a regression analysis and a buy and hold strategy that 
investors can benefit from examining the difference in optimism and pessimism information 
expressed by managers on the management committee report. This should in fact yield to 
subsequent return in the short term and even after earnings announcement.  
Also, Tetlock (2007) has examined whether the information relative to management 
discussion12 is incremental regarding the firm’s characteristics such as size and analyst followers. 
                                                          
11
 Stock market reactions to news and no news.  
12
 This strategy requires investors to assess whether the nonfinancial information is favourable or 
unfavourable in examining returns. This study looked at the frequency of positive versus negative words in 
the SEC disclosures. Findings show that results are significant in a short-term window and can be exploited 
by investors willing to earn subsequent returns.  
  
35 
 
The change in information appears to be weaker for value firms than for firms with positive 
earnings surprises; therefore investors willing to benefit from this market mispricing can earn 
subsequent returns. 
Thus, the overreaction to information is a challenge to the efficient market hypothesis. 
Individuals react differently to the flow of news as they have different beliefs when it comes to 
make a decision. In other words, heavier weights will be assigned depending on the individuals.   
1.2.3 Industry momentum 
Academic researchers have exposed an intermediate momentum effect in US stock 
returns and attributed it to an industry effect, suggesting that strong (weak) industry 
performance is followed by strong (weak) industry performance over a period of months. Here 
we are clearly suggesting that investor can benefit from an industry effect. 
Fama and French (1996) highlighted that a stock-specific returns momentum strategy 
should be more profitable than a total return momentum strategy and that the profitability of the 
momentum strategy cannot be fully explained by the cross-sectional variability or as a reward for 
being part of an industry risk. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) have considered the momentum 
effect in the industry components of stock returns – the industry components account for much 
of the momentum anomaly – and their results found strong evidence of the industry momentum 
effect even after controlling for microstructure effects and individual stock momentum and even 
after taking into account the cross-section dispersion. Similarly, Lewellen (2002) tested 
momentum strategies in terms of return regarding the role of the industry sector, the size and 
the book to market factors, suggesting that the three factors exhibit strong momentum.  
Therefore, the industry momentum effect should be considered when analyzing firms; in 
fact, by combining the momentum and industry effect investors can better identify stocks to buy 
to take advantage of the expected trends.  
Also, different studies in the literature suggest that value and momentum strategies 
might be dependent on each other.  
Asness et al. (1997) suggested that value and momentum strategies might be dependent 
on each other by examining value strategies among stocks that have exhibited strong 
momentum. Value strategies appear to be negatively correlated with momentum strategies and 
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both are positively correlated with return, advising that value should work better if momentum is 
held constant and vice versa.  
Bird and Whitaker (2003) have interrogated the success of a combination between value 
and momentum strategies and found such kind of strategy capable of outperforming the market. 
For instance, they examined the performance of value and momentum strategy in the European 
markets over the period from January 1990 to June 2002 and revealed astonishing abnormal 
returns.  
In summary, investors can try to add an effect to their momentum strategy when they are under 
the decision-making process.  
1.2.4 Buy back 
Empirical studies have expressed the motivation to understand evidence supporting the 
share buyback.  
Vermaelen (1981) studied 131 buyback offers and attributed that positive share market 
reaction to the information was a signal whereby the managers of the firms try to convince 
shareholders that the shares of the company are undervalued. 
Stein (1996) claimed that, when a company’s stock is mispriced, a manager can issue 
overvalued stock or buy back undervalued equity. When stock prices are above fundamentals, 
rational managers of equity-dependent firms think it more attractive to issue equity, whereas, 
when stock prices are below fundamental values, managers of equity-dependent firms do not 
invest, because, for them, investment requires the issuance of stock at a price below their 
expectations. MacDonald (1993) has disputed that the stock prices reflect the future stream of 
dividends and asked whether a long-run relationship exists between stock prices and 
fundamentals. It is well known in the industry that firms facing large capital expenditure to 
finance new and existing opportunities may pay no dividend for several years; also, it is claimed 
that managers might manipulate the stock price of their company before issuing buyback shares.  
Ikenberry et al. (1995) found that stock prices rise on the announcements of share 
repurchases and then continue to drift in the same direction in the following years.  
Recently, Wang and Johnson (2009) stated that, when a management team is issuing a 
share buyback announcement, investors should deal with the idea that the company is displaying 
promising earnings. However, this practice is perceived by the market as a support for the stock 
price.  
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1.3 The accruals anomaly 
 
A number of empirical studies have compared the benefits of accrual income with those 
of cash flows. By definition, accruals represent liabilities and non-cash-based assets; this account 
includes accounts payable, accounts receivable, goodwill, future tax liability and future interest 
expense.  
Sloan (1996) is certainly among the pioneers giving an extensive explanation of the 
accruals anomaly, even if, previously, Dechow (1994) compared income directly with cash flow, 
showing that accrual income more closely measures firm performance as reflected in stock 
return. Moreover, Dechow et al. (1998) showed that accrual income is a better predictor of future 
cash flows than current cash flows.  
Also, Sloan (1996) suggested that firms with high accruals earn lower returns on average 
than firms with low accruals and claimed that earning driven by positive accruals earnings (i.e., 
profits are greater than cash flow from operations) is a bad signal of future profitability and 
returns. As stated: “Firms with relatively high (low) levels of accruals experience negative 
(positive) future abnormal stock returns that are concentrated around future earnings 
announcement” (p.290, Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows 
about Future Earnings?). 
One objective of this part of the chapter is to understand the role of accruals in producing 
earnings. As Dechow (1994) stated: “The primary role of accruals is to overcome problems with 
measuring firm performance when firms are in continuous operation” (p.4, Accounting Earnings 
and Cash Flows as Measures of Firm Performance: The Role of Accounting Accruals). 
Hence, Fairfield et al. (2003) examined whether accruals are a component of growth in 
net operating assets and a component of profitability by suggesting that one year ahead return 
on assets is negatively associated with accruals and growth in net operating assets: “If the 
overvaluation of accruals relative to cash flows documented in Sloan (1996) is attributable to the 
market’s misunderstanding of the incremental effect on one year ahead ROA (return on assets) of 
growth in net operating assets, then we would expect to find a similar overvaluation of growth in 
long-term net operating assets” (p.355, Accrued Earnings and Growth: Implications for Future 
Profitability and Market Mispricing). Thus, one of the primary results is that investors tend to 
overvalue the implications of accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets.  
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Zhang (2007) investigated whether accruals capture fundamental investment in working 
capital. Covering the period 1964 to 2003, he documented that high-growth firms tend to 
generate low stock returns in the following years, suggesting that investors overestimate the 
continuing performance of growth firms. Also, Zhang found that accruals co-vary with growth 
components such as growth in the number of employees, external financing, and cash sales 
growth, suggesting that accruals capture fundamental investment information. 
We follow our discussion with Yu (2005), who has figured out that excluding cash flow 
from a model linking return and accruals creates an omitted variable problem. This same omitted 
problem has been confirmed by Livnat and Santicchia (2006), who have detected similar results 
whether using annual or quarterly data when examining accruals. Similarly, Gerard et al. (2009) 
inspected the interaction between operating cash flow, earnings, accruals and their association 
with subsequent stock returns; they reveal that operating cash flow and accruals are negatively 
correlated with subsequent returns and suggest that firms with negative cash flow and negative 
accruals are a key driver of the asymmetric performance of accruals and cash flow strategies.  
Mashruwala et al. (2006) advanced that the presence of arbitrage risk limits the ability 
and desire for institutional industries to fully implement the accruals strategy. “Even if smart 
arbitrageurs were to understand the implications of accruals for future earnings, they are likely to 
be constrained by excessive exposure to idiosyncratic volatility and transaction costs to eliminate 
the mispricing related to accruals” (p.5, Why is the Accrual Anomaly not Arbitraged Away? The 
Role of Idiosyncratic Risk and Transaction Costs).  
Therefore, one possible reason why the accruals strategy earns subsequent returns is 
because investors naively focus on earnings. In fact, investors fail to fully price the differing 
implications of the accruals and cash flow and overweight the accruals anomalies of current 
earnings when trying to forecast earnings and, in consequence, when this accrual falls investors 
are surprised about future earnings announcements and subsequent returns correspond to price 
adjustment. This has been confirmed by Xie (2001) when he appraised that the market tends to 
overestimate accruals, even if Khan (2008) suggested that accruals are not mispriced and not 
misunderstood by market participants. 
It has long been known that accruals tend to be reversed, hence Houge and Loughran 
(2000) pointed out that this suggests a natural earnings quality trade; for this reason, LaFond et 
al. (2005) explored whether investors price accruals quality. They stated: “Accruals quality tells 
investors about the mapping of accounting earnings into cash flows” (p.296, The Market Pricing of 
  
39 
 
Accruals Quality), and suggested that investors being able to distinguish good quality accruals 
from poor quality accruals generally associated with larger costs of debt13 will earn abnormal 
returns.  
Accordingly, Chan et al. (2006) focused on accruals as a potential indicator related to 
earnings quality for future stock returns. They explored reasons why accruals might be linked with 
subsequent returns by providing evidence that a firm facing difficulties in generating sales will 
experience a build-up in inventories, hence the components that accruals increase early might be 
a sign that sales growth is slowing.  
Similarly, Richardson et al. (2006) aimed at examining whether the accrual component of 
earnings is attributable to temporary accounting distortions that could arise from accrual 
estimation error and concluded that accounting distortions could be a significant explanation for 
the diminution of the accruals components and that those distortions would be the results of 
some intentional manipulation by managers. As a result, Kothari et al. (2006) investigated 
whether managers of overvalued firms are more likely to revise accruals components upwards to 
carry the overvaluation. They stated: “One of the predictions of the theory is that overvalued 
firms’ managers attempt to boost their firm’s reported performance to meet investor 
expectations” (p.1, Agency Theory of Overvalued Equity as an Explanation for the Accrual 
Anomaly).  
In another way, Pincus et al. (2007) cross-examined whether the accruals anomaly is 
related to country differences in accounting and institutional structures and found the occurrence 
to be present in countries with common law and in countries allowing an extensive use of 
accruals. Indeed, in the 90s, Fama and French (1998) provided evidence that the accruals anomaly 
is likely to occur in countries sharing the same principle in law. In other words, the accruals 
anomaly characterized by stock markets overweighting accrual is present in only four countries: 
Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. Their persistence can be explained by the presence of some 
barriers to arbitrage, and it is more likely to see the appearance of the anomaly in countries 
where the capital markets are considered most efficient and one of the possible reasons given 
might be the focus on earnings by investors in those countries.   
Therefore, Gerard et al. (2009) came upon a hypothesis that accruals would perhaps 
perform better during periods of high sentiment14 and consequently poorly during periods of low 
                                                          
13
 Firms with the best accrual quality enjoy a 126 basis point lower cost of debt than firms with a poor 
accrual quality  
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sentiment, in contrast with a cash flow strategy which performs poorly during periods of high 
sentiment and well during periods of low sentiment. Similarly, Ali and Gurun (2009) scrutinised 
the effect of investors’ sentiment on accruals anomaly and accruals management by claiming that 
small stocks mispricing per unit of accruals is greater in high sentiment periods in contrast with 
low sentiment ones. 
Finally, Wei and Xie (2008) advocated a strategy where investors can earn subsequent 
returns by using the accruals and capital investment after adjusting for the Fama-French three 
risk factors. We believe this strategy is a re-adaptation of Rangan’s (1998) work, which 
investigated whether accruals and capital investment capture the same components. If managers 
expect the firm’s demand to be high they will build up the production capacity and inventory. 
“Building up production capacity required an increase in capital investment and building up 
inventory requires an increase in accruals because inventory is a component of current accruals” 
(p.1, Empirical Evidence on Capital Investment, Growth Options, and Security Returns). Each 
component is assessed to see if individually it provides new information to affect prices, and the 
outcome propounded that the accruals component and the capital investment component are 
distinct from each other. In fact, they recommended a strong capital investment effect on 
accruals and inversely a strong accruals effect on capital investment. As a trading strategy, when 
forming their portfolio they found that a trading strategy consisting of buying firms in the lowest 
total accruals quintiles and the lowest capital investment and simultaneously shorting firms in the 
highest total accruals quintiles and the highest capital investment can lead investors to a 15.35% 
characteristic-adjusted return per year and 12% per year risk-adjusted return.  
Recently, it has been stated among the literature that the accruals components seems to 
be disappearing. For example, Green et al. (2011) studied whether the accruals anomaly is still 
existent, and suggested that the accruals anomaly has deteriorated in the US stock market to the 
point that it is not positive anymore. Similarly, Mashruwala et al. (2006) examined whether the 
accruals anomaly can still earn abnormal returns and found that returns are no longer positive. 
They suggested that one of the possible reasons behind the accruals anomaly no longer being 
positive is that the strategy has been overused by hedge fund managers. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
14 Gerard et al. (2009) found that market sentiment is an important factor in distinguishing stock 
performance of financially distressed firms for investors and came upon an example by saying that when 
sentiment is high investors seem to be optimistic about the returns of a financially distressed company 
whereas when sentiment is low investors are pessimistic about the returns of a financially distressed 
company. 
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1.3.1 The q theory  
Wu et al. (2010) referred to the q theory to understand the accrual anomaly by arguing 
that firms adjust their accruals in response to discount rate changes15. As stated in their paper: 
“When the discount rate falls, more investment projects become profitable, increasing accruals, 
and future returns decrease on average because the lower discount rate means lower expected 
returns going forward. When the discount rate rises, fewer investment projects become 
profitable, decreasing accruals, and future returns increase on average because the higher 
discount rate means higher expected returns going forward” (p.178, The Q-theory Approach to 
Understanding the Accrual Anomaly). In a similar manner, Polk and Sapienza (2009), using the 
Tobin’s q theory, reported a form of mispricing in the market by focusing on discretionary 
accruals to measure a firm’s level of abnormal cash earnings. Firms with high discretionary 
accruals have a relatively low stock of returns in the future and in consequence are overpriced. 
Also, the authors reviewed the relationship between investment16 and future stock return. 
Bakke and Whited (2010) studied the effect of the stock market on investment by using 
the variation in Tobin’s q in their model. By using their model, they try to identify characteristics 
of the firms that use external information in stock prices as well as those that exploit stock 
market mispricing. 
Overall, accruals have become a major component in accounting as they increase the 
amount of information contained in a company when analyzing financial statements and they are 
a major strategy used by practitioners.  
1.4 The value premium 
1.4.1 Debt capacity 
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of announcements of debt capacity changes 
on stock prices. In efficient markets, this should result in a change in the firm’s value and 
consequently impact the stock prices.  
                                                          
15 A higher discount rate implies less profitable investments and lower accruals while a lower discount rate 
implies more profitable investments and higher accruals. 
16
 Polk and Sapienza (2009) said if a firm is misallocating its resources due to market misevaluation, then 
subsequent investment should predict risk-adjusted returns, and found that firms with high (low) 
investment have low (high) stock returns on average. Also, this effect appears to be more significant among 
firms with higher R&D intensity or higher share turnover. 
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For instance, Bernanke et al. (1996) used the financial accelerator effect and the credit 
multiplier of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to test the hypothesis that high debt capacity firms are 
more likely to have higher exposure to risk associated with changes in internal and external funds 
for investment.  
Therefore, if this risk can be priced by the market an investor can benefit from this 
strategy to earn subsequent returns; thus, investors should expect high debt capacity firms to 
earn higher returns than low debt capacity firms.  
Recently, Hahn and Lee (2009) developed and tested a model on the differential effect of 
debt capacity on stock returns across financially constrained and unconstrained firms and found 
that debt capacity is only significant in determining stock return among financially constrained 
firms. The authors stated: “For financially constrained firms whose investments are below the 
first best level, higher debt capacity implies a higher sensitivity of collateralized investment to 
changes in the availability of internal funds: A marginal increase in internal funds will support 
more borrowing and investment for those firms that invest in assets with higher collateral value” 
(p.892, Financial Constraints, Debt Capacity and the Cross Section of Stock Returns). 
These findings support the efficient market hypothesis because they indicate that stock 
prices react to changes in accounting variables, in this case a change in debt capacity.  
1.4.2 Corporate events 
Several studies have examined the impact of corporate events on stock prices and how 
the market impacts such kind of events.  
The reaction to mergers is that the stock of the firms being acquired increases in line with 
the premium offered by the acquiring firm, whereas the stock of the acquiring firm decreases 
because investors think that they overpaid for the stocks. Smith (1986) gives an extensive review 
of the capital acquisition process. Also, recently, Gulen et al. (2008) examined the firm level asset 
investment effects, moreover, corporate events associated with asset expansion such as 
acquisitions, public equity offerings, public debt offerings, and bank loan initiations. The authors 
suggested that corporate events tend to be followed by periods of low return whereas events 
associated with assets contraction such as spinoffs, share repurchases, debt repayments, and 
dividend initiations are associated with abnormal returns.  
Also, Livdan et al. (2009) re-examined external financing anomalies such as firms raising 
capital earn lower returns compared to firms distributing capital and examined the frequency of 
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equity issuance. The results suggest that firms conducting equity offering underperform firms 
that do not issue.  
In summary, most studies found a positive or a negative impact on stock returns because 
of corporate events.  
1.4.3 Financially distressed firms 
A couple of studies have examined the importance of a firm’s distress risk factor and 
stock returns, and revealed that bankruptcy is not systematically rewarded by higher returns and 
in consequence the size and book to market factors are unlikely to be related to bankruptcy risk. 
Dichev (1998) tested the importance of the firm’s distress risk factor and its relation to 
size and book to market and provided evidence about the relationship between bankruptcy risk 
and systematic risk. As mentioned: “Simple correlations reveal that bankruptcy risk is negatively 
related to firm size and positively related to book to market. Thus, bankruptcy risk could 
potentially account for the size and book to market effects if bankruptcy risk is a systematic risk 
priced into returns” (p.1132, Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?). The study also explored 
the risk of bankruptcy by using two well-known models in the literature, the Altman Z-score 
(1968) and the Ohlson O-score (1980), to study whether bankruptcy risk is a systematic risk priced 
in subsequent security returns.  
In addition, Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) decomposed the relationship between 
stock prices and corporate capital expenditures and found a strong relationship between stock 
price and investment to be more significant for certain type of firms such as firms subject to debt, 
financial distress and information asymmetry, and suggested that firms with more leverage, firms 
with less cash flow, firms with lower dividends and firms with lower interest coverage are more 
sensitive in their investment decisions to stock prices. 
Campbell et al. (2008) documented the determinants of corporate failure and the pricing 
of financially distressed stocks using US data over the period 1963 to 2003. They presented 
evidence that failure risk cannot be adequately explained by the measure of distance to default 
inspired by Merton’ (1974). Also, they show that stocks with a high risk of failure tend to deliver 
low average returns. Similarly, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) examined the relationship between 
book to market, distress risk and stock returns. Their findings showed that the low average 
returns of firms with high distress risk are driven by the poor stock price performance of these 
low book to market firms and suggest that firms with high distress risk exhibit the largest return 
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reversals around earnings announcements and that book to marked effect is largest in small firms 
with low analyst coverage.  
Vassalou and Xing (2004) documented and calculated distance to default and found 
evidence that distressed stocks with low distance to default have higher returns, but this 
evidence is restricted for small value stocks. 
Playing on financially distressed firms has always been part of the decision-making 
process of investors as, if you are willing to take more risk, subsequent returns can be earned 
from this strategy.  
1.4.4 Bid-Ask value strategy 
The results of several studies have examined the response of stock return with the spread 
in the Bid-Ask – essentially the difference in price between the highest price that a buyer is willing 
to pay and the lowest for which the seller is willing to sell.  
Studies by Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest that the effect of the bid-ask spread is an 
important component to take into account when investors want to exploit the potential to earn 
abnormal returns by exploiting such anomaly.  
Morse and Ushman (1983) showed significant increases in the bid-ask spread and 
revealed that the higher a stock’s spread the higher its return. Following this strategy, Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) showed during 1961-1980 that the monthly excess return of a stock with a 
1.5% spread is 0.45% greater than that of a stock with a 0.5% spread, but the monthly excess 
return of a stock with a 5% spread is only 0.09% than that of a stock with a 4% spread, and 
supported the idea that the spread is an important determinant of stock return. The authors 
concluded that stock returns are an increasing and concave function of the spread. The higher 
yields required on higher spread stocks give firms an incentive to increase the liquidity of their 
securities, thus reducing their cost of capital.  
In summary, stocks exhibiting a large change in stock price in response to a new 
information can help investors to benefit from this overreaction. Overall, studies are suggesting 
that change in the bid-ask spreads is more recurrent in the short term, especially with regard to 
negative information, allowing investors to benefit from inefficiency in the market.  
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1.5 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, over the past few years the market has demonstrated some form of 
inefficiency, in contradiction to the efficient market hypothesis theory. The theory contends that 
stock price fully reflects information and implies that no group of investors can have access to 
private information that will allow them to experience above-average returns. From the 
numerous studies reported in our first chapter we have tried to give investors some brief insights 
into the previous research and on the different anomalies exploitable out of the market. Thus, 
when forming their investment decisions, sophisticated investors can benefit from superior 
above-average returns based on those anomalies. We introduce in our next chapter a new 
approach which has proven to be efficient as it appears that markets are inefficient.  
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Chapter two – The use of Piotroski’s 
model in the current environment 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The nature of this thesis lies in applying a simple fundamental analysis strategy developed 
by Joseph Piotroski, who is an Associate Professor of Accounting at Stanford University’s 
Graduate School of Business. Prior to this position, Piotroski was an Associate Professor of 
Accounting at the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business. His research focuses 
mainly on how market participants use financial statement information when forming a decision. 
He has published research papers in numerous scholarly journals such as the Accounting Review, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and The Journal of Finance 
and he is part of the Editorial Advisory Boards of The Accounting Review, The Journal of 
Accounting Research, and The Journal of Accounting and Economics.  
When screening stocks in high book to market i.e. in order to select an individual stock as 
an investment, investors need a good source of prospective investments, Piotroski (2000) argued 
that stocks are suffering more often than not from financial distress. His answer to this was that 
the incorporation of a simple set of financial health checks including relevant variables that focus 
on three areas of a firm’s financial condition can help an investor to shift the “distribution of the 
returns”. The three areas are: profitability, which provides information about the firm’s ability to 
generate funds internally, the financial leverage/liquidity of the firm designed to measure 
changes in capital structure and the firm’s ability to meet future debt service obligations and, 
finally, through performance signals such as operating efficiency.  
The model consists of a set of binary financial tests based on profitability, leverage, 
liquidity and operating efficiency, as mentioned above, where the higher the score, the better the 
investment is said to be. A stock that passes all the tests would be an excellent investment whilst 
a stock with a score of zero or one should be avoided. With the exception, as reported in the 
literature, that you decide to short those stocks.  
Piotroski’s so-called F-score was not based on some optimized form of backtesting, rather 
it was a reflection of what prior academic research and practitioners had identified as helping to 
boost future returns. This chapter is looking at applying the strategy developed by Piotroski 
(2000) to a universe of stocks such as the S&P 150017 and analyzing further if this strategy helps in 
                                                          
17
 The S&P 1500 combines three leading indices, the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400 and the S&P SmallCap 
600, to cover approximately 90% of the US market capitalization. It is designed for investors seeking to 
replicate the performance of the US equity market.  
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distinguishing winners from losers in that particular universe. Also, we intend to rebuild the 
backtesting and deal with data snooping.  
The origin of the idea was developed during the researcher’s second year as a PhD 
student, which was spent working for an investment bank as an intern. With the growing 
importance in the role of equities to both the international and local investors, the selection of an 
attractive stock and the ability to ensure the performance return could be a reliable investing tool 
in the selection process of a portfolio and will give a competitive edge over other investors in the 
market.  
The study was run using advanced programming languages such as SAS18 to extract data 
from Compustat19 and CRSP. Compustat is a database that contains US fundamental statement 
and market information on active and inactive publicly held companies. It provides insight into a 
vast range of income statements, balance sheets, statements of cash flows and other data items. 
The database allows us to compare current and prior years’ results on a comparable basis. Annual 
history is available for most companies back to 1950 and quarterly history back to 1962, with 
monthly market history back to 1962. In contrast, the CRSP database contains information on the 
returns, events, beta, and volume data for the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock markets.  
Using relevant data variables, the F-score was estimated using fiscal year data for the 
period ranging from 30/06/1991 to 31/05/2013. Companies can close their fiscal period in any 
month of a calendar year. A fiscal year is an accounting period of twelve months and a company’s 
fiscal year corresponds to the calendar year in which it has the most overlap in months. As an 
example, if a company’s fiscal year-end is March 2001, the data in its annual report represents 
the company’s operations for nine months in 2000 and three months in 2001. Therefore, the data 
would be classified as fiscal 2000 data. In contrast, a calendar year is a period of one year 
beginning with January 1 and ending with December 31. In this research, fiscal years ending 
between January and May are assigned to the previous calendar year whereas fiscal years ending 
between June and December are assigned to the current calendar year. Using the variables 
DataDate20 and fyear21 under Compustat we were able to determine a firm’s fiscal year-end.  
                                                          
18
 SAS, also called Statistical Analysis Software System, is an integrated applications system that gives 
researchers strategic control over their data processing and make possible an unlimited variety of 
applications. SAS is also a powerful programming language that enables researchers to access, manage, 
analyze and present their data.   
19
 Compustat offers restated data that allows for comparability between current and prior years’ results on 
a comparable basis. 
20
 This item indicates the time period to which each item applies.  
21
 Data Year – Fiscal. 
  
49 
 
Here, we wanted to give some brief insight of value investing which was initiated by 
Graham and Dodd (1934), where they argued that out of favour stocks are often under-priced in 
the market and therefore “Intelligent investors” may make a profit by identifying those 
companies. Over the years, a number of leading investors such as Warren Buffet22, Mario 
Gabelli23, and Seth Klarman24 among others have followed the rules influenced by the school of 
investment. Graham and Dodd (1934) argued that, while markets were efficient overall, pockets 
of inefficiency existed. They believed that opportunities for mispricing were most likely to happen 
in the smaller stocks.  
Graham and Dodd (1934) showed that it was possible to find companies that were under-
priced in the market, often because investors were too focused on short-term news. They also 
developed the concept of “margin of safety” where investors should try to always buy shares well 
below their intrinsic value.  
Value strategy is therefore not new and one should not avoid investing in growth stocks, 
as they tend to offer decent dividend yields which remain attractive in a low interest rates 
environment. Growth stocks should be able to do relatively well against a low growth 
backdrop/downturn; also, even in economic storms those stocks tend to have higher margins, 
earn higher returns for shareholders and have stronger positions. However, such companies are 
usually a lot more expensive in valuation terms but in a low growth environment they could 
continue to lead the way. 
These days, investors are facing a stock picking paradise, where the apparition of stock 
picking among practitioners is becoming interestingly consistent in their investment process. The 
stock-picking approach looks at the quality of a company’s business model, what is driving cash 
flow, sustainability of growth and margin expansion under management decisions. Investors 
diversify portfolios by growth driver, investment theme, investing in both value and growth stocks 
and look at market capitalization.  
The aim is to diversify their basket to the point that, no matter the market direction, a 
portfolio will produce positive returns over the long term. It is therefore not surprising that 
                                                          
22
 He is an American investor widely considered one of the most successful investors of the 20
th
 century; he 
is also the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway and consistently ranks among the world’s wealthiest people.  
23
 He is an American investor, founder, chairman and CEO of Gabelli Asset Management, a $30 billion global 
investment firm. Gabelli is said to be a leading proponent of the Graham-Dodd school of security and a 
pioneer in the application of Graham and Dodd’s principles.  
24
 He is an American billionaire, founder of the Baupost Group, a private investment partnership, and the 
author of a book entitled: “Margin of Safety: Risk-Averse Value Investing Strategies for the Thoughtful 
Investor”.  
  
50 
 
distinguishing winners from losers has attracted much attention from financial agents in the 
market. Over the past few years, researchers and practitioners have claimed the idea that being 
able to find a company that is trading at a discount to intrinsic value will generate higher returns 
(i.e., the actual value of a company may or may not be the same as its current market value).  
Nevertheless, investors make buy and sell decisions on the basis of the current price of 
the securities compared with the perceived values of those securities. Over the long term, 
investors tend to believe that stocks will reflect the underlying businesses. Also, investors should 
be cautious when performing their investment ideas as to whether or not the stock price 
fluctuations will reflect the underlying businesses.  
According to circumstances, the investment process is therefore to discover and purchase 
stocks which are undervalued and hold these until they cease to be a “good value”; successful 
identification of mispriced stocks is generally possible by personal study of relevant information 
or by seeking out expert advice in the form of investment as an advisory service. The same 
approach has been formulated in this research using financial statement variables providing 
information that might help the ordinary security holder to formulate buy and sell decisions. The 
idea is to provide a better service when it comes to forming a portfolio.  
In the US, higher quality stocks based on the Piotroski measure are relatively inexpensive 
versus the normal premium they attract. Market turbulence and rising doubts as to the 
sustainability and therefore duration of the current economic downswing has increased investor 
interest in lower risk, higher quality equities where buying low versus high beta stocks has proved 
to be an interesting investment style. In fact, extreme levels of volatility, typically driven by 
macro-orientated events, create a market that becomes highly susceptible to sudden changes in 
investor sentiment and market reversals.  
In consequence, the motivation of this chapter was to predict a company that can create 
a stronger value when forming a portfolio. If effective, as mentioned by Piotroski (2000), “The 
differentiation of eventual winners from losers should shift the distribution of the returns earned 
by a value investor” (p. 2, Value Investing: The Use of Historical Financial Statement Information 
to Separate Winners from Losers). After reproducing the F-score, results are consistent with 
previous findings and by using this strategy an investor can achieve superior performance in 
distinguishing US stocks.  
Overall, Piotroski’s model achieves superior performance when used to distinguish 
winners from losers in a universe. This indicates that the F-score is a promising investment 
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strategy tool in evaluating companies. In summary, here we intend to apply the Piotroski F-score 
approach by applying the strategy on a bigger universe and by not limiting our screening process 
on only high book-to-market firms. Also we intend to update the backtesting as part of our 
contribution to the literature. 
Finally, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the existing empirical 
evidence of value investing in the US and overseas and financial statement analysis, and defines 
the nine financial signals used by Piotroski to differentiate firms. Section 3 presents the data used 
and discusses the procedures and methods adopted. The results are reported in section 4, which 
gives an insight into a buy and hold strategy, the data migration stability of the Piotroski model 
and, finally, analyzes the results of each F-score in terms of returns to see if they are sustainable 
over time – after plotting some graphs we are looking to find a steady line.  
2.2 Literature review 
 
The literature review intends to lay a foundation for the current research. We set the 
chapter within a research context consisting of relevant research studies directly related to the 
use of the Piotroski model using working papers as well as articles from different academic 
journals of research relevant to the subject, and try to link to related ideas over the past few 
years.  
Following a chronological approach, even if this is not all-inclusive, we firstly tend to 
group by relevance of the topic when it comes to describing the nature of that subject.  
Fischer Black25 (1971) stated: “The random walk theory of stock price behaviour is that 
the past history of stock price movements, and the history of stocks trading volume, does not 
contain any information that will allow the investor to do consistently better than a buy and hold 
strategy in managing a portfolio” (p. 30, Implications of the Random Walk Hypothesis for Portfolio 
Management). 
David N. Dreman26 (1977) emphasized the random walk theory by mentioning: “The 
efficient market hypothesis is for the birds and what random walk fails to take into account are 
the psychological influences that play a major and often harmful in professional investment 
                                                          
25
 An American economist best known for his applications of the Black-Scholes equation. 
26
 Dreman is an investor and chairman of Dreman Value management. He has published many journal 
articles and has written four books.  
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decisions. Random walk is based on the hypothesis that we are basically human computers with 
consistent rationality. But there is tremendous evidence that we do not behave that way at all” 
(p. 15, Psychology of the Stock Market: Investment Strategy beyond Random Walk).  
2.2.1 The premise of value investing 
2.2.1.1 High book to market literature review 
The above quotations appear to have been reflected in the study of Dreman (1977), 
where he decided to ignore the random walk theory in his model and to invest solely in 
companies with a solid financial statement and the lowest price to earnings PEs. When the PE 
moves up relative to the market average industry/sector, the company should be sold and the 
money should be reinvested in the most neglected stocks. According to Dreman, buying with the 
lowest PE could lead to better annual returns than buying stocks that have a PE in the top 10% of 
the market.  
Furthering the discussion, Rosenberg et al. (1985) reported the statistical significance of 
two strategies: firstly they showed that a strategy that buys high book-to-market and sells stock 
with low price to book to market firms can generate on average higher expected returns, and the 
second strategy consists of a simple “specific return reversal” strategy. The success of these two 
strategies in detecting market inefficiencies as stated by the authors suggests that there are still 
potential profits to be made out of the market. 
Discussion was reawakened by Fama and French (1992) in a study where they argued that 
the cross section of stock returns could be explained by three risk factors related to the return of 
stocks. For instance, an overall market factor and factors related to firm size/market capitalization 
and book to market equity. Fama and French demonstrated that used alone size, PE, leverage and 
book to market equity have explanatory power.   
The study has been realized on all NYSE stocks in June of each year from 1963 to 1991; 
data were extracted from the CRSP database. Stocks were than ranked and the median NYSE size 
was used to split NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ stocks into two groups, “small” and “big”. Then stocks 
were split into three book to market equity groups, bottom (30%), middle (40%) and top (30%), 
where they define book to common equity as the Compustat book value of stockholder’s equity, 
plus balance sheet deferred tax and investment tax credit minus the book value of preferred 
stocks. The results confirm the same hypothesis, that high book to market strategies outperform 
the market.  
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Lakonishok et al. (1994) presented in their study a contrarian strategy on the US market 
from 1968 to 1994. The contrarian strategies based on ratios such as price to book ratios or past 
turnover growth were not fundamentally more risky and they demonstrated that, because the 
stock market is not efficient, financial ratios have predictive power because they are able to 
capture systematic errors from investors’ expectations about future returns. Haugen (1995) 
argued that the value premium arises because the market undervalues distressed stocks and 
overvalues growth stocks. In the same manner, Chan et al. (1991) contributed to the finance 
literature by providing some evidence on the cross-sectional returns in the Japanese market: that 
earnings, size, book to market ratios and cash flow can help to reveal the relationship between 
fundamental variables and returns and, accordingly, found strong evidence for the superior 
performance of value investment strategy.  
Clearly, as demonstrated previously by Haugen (1995), if an investor identified those 
stocks that have performed poorly in the market due to overreaction to poor news, this same 
investor should buy those stocks and hold them long enough for the market to react and 
therefore readjust its decisions. This theory follows the evidence suggested by Debont and Thaler 
(1985) that the stock market consistently overreacts to unexpected bad news and in consequence 
someone being able to form a portfolio of eventual “losers” will outperform a portfolio of 
eventual “winners”. 
Thus, one possibility is the market has a behavioural bias towards growth, for which it 
tends to overpay. This bias can be explained partly by the hypothesis that the market extrapolates 
past trends into the future and thus expects the low past growth of value stocks to persist. As the 
market cannot clearly predict with accuracy the turning points in the long-term growth of a 
company, value stocks tend to provide positive surprises, and in consequence outperform the 
market. LaPorta (1996) found that investors’ expectations about future earnings are more than 
often too extreme; this hypothesis is supported by empirical findings based on the forecasts of 
American analysts. Stocks with high earnings expectations tend to underperform stocks with low 
earnings expectations. Similar trends can be observed in current year’s earnings estimates, with 
downward revisions for growth stocks much higher than for the rest of the market. Bias towards 
growth can be explained by looking at the work in the financial services industry.   
In fact, it is easier for an analyst or a broker to recommend growth stocks over value 
stocks to a portfolio manager as the perceived risk would not be the same; the hypothesis applies 
in the same manner to fund managers who recommend stocks with liquidity. The idea being that 
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across this chain of participants everyone has to justify him or herself about the investment 
decisions made.  
2.2.1.2 Earnings surprise literature review 
The literature on earnings surprise is more recent. For example, Chan et al. (1996) 
examined whether the forecasted returns based on past returns is due to the market’s under-
reaction to information; they suggest that this outperformance is the product of an under-
reaction by analysts’ consensus to earnings surprises. Similarly, Chan and Chen (1991) postulated 
that the earnings prospects of firms are associated with a risk factor in returns: firms that have 
poor prospects signalled by low stock prices and high book to market ratios have higher expected 
returns than firms with strong prospects. Fama and French (1995) tested for a relationship 
between the risk factors in return and earnings. To demonstrate this relationship they discussed 
the hypothesis by testing whether or not there are earnings shocks in size and book to market, 
and tested whether there are traces in returns of common factors in earnings. However, their 
results were not entirely successful, finding that the market and size factors in earnings do not 
help to explain the change in returns also no evidence has been reported regarding the book to 
market factor in earnings; and suggesting that the failure might be partly due to some noisy 
measures of shocks to expected earnings.  
Also, it should be noted that analysts tend to be biased in favour of companies they cover 
due to some pressure from the management of those companies and are thus less reluctant to 
downgrade their estimates following a negative surprise than to upgrade them following good 
news. For example, Bernard and Thomas (1989) studied whether there is an explanation for post-
earnings drift and explained that the price response to new information is delayed. 
This delay might occur because there is a lack of available information to be assimilated 
or because certain costs such as transaction costs exceed gains from an immediate exploitation of 
the information. Another explanation is attributed to a misspecification of the CAPM27 and a 
failure to adjust abnormal returns fully for risks. Chen and Zhang (1998) examined whether the 
behaviour of value stocks is the same across different countries such as the US, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. To examine this, they classified firms by size and book to market 
and identified the risk associated with value firms (e.g., dividend is used to analyze the financial 
distress of a company, financial leverage to measure the financial risk and earnings uncertainty to 
                                                          
27
 The capital asset pricing model is used to determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return of 
an asset. The CAPM was introduced by Jack Treynor, Willam Sharpe, John Lintmer and Jan Mossin 
independently working on the earlier work of Harry Markowitz on diversification and modern portfolio 
theory.  
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measure the future cash flow risk) and showed that value stocks offer considerable returns in the 
US, Japan, Hong Kong and Malaysia as a compensation for risk; results are not similar in Taiwan 
and Thailand because the spread of risk between firms is too small. The given reason for the 
results as exposed by Chen and Zhang(1998) is due to some pattern of different maturity of 
market growth rates in the different countries. For example, the US is more likely to contain a 
high proportion of distressed companies due to a stable and mature market, whilst high growth 
markets such as Thailand and Taiwan will have more firms benefiting from the expanding 
economy and therefore the risk attached to those firms is less high than the one attached to a 
mature company where investors are uncertain about the outlook. The authors argued that 
higher returns for value stocks are compensation for risks.  
Frankel and Lee (1998) examined analyst earnings forecasts to see whether or not they 
are useful to predict the cross section in stock returns in the US. They used consensus earnings 
forecast as a new benchmark for market expectations about future earnings and found that 
analysts tend to be over-optimistic in firms with higher past sales growth and higher price to book 
ratios; also, they showed, by contrast, that cross-sectional errors in three-year-ahead consensus 
forecasts are predictable. Dechow and Sloan (1995) found no evidence that stock prices reflect 
extrapolation of past trends in earnings and sales growth; however they found that a contrarian 
strategy can be used when looking at future earnings growth based on analysts’ forecasts. Ou and 
Penman (1989) compared the ability of price and financial statement to predict future earnings 
and found that financial statement is a good predictor of future expectations.  
Similarly, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) identified a set of financial variables to be useful in 
examining firms and examined further the relevance of those variables over earnings, also called 
the L-score, which has proven to be highly correlated to the F-score. Recently, Piotroski (2012) 
has looked at the source of return differential for value/glamour stocks and tested whether the 
prices of glamour (value) firms reflect overly optimistic (pessimistic) expectations.  
In summary, a more dynamic approach would imply the use of multiple pieces of 
information contained in the financial statements.  
Before introducing the literature review on the different uses of the F-score, we would 
like to introduce survivorship bias. One frequently raised problem in the discussion of value 
investing is the question of survivorship bias. The main idea is that heavily discounted stocks are 
more likely to disappear than the market in general as the result of bankruptcy or an acquisition. 
Thus, some value stocks which have disappeared are no longer present in most databases. It is 
  
56 
 
said that survivorship bias would lead to an overestimation of the outperformance of value 
stocks. When analyzing data it is therefore essential to include companies which are no longer 
listed. Another way of minimizing the survivorship bias is to limit one’s universe to larger 
companies, where the influence of this effect is less likely to arise. Chan et al. (1994) provide 
evidence on the existence of bias in the pricing of value and glamour stocks.  
2.2.2 Literature review regarding the F-score  
2.2.2.1 F-score literature review 
By examining fundamental statements, Piotroski (2000) developed a composite called the 
F-score to distinguish winners from losers in a market and help investors seeking returns. The 
model is measured as the sum of nine binary signals.  
When building the F-score, Piotroski suggests using four profitability measures: 1) Return on asset 
(ROA28), 2) Cash flow from operations (CFO29) and 3) ∆ ROA (current year less prior year). ROA is 
calculated as net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets whilst CFO is cash 
flow from operations divided by total assets. If ROA is positive the firm is said to be profitable, so 
the firm scores one, otherwise it gets zero. The same notion is applied to CFO. Also, in order to 
improve the profitability, Piotroski looked at the variation in ROA (∆ ROA) by simply looking at the 
year-on-year change in ROA. If the current year ROA is greater than the previous year, the firm is 
awarded a score of one, zero otherwise.  
The model compares net income before extraordinary items against cash flow from 
operations, 4) if the change in CFO is greater than the change in ROA then the firm scores one, 
otherwise it gets zero. As mentioned in different papers, most notably by Sloan (1996), who 
showed that earnings driven by positive accruals30 earnings (i.e., profits are greater than cash 
flow from operations) is a bad signal about future profitability and returns. Sloan examined 
further the nature of information contained in accruals and cash flow to see if the information is 
reflected in the price, and stated that “Firms with relatively high (low) levels of accruals 
                                                          
28
 A manager often measures the performance of a firm by the ratio of income to total assets (income is 
usually defined as earnings before interest but after taxes). This is an indicator of how profitable a company 
is relative to its total assets and gives an idea of how efficient management is at using its assets to generate 
profit. In this research we use net income before extraordinary items, which represents the net income 
before being adjusted by extraordinary items such as accounting change, discounted operations, 
extraordinary item, and taxes on extraordinary items.  
29
 Cash flow from operations does not include long-term capital or investment costs, also called operating 
costs. Cash flow can be calculated as = EBIT + Depreciation – Taxes.  
30
 On a balance sheet, an expense or asset that is recognized before it is paid. Accruals are recorded as 
liabilities or non-cash-based assets. These accounts include accounts payable, accounts receivable, 
goodwill, future tax liability and future interest expense.  
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experience negative (positive) future abnormal stock returns that are concentrated around future 
earnings announcement” (p. 290, Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash 
Flows about Future Earnings?). 
 In his demonstration, a main idea is highlighted by the fact that investors are “fixated” on 
earnings and therefore will tend to overprice or under-price stocks in which the accrual 
component is relatively high or low; this situation occurs when earnings are not fully anticipated.  
Sloan (1996) found that someone who will build a strategy of buying low levels of accruals 
and shorting stocks which are reporting relatively high accruals will achieve a return of 10.4% 
over a year, as demonstrated by Sloan (1996). Chan et al. (2007) investigated whether analysts, 
when predicting an earnings announcement, adjust their estimates either in favour of a company 
or to help managers. They argued in their article that recent US market conditions have increased 
the predisposition of analysts towards positive earnings surprises. The results accentuate the fact 
that non-negative surprises are less likely to happen in growth stocks rather than in value stocks.  
Overall, they examined how the stock markets react to earnings surprises and whether 
this growing attitude is more pronounced with growth stocks than with value stocks. The results 
concluded that analysts have a predisposition to incentives and therefore are influenced in the 
way they manage earnings and forecasts with the goal to please investors. With regard to this 
attitude, analysts are becoming “cheerleaders” in the way they recommend stocks. Potential bias 
in earnings surprise as analyst are becoming cheerleaders. 
Also, Piotroski identified three factors that would help avoid stocks running into financial 
difficulty: an increase in leverage, deterioration in liquidity or the use of external financing are 
assumed to be bad signals about financial risk. Leverage is the annual change in a company’s long-
term debt, as measured by the year-on-year change in the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
The ability to self-finance a business particularly given the current turmoil in debt markets is 
important and more often than not forgotten at the peak of an economic cycle.  
By raising external capital a firm is showing its inability to generate sufficient internal 
funds. As demonstrated by Myers and Majluf (1984), if a firm has to issue common shares to raise 
part of all the cash required to finance an investment project this is perceived as a negative sign 
by investors. The three possibilities that emanate from their articles are that a firm can finance an 
investment by issuing stocks, reducing its cash balance or even selling marketable securities. As 
stated by Myers and Majluf “The conventional rational behaviour behind holding slack (cash 
liquid assets or unused borrowing power) is that the firm does not want to have to issue stock in 
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short notice in order to pursue an investment opportunity” (p. 134, Corporate Financing and 
Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have). “Slack does not 
allow a firm to take advantage of investors by issuing only when the stocks in undervalued: if 
investors know the firm does not have to issue to invest then an attempt to issue sends a the 
wrong signals to the market “ (p. 195, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have). In fact, an attempt to issue if there is no need 
sends a wrong signal to the market. 
The results of their findings sum up the different ways for a firm to issue when it comes to 
investment decisions and are expressed below as they can be useful for investor decisions:  
 It is better to issue safe securities than risky ones. Firms should go for bonds 
when they want to raise capital.  
 Firms can build up slack by restricting the issuing of dividends; another way would 
be to issue stock when manager’s information advantage is small, otherwise 
stock price will fall.  
 Firms should not pay dividends if at a later stage they have to raise funds by 
issuing risky securities.  
 A merger can help to increase the combined value of a slack. In addition, an 
increase in long-term debt is likely to place additional constraints on the firm’s 
financial flexibility.  
Regarding the leverage/liquidity, Piotroski defined the 5) variable as FT_LEVER as equal to 
one (zero) if the firm’s leverage ratio fell (rose) in the year preceding portfolio formation. 
Piotroski is also concerned with short-term debt denoted as 6) ∆ Liquid; the measure concerns 
the short-term financing of the business and is measured as the annual change in the current 
ratio (ratio of current assets to current liabilities). A rise in the current ratio indicates the ability of 
the company to service debt costs, whilst a decline could indicate potential short-term problems. 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) examined long-run performance stocks following open market 
shares repurchase announcements for the period 1980 to 1990 and found that, for the results of 
undervaluation, value stocks experience average abnormal returns for a buy and hold strategy 
during four years of 45.3% whilst for growth stocks the repurchase of stocks is less likely to be of 
the same importance. The authors explained that a company might repurchase shares due to 
capital structure adjustments, takeover, signalling, excess cash distributions, and substitutions for 
cash dividends. When discussing why management might choose to repurchase shares, the most 
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common answer from managers is undervaluation of shares and that their shares represent a 
good investment. Despite this fact, the author’s discussed that the information behind share 
buyback is largely ignored by market participants; indeed, only 3.5% of them react to shares 
repurchases. According to them, high book to market stocks that announce share buyback are 
more likely to be truly out of favour stocks. As discussed by Lakonishok et al. (1994), not all high 
book to market firms are true out of favour firms. (True out of favour firms will show higher 
average returns compared with high book to market firms in general.)  
Also, the work of Michaely et al. (1995) analyzed when a firm is initiating the payment of 
a cash dividend or omits such a payment, signalling a change in the corporate policy. They have 
investigated the three-day reaction to initiation or omission announcements over the long term 
and found that announcement initiated with omission results in a price drop of about 7% and 
initiations are associated with a price increase of 3%.   
A  hot topic at the moment  is rights issues or seasoned equity offerings, unless the shares 
are given away for free, in which case this might not be considered as a rights issue; issuing stock 
costs the existing shareholder either in cash and/or in dilution. See for instance Loughran and 
Ritter (1995), who issued an article which examined companies issuing stock from 1970 to 1990. 
The analysis compared companies issuing “IPO” (initial public offering) and “SEO” (seasoned 
equity offering) and whether or not those companies underperform companies that are not-
issuing stocks for five years after the offering date. Their results showed that firms issuing stocks 
from 1970 to 1990 either through an IPO or SEO have been poor long-run investments for 
investors. They found that the average annual return during five years after issuing is only 5% for 
firms going through an IPO and 7% for companies going through SEO. In contrast, someone who 
would have invested in a non-issuing firm would have produced an average annual return of 12% 
per year for an IPO and 15% for SEO.  
 A deeply discounted rights issue at depressed prices might be irritating for shareholders 
given that many companies currently raise funds by issuing buyback stocks several months earlier 
at a significantly higher level. In his model, Piotroski defined the 7) EQ_OFFER as equal to one, 
zero otherwise if the firm did not issue common equity during the year of the portfolio formation 
for those stocks that issue equity. It is measured as the year-on-year change in shares. Piotroski 
highlights “The fact that these firms are willing to issue equity when their stocks prices are likely 
to be depressed highlights the poor condition that those firms are facing” (p. 9, Value Investing: 
The Use of Historical Financial Statement Information to Separate Winners from Losers). 
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Finally, Piotroski looked at the operating efficiency designed to measure changes in the 
efficiency of the firm’s operations. The model includes two simple measures of the firm’s 
operating margin, 8) Margin, which measures the year-on-year change in gross operating margin 
and the annual change in the asset turnover; and  9) Turnover, which shows how much sales 
increased relative to the size of the asset base. Increasing sales at a greater speed to the change 
in asset base implies that a firm is generating more business from existing assets rather than 
simply making acquisitions.  
Thus, F-score is the sum of the individual binary signals, F-score = F_ROA + F_CFO + 
F_ΔROA + F_ACCRUAL + F_ΔMARGIN + F_ΔTURN + F_ΔLEVER + F_ΔLIQUID + EQ_OFFER.  
For each year from 1976 to 1996 in the US equity market, Piotroski calculated the market 
value of equity, and book to market ratio at fiscal year-end. After removing all the financials for 
each fiscal year, Piotroski ranked all firms with sufficient data on Compustat to identify book to 
market quintiles and size terciles. According to Piotroski, historical data represents both the best 
and most relevant information of a firm’s financial condition. Across his review, Piotroski applies 
tests to his strategy, firstly by comparing the returns earned by a high F-score firm against the 
ones earned by a low F-score, and secondly the test compares a high F-score firm against the 
complete portfolio of all high book to market firms. The results were tested using t-statistics as 
well as implementing a bootstrapping approach to test the difference in portfolio return. The 
findings show that the mean return earned by a high book to market firm can be increased by at 
least 7.5% annually through the selection of strong high book to market firms.  
The success of this strategy is based on the ability to distinguish firms that will have high 
future performance and the market’s inability to highlight them, which gives an edge to an 
investor. In addition, Piotroski showed that a strategy that buys high F-score and sells low F-score 
will lead to a 23% annual return and the strategy appears to be robust across time. Among the 
different limitations described by Joseph Piotroski, we were able to find the potential data 
snooping bias when matching Compustat with CRSP when it comes to match the return, plus the 
translation of the different factors into binary signals could potentially eliminate useful 
information. Thirdly, Piotroski documented that less than 44% of all high book to market firms 
earn positive market-adjusted returns in the two years following the portfolio formation. 
2.2.2.2 G-score literature review 
Mohanram (2005) analyzed whether applying a simple, financial-based statement 
analysis to a high and low book to market sample can help an investor to shift its return. By 
looking at financial statements, Mohanram aimed to extrapolate earnings and future cash flow 
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profitability. Relevant signals are aggregated into a single composite, also called the G-score, 
which consists of separating winners from losers in a universe of low book to market stocks.  
The G-score consists of a set of eight criteria, tested to identify winners from losers 
among low book to market firms in terms of ex-post stock returns from 1978 to 2001. The sample 
is partitioned in a variety of ways in order to tackle the problem related to implementation, and 
results are strong among the entire partitioned sample including large firms, firms well followed, 
firms with put options and firms with a high level of liquidity. However, as mentioned by 
Mohanram this mitigates the potential to implement a long-short strategy.   
Those signals are all created using financial statements. Mohanram defined the earnings 
variability measured as the variance of a firm’s ROA, and sales variability as the variance of a 
firm’s year-over-year sales growth looking at quarterly financial statements over the past four 
years and adding the constraint that at least six quarters’ information is available. In the case 
where data are missing, the observations are not deleted but the signal is denoted as zero. 
The signals/variables used in this paper to separate potential winners from losers in a low 
book to market universe of stocks are classified into three categories: traditional fundamentals, 
variables relevant to a firm’s profitability and cash flow performance. Firms that are currently 
profitable are likely to remain profitable and maintain their financial strength over the long term. 
Profitability is measured in two ways, firstly by the ROA, defined as the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items scale by average total assets; and secondly by comparing the ROA of a given 
firm to the ROA of all other low book to market firms in the same two-digit SIC code (defined by 
Compustat). Thus, G1 is equal to one if a firm’s ROA is greater than the median ROA for all low 
book to market firms in the same industry and zero otherwise. Mohanram used an additional 
measure of profitability by calculating ROA with cash from operations instead of net income as 
used by Piotroski (2000). Mohanram defined the second signal, G2, as equal to one if a firm’s cash 
flow ROA exceeds the median for all low books to market in the same industry and zero 
otherwise. Sloan (1996), among others, has shown the importance of accruals by demonstrating 
that, generally, firms with greater accruals components in their earnings are more likely to 
underperform in the future. Accordingly, G3 is defined as equal to one if a firm’s cash flow from 
operations exceeds net income and zero otherwise. G4 is defined as equal to one if a firm’s 
earnings variability is less than the median for all low book to market firms in the same industry 
and zero otherwise. G5 is defined as equal to one if a firm’s sale growth variability is less than the 
median of all low BM firms in the same industry and zero otherwise. When defining these 
variables, Mohanram mentioned that he was focusing on sales growth rather than earnings 
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growth, as it is more difficult to conceptualise negative earnings, which many low books to 
market have.  
The final three growth signals are based on the different actions that a firm may take to 
boost future growth, such as R&D, capital expenditure and advertising. A high level of 
expenditure on those items may boost future growth and make the firms more likely to meet 
market expectations. Accordingly, G6, G7 and G8 are defined as equal to one if a firm’s R&D, 
capital expenditure and advertising intensity are greater than the medians of the corresponding 
variables for all low book to market firms in the same industry and zero otherwise. The intensity 
of R&D, capital expenditure and advertising are measured by deflating these variables by 
beginning assets.  
Firm level return is calculated using CRSP as a buy and hold return for 12-month and 24-
month horizon starting on the 1st of May of the year after the portfolio formation to ensure that 
the most recent variable is included in the financial statement. Returns are size adjusted by 
subtracting the return in the same period for the same capitalization decile31.  In some extent, 
investors can argue that the G-score is preferable to the F-score when applied in the context of 
growth stocks.  
Mohanram’s results are consistent with his findings that when financial statements are 
appropriately designed to analyze growth stocks the strategy is good at distinguishing ex-post 
winners from losers. To emphasize his findings, firms with the lowest G-score earned a mean-
adjusted return of 3.1% in the first year after portfolio formation, while firms with the lowest G-
score earned 17.5%, meaning that a long/short strategy based on G-score might help an investor 
to earn abnormal returns. As mentioned by Mohanram “Ability to short is crucial to use this 
strategy” (p. 134, Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using 
Financial Statement Analysis). 
Finally, Mohanram found strong results in firms without analyst following, consistent with 
the findings of Piotroski (2000) that the success of the F-score is driven by investors ignoring the 
financial information of particular firms. The only downside of using this strategy, as pointed out 
by the author, is that most returns are earned on the downside and therefore being able to short 
stocks is “crucial”.  
                                                          
31
 A method of splitting a set of ranked data into 10 equally large subsections. This type of ranking is 
commonly used among the literature studies in finance.  
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2.2.2.3 Discussion about the use of the F-score in the US stock market 
Woodley el al. (2011) found that financial statement variables identified by Piotroski 
(2000) no longer distinguish between future winners and future losers when applied to a high 
book to market environment. The purpose of their research was to see whether the ability of the 
F-score to distinguish companies has diminished, disappeared or improved. Following a 
methodology described by Piotroski (2000), for each fiscal year each firm’s book to market ratio 
and total market value are calculated. When information was missing from Compustat, the 
authors decided to drop that observation from the sample, and the process is repeated for each 
fiscal year from 1976 to 2008. Thus, they grouped all observations given a specific F-score and 
year for the purposes of determining the return. Then the same tests were rerun after separating 
the sample into two sub-samples; the first one is for fiscal years ending in 1976-1996, in order to 
match the sample proposed by Piotroski (2000), and the second sub-sample is for the period of 
fiscal years 1997-2008. 
Firms were then sorted into quintiles based on their book to market ratios and separately 
sorted into terciles32 based on size. Each firm that falls within the top book to market quintile is 
considered part of the sample of value firms. Raw returns and market-adjusted returns were then 
calculated for the one-year period beginning in the fifth month after the end of fiscal year T. 
Woodley et al. (2011) also tested for market risk and F-score to see whether the average excess  
market-adjusted return for the high F-score can be potentially explained by differences in the 
average beta measure. Their results showed that it cannot be explained by a higher average level 
of beta.  
For the period as a whole and for the sub-periods, high book to market firms tended to 
have smaller returns and be less profitable than the average firms. Indeed, the results show that, 
during the period that falls into Piotroski’s sample period, the strategy of investing in high F-score 
will produce an average market-adjusted return inferior than the one produced by investing in a 
broad portfolio of value stocks, and suggest that results produced by Piotroski (2000) were in fact 
inverted for the period 1996-2008 despite the fact that results for the period 1976-1996 confirm 
Piotroski’s findings that higher F-score leads to higher return. The mean one-year market-
adjusted return to high F-score stocks is 23.71% lower than the return to the overall set of value 
stocks and 26.52% lower than the return to low F-score firms. Both results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and appear to be economically significant.  
                                                          
32
 A way of dividing the sample into three parts. 
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Overall, they performed twelve tests; high F-score firms underperform in ten of these 
twelve comparisons. As a point to take away from this, the strongest underperformance occurs 
when the point of comparison is the mean return.  
Even if Woodley el al. (2011) found that the F-score is no longer useful for portfolio 
construction due to different findings then the one reported by Piotroski we highly believe that 
the strategy is useful at distinguishing between winners and losers. It’s difficult to describe the 
rational behind their findings but one possible assumption could be the risk characterisation at 
that time for firms was not the same; also the market was facing economic downturn where the 
volatility is increasingly becoming one potential major explanation on their results. The F-score is 
useful and has proven to be useful at distinguishing winners from losers otherwise that kind of 
strategy would not be use anymore by hedge funds or funds when forming their investment 
ideas. 
2.2.2.4 Discussion about the use of the F-score and the G-score in the 
Thai stock market 
Tantipanichkul (2011) extended the research proposed by Piotroski (2000) and 
Mohanram (2005) to see whether those two scores can help an investor to distinguish between 
winners and losers in the Thai stock market. The author used three categories of composite 
scores: the F-score, the G-score and a T-score (combination of the F-score and G-score), which is a 
combination of both traditional and growth-orientated measures. All financials signals were 
computed for each firm and firms were classified as either good or bad based on their outcome. 
The sums of all variables were assigned to a composite score within the range of zero to nine. 
Then the market-adjusted return for each stock for one- and two-year buy and hold strategy was 
computed. Accordingly, the mean and median were calculated. A portfolio formation occurs in 
the fourth month after the annual financial statement has been released to ensure that all the 
information has already been factored to each investor.  This paper examines whether accounting 
based financial analysis can help investors earn excess returns among high and low book-to-
market firms in the stock exchange of Thailand and the market for alternative investment during 
1994 to 2008. 
The investment strategy is then developed by purchasing a group of high F-score and 
shorting a group of low F-score; then to judge if the strategy is effective the magnitude of the 
return difference is considered. Tantipanichkul (2011) tests for statistical significance using the T-
test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. The entire methodology is repeated for the G-score 
and for the T-score, which is a combination of the F-score and the G-score. The results show that 
  
65 
 
high score firms outperform low score firms both one and two years after portfolio formation. For 
the F-score, the mean (median) for the high and low group is 24.09% (12.97%) and 5.39% (-
3.83%). The G-score yields a lower return with a return difference of 11.44% (16.85%) for the 
mean (median) market-adjusted return. The second comparison is between the F-score and T-
score; the high T-score group earns a mean (median) market-adjusted return difference of 
23.60% (26.21%). Overall, a combination of the F-score and the G-score, also called the T-score, 
leads to higher positive returns.  
Regarding low book to market firms, the F-score market-adjusted return has a mean 
value of 5.38% for the high group, compared to 11.43% for the low group. Similar trends are also 
seen for the median value with a larger return of 23.64% and results are statistically significant. 
Using the G-score, Tantipanichkul (2011) showed that on average investors can earn returns of 
16.57% and similar trends are seen for the median value: the market-adjusted return has a 
median of 1.71% for the high group whilst -12.% for the low group, which are both statistically 
significant. While the returns from the F-score and the T-score outperform those of the G-score, 
Tantipanichkul (2011) highlighted the ability of being able to short stocks in the low group.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with Mohanram (2005), that there exists a unique 
set of composite scores, and demonstrate that fundamental analysis when suitably modified can 
also be successful for growth stocks. Moreover, in the high book to market stocks universe the G-
score shows more feasibility than the T-score. 
In summary, this paper shows that a simple accounting-based strategy can effectively 
separate winners from losers in terms of future returns. The performance of each score with one- 
and two-year investment horizons is compared and indicates that, regardless of the composite 
score used, firms in the high book to market group generate higher market-adjusted returns than 
firms with low scores. Among high book to market firms the T-score is better able to differentiate 
financially healthy firms, whilst the author claims that, for low book to market firms, the G-score 
can produce subsequently higher returns than other composite scores and even when taking 
short-selling into account it still generates the highest positive return. Overall, the results show 
that fundamental analysis is quite effective in Thailand, especially among small and liquid high 
book to market stocks.  
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2.2.2.5 Discussion about the use of the F-score in the European stock 
market 
Mohr (2012) provided evidence on the utility of the F-score in the growth segment 
market and back tested a strategy that buys high F-score and shorts low F-score growth stocks 
while focusing on the Eurozone equity market from 1999-2010, and excluding all companies that 
do not have sufficient financial data as well as excluding all the financials using data provided by 
MFIE capital33. 
Mohr excluded all companies that do not have enough sufficient data to calculate price to 
book ratio and attempted to remove all companies with a trading volume less than EUR 10,000. 
He then sorted the entire sample into price to book quintiles and extract the 20% with the highest 
P/B ratio.  
A test of high and low F-score growth stocks is constructed referring to an F-score of 0 to 
3 as “low F-score” and an F-score of 7 to 9 as “high F-score”. The market-adjusted returns for a 
one-year holding period for both portfolios are compared and calculated as well as the hedge 
return(high F-score – low F-score) for the strategy by subtracting the low F-score market-adjusted 
portfolio return from the high F-score market-adjusted return. Portfolios are readjusted once a 
year, always at the 30th June. For reasons of simplicity, trading costs, slippage and taxes are not 
taken into consideration. In a second step, Mohr tested whether the results are significantly 
different from zero and did so by applying a variety of t-tests at different levels of confidence. In 
addition to the evaluation of hedge return, Mohr controlled for possible other factors that could 
explain the returns in the growth segment of the Eurozone equity market. Accordingly, a 
multifactor regression was built, consisting of all the explanatory factors such as size, price to 
book, momentum, accruals, equity offerings and F-score.   
In summary, the results provide empirical findings around strategies that evaluate the 
power of fundamental analysis within the Eurozone growth stocks. The findings confirm research 
by Piotroski (2000), who stated that the F-score does not lose its predictive ability when applied 
to growth stocks. However, the results provide counter-evidence to Mohanram’s (2005) results, 
which provides evidence that fundamental analysis is strongly context dependent and that the F-
score loses its predictive ability once it is applied outside the value stocks universe. Additionally, 
the strategy can be vulnerable in a practical set-up due to the low sample size out of the F-score.  
                                                          
33
 MFIE Capital is an independent organization providing investing tools and media for investors. 
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2.2.2.6 Discussion about the use of 24 accounting variables in the 
European stock market 
Bird and Casavecchia (2007) used a dynamic model based on 24 accounting variables to 
predict the probability of a stock having improved earnings per share performance. Their results 
are consistent with Piotroski’s and Mohanram’s that fundamental analysis can help differentiate 
“good” from “bad” value and glamour stocks. They examined single and combined impact on 
value and growth stocks based on two insights, either sentiment/momentum and accounting 
fundamentals/financial health. The focus in this paper is on evaluating, within a European market, 
the use of both market sentiment and financial health to enhance the performance of value and 
growth investment strategies.  
Bird and Casavecchia suggested looking at the combined impact of the application of both 
sentiment indicator, based on the stock’s recent market performance, and a financial health 
indicator based on several accounting ratios. This is to determine which value stock is better and, 
to an extent, determine which of these two indicators is more relevant. They suggested the 
possibility of constructing a well-performing growth portfolio by identifying the sentiment and 
financial health indicators as already suggested for good-value stocks.  
Also, as a final check they applied the three-factor model proposed by Fama and French 
(1992) in order to analyze the characteristics of value and growth portfolios constructed after 
applying a combination of market sentiment and financial health indicators. The aim was to 
establish whether the strategies reflect either a risk-based explanation or returns are reflecting 
systematic mispricings. 
The sample consists of almost 8000 firms from 15 European countries: France, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Greece, 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The analysis was conducted over 15 years from 1989 to 
2004. Data were obtained from Compustat Global Vantage34; data for stock indices and other 
financial variables were obtained from Datastream35 and GMO UK36. The exchange rate effect was 
avoided by using data expressed in local currencies and, consistent with other findings, the 
authors excluded all stocks attached to the financial sector and those with a negative book value 
                                                          
34
 A database that provides data on publicly traded companies in more than 80 countries. The database 
covers 90% of the world market capitalization, including 90% of the Asian market capitalization, 90% of the 
Indian market capitalization, 95% of the Taiwanese market capitalization and 95% of the European market 
capitalization.  
35
 An extensive database that contains historical financial data. It contains over 40 years of data and data is 
provided by a number of organizations such as Worldscope, International Monetary Fund, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and national government sources.  
36
 Global investment management firm that employs more than 550 people worldwide.  
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or priced at less than a pound. The sample results are constituted of approximately 1650 stocks in 
each year.  
Then, they ranked stocks at the end of August each year based on their sales to price 
valuation metric and used these rankings to form equally weighted value portfolios to measure 
performance over a period ranging from one month to 36 months. They decided to classify the 
top quartile of stocks ranked by sales to price as value stocks and the bottom quartile as growth 
stocks. Also, they formed portfolios in August to allow sufficient time for the accounting 
information to be factored in. The returns that they report are excess returns where the 
benchmark is the return on an equally weighted portfolio of all the stocks included in the sample 
each month. Then they examined the impact of applying a sentiment screen to both value and 
growth stocks. They used price momentum over six months as a measure of market sentiment. 
Furthermore, they divided each value and growth portfolio according to whether the stocks 
contained in them were classified as winners or losers and observed the performance of four 
portfolios: value winners, value losers, growth winners and growth losers. Then they calculated 
the excess return for each of these four groups over a period of one and 36 months.  
  Accordingly, in order to measure the financial health they developed an indicator based 
on 24 variables which have previously been founded to be relevant and each year this indicator 
was used to predict the probability that the reported earnings per share (EPS) for each stock 
would be greater for the next financial year than in the current one. 
The results show that a strategy of identifying value stocks and growth stocks can be 
overcome by the application of a sentiment/momentum indicator and a financial health indicator. 
The main problem was to identify when particular stocks will experience a market turnaround. 
Sentiment proves to be effective for timing the acquisition of these stocks by delaying the entry 
until a market turnaround is likely to happen. However, for growth stocks timing is difficult as 
those stocks are already expensive. However, the researchers proved the combination of 
sentiment and financial health to be very useful in identifying those stocks and provided insights 
that they are able to extract higher added value from a “good” growth portfolio that they are 
from a “good” value portfolio. 
2.2.2.7 Discussion about the use of the F-score in Emerging stock 
markets  
Hyde (2013) examined the effectiveness of the F-score signal across all countries in the 
MSCI Emerging markets index and whether the F-score in global emerging markets can distinguish 
between winners and losers. The results show that there is a meaningful premium attached to 
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high F-score stocks which is unrelated to the size, value and momentum premiums. Hyde (2013) 
proposed an additional factor, the conditional bias to re-examine the premium attached to high 
book to market stocks.  
After replicating Piotroski’s (2000) F-score, the study examined the effectiveness of the F-
score signal across all countries in the MSCI emerging markets that can discriminate between high 
and low returns in emerging markets. The study was carried out over the period January 2000 to 
December 2001 on the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. The sample contains 667 stocks in January 
2000 and 805 stocks in December 2001 and 99,658 stock date observations in total. All portfolio 
average excess return is equally weighted. If missing data occur, he substitutes the index return 
for that stock date, then the excess return of a stock is calculated as the absolute total return for 
the stock less the benchmark return for the country/region to which the stock is assigned. 
Similarly, when conditioning stocks for size, value and momentum effects, stock are sorted 
relative to other stock in the same country/region to which the stock is assigned to ensure the 
portfolio is country neutral. Countries examined in isolation are those which contain many stocks 
and have a large market capitalization; the other countries are aggregated into countries on the 
basis of geographic proximity.  
Observations of the F-score between 4 and 7 account for 74% of the data sample, while 
13% are associated with extreme scores of 0, 1, 8 and 9. The results show that there is little year-
to-year variation in the average F-score within the range of 4.89 to 5.66. The average F-score 
reached its lowest points in the years 2000, 2009 and 2010 due to weak economic growth 
coinciding with weak financial strength. The Latin America region (excluding Brazil) registered the 
highest average F-score while South Africa registered the lowest. While some delay in the 
diffusion of the information into stock prices, it is therefore necessary for the F-score to have 
predictive power also they argue that the confirmation bias can have a role in data snooping and 
thus in explaining the cross-sectional variation. 
The results do not vary greatly with the value or momentum of stocks. The equal 
weighted average F-score for the bottom 50% stocks ranked on the price to book ratio is 0.11 
lower than for the top 50% stocks, and the average F-score between high and low (six- month) 
momentum stocks is only slightly higher at 0.21.  
In his analysis, Hyde (2013) compared the equal weighted excess return of high F-score (F 
≥ 8) to low F-score stocks (F ≤2). The results show that there a statistically significant premium 
attached to stock with F ≥ 8; this premium is 3.51 % per annum and 2.06% for a 12-month period; 
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however, this is lower than the 7.5% premium observed by Piotroski (2000). The results show that 
this premium varies within the lowest 20% and for the middle 60% of stocks ranked by price to 
book.  
Regarding the difference between high and low F-score, results are 4.10% per annum for 
a six-month period and 4.36% for a 12-month period. However, this premium is lower than the 
23% per annum premium reported by Piotroski (2000). This analysis was repeated using an F-
score ≥ 7 for the high price to book firms and F-score ≤ 3 for the low price to book firms, and the 
results are slightly better, being 5.28% and 4.94% per annum for the six-month and 12-month 
holding period respectively.  
Over his research, Hyde (2013) tested for components that generate stronger 
contributions and found that ΔLeverage makes a negative premium to the overall portfolio. Hyde 
also controlled for size effects and his findings contrast with Piotroski’s results that the premium 
is concentrated among small stocks.  
After testing for value premium, findings show that the premium attached to high F-score 
stocks is higher for value stocks than growth stocks regardless of whether they are defined by P/B 
or PE ratio. Momentum effect has also been tested and the findings show mixed evidence as to 
whether the return differential between high book to market firms and low book to market firms 
is sensitive to changes in momentum.  
Findings are consistent with previous evidence from both developed and emerging 
market studies: stocks with a high F-score earn a significant return premium over stocks with a 
low F-score. The results indicate that the Piotroski F-score can be implemented into value and/or 
momentum investing strategies in emerging markets.  
Caveats highlight the importance of including new information about the stock price to be 
necessary for the F-score to have any predictive power. Also, even after allowing for bias effect 
results, there are still unanswered questions as to whether the low value/low momentum stocks 
generate a higher premium than low value/high momentum or high value/low momentum 
stocks. Therefore, a more in-depth analysis of the Brazilian market is also needed.  
2.2.2.8 Discussion on the use of the F-score in the Brazilian stock 
market 
Galdi and Lopes (2008) showed that results obtained by accounting-based fundamental 
analysis strategies in the US cannot be replicated and extended to other markets. One of the main 
reasons described in their article is the hypothesis that abnormal return to financial statement 
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analysis will be generated by limits in arbitrage and could not potentially be replicated in the 
Brazilian market as they control for restrictions on the actions of arbitrageurs. This paper tends to 
replicate the approach developed by Piotroski (2000) using nine signals and making assumptions 
about the features of the Brazilian market. Galdi and Lopes (2008) classified firms as either “bad” 
or “good” depending on the signals on future price and performance. If the realization was good 
they assigned a one, otherwise a zero. The main reason for re-adaptation of the Piotroski model is 
the absence of published cash flow in Brazil.  
The three financials signals used to measure changes in the capital structure and liquidity 
and cash flow are ΔLiquid, ΔLEVER and EQ_OFFER. Cash flow is defined by firm-year change on 
cash and cash equivalent scales by beginning of the year total assets. Regarding the use of the 
debt variable due to the absence in the way Brazilian firms report, they considered long- plus 
short-term debt as opposed to long-term debt as defined by Piotroski (2000). They decided not to 
use EBITDA as a proxy for cash flow from operations due to the huge discrepancies in numbers.  
The research focused on the Sao Paolo stock exchange from 1994 to 2004 and collected 
data from the Economatica37 database: 6682 firms each year after excluding all financials. The 
findings showed that an investor could have changed its market-adjusted return from one year 
(two years) from 5.7% (42.4%) to 26.7% (120.2%) by selecting financially strong high book to 
market firms in the Sao Paolo stock exchange. Overall, the results show that the market-adjusted 
return is considerably higher than the one constructed by Piotroski (2000) and point out that a 
strategy consisting of buying and shorting will generate a 41.8% annual return; and the authors 
concluded that financial statement analysis based on strong high book to market firms can help to 
distinguish winners from losers.  
However, the strategy only works for the groups of small and medium firms and for the 
groups of low and medium liquidity firms but not for large and high liquidity firms. Therefore, 
results are mainly driven by small, low liquidity. Also, firms who do not have derivatives based on 
their shares are making the implementation of the strategy really difficult. Recently, Dosamantes 
(2013) examined whether an accounting fundamental analysis when applied to the Mexican stock 
market can contribute to the literature on value investing for investors in Emerging markets. Two 
scores were constructed, the F-score and the L-score, based on the methodology developed by 
Piotroski (2000) and Lev and Thiagarajan (1993). Econometric models were designed and 
performed to show how those two scores add value to book to market ratio, firm size and 
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 Database that offers information listed on the exchange such as for Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, 
Colombia and Venezuela.  
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earnings per share. Using quarterly data from Economatica for all active firms in Mexico’s stock 
market from 1991 to 2011, a significant relationship was found between the F-score and the L-
score, enhancing some evidence of the value relevance of accounting fundamental analysis for 
investors when forming their portfolios, and contradicting the findings of Galdi and Lopes (2008). 
2.2.2.9 Discussion about the use of the F-score in the Indian market 
Aggarwal and Gupta (2009) investigated whether a strategy based on accounting 
fundamentals can help investors to distinguish between winners and losers in the Indian stock 
market. The strategy adopted is based on the Piotroski (2000) model, using the nine fundamental 
signals identified to compose the F-score; researchers look at whether this strategy is applicable 
since there is evidence of market efficiency at a late form in the Indian market. Using Piotroski’s 
framework and applying a different approach to portfolio formation, convincing evidence was 
found highlighting the hypothesis that a fundamental analysis-based investment strategy can 
separate winners from losers in the Indian stock market. The research was carried out for the 
period of financial year ending 2003 to financial year ending 2007. On the 31st March 2004, all the 
companies listed on the National Stock Exchange were arranged in descending order of book to 
market ratio using the CMIE38 database Prowess39. Then the book to market firms were divided 
into five quintiles; focusing on the high book to market quintile 104 companies came out of the 
poll. Accordingly, three portfolios were developed, denoted as P1, P2 and P3; each portfolio 
consisted of companies having an F-score in the range of 0-3, 4-6, 7-9. Furthermore, each 
portfolio consisted of 20 equally weighted companies randomly selected from the respective F-
score groups.  
Returns were calculated on a buy and hold basis for a period of one year and two years 
and portfolios were formed three months after financial year-end, so that all the information 
required was available. Market-adjusted return was calculated in two forms, according to the 
authors, calculating absolute excess return over the market returns and by calculating returns as 
driven by risk of the portfolio. For market-adjusted return three market indices were used as a 
benchmark (S&P CNX Nifty40, CNX midcap41, and S&P CNX 50042). 
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 Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. 
39
 Largest database of financial performance of Indian companies. 
40
 Is the National Stock Exchange of India’s benchmark for the Indian equity market. The CNX Nifty covers 
22 sectors of the Indian economy and offers investment managers exposure to the Indian market.  
41
 Is a benchmark for midcap segment; the CNX Midcap index represents about 12.41% of the free float 
market capitalization of the stocks listed on the National Stock Exchange of India as on 30
th 
September, 
2013.  
42
 Represents about 96% of total market capitalization and about 93% of the total turnover on the National 
Stock Exchange of India.  
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The results showed that firms in the highest book to market quintile have a mean 
(median) book to market ratio of 4.96 (3.51). Descriptive statistics regarding the nine 
fundamental signals out of the F-score were also performed among the three portfolios 
suggesting the number of positive signals was higher in portfolio 3 (F-score above 7), indicating 
that investing in companies with high book to market can be profitable. 
Also, a comparison of portfolios on different fundamental signals was evaluated, plus the 
performance of the three portfolios over one year and two years was observed. Overall, 
portfolios 1 and 2 showed a mixed response in terms of excess performance out of the three 
market indices; however, portfolio 3 was consistent in its performance with all the market indices 
outperformed for both one- and two-year windows. This finding highlights the ability of the F-
score in creating subsequent returns.  
2.2.2.10 Discussion on the use of 11 fundamental variables in the US 
stock market 
Xue and Zhang (2011) examined whether institutional investors exploit abnormal returns 
derived from financial statements and studied how transaction costs and arbitrage risk affect the 
profitability of the trading strategy. Finally, they studied the impact of institutional investors’ 
trading behaviour on the profitability of the fundamentals-based trading strategy. 
To focus on institutions that are more likely to trade on fundamental signals they 
followed Bushee’s (2001) findings. For instance, Bushee (2001) examined whether investors 
exhibit preferences for near-term earnings over the long term and whether this has an impact on 
stock prices. One of the main assumptions is that managers boost operational and accounting 
decisions to boost short-term earnings under the pressure of institutional investors referring to 
the term “myopic”. Findings show that the strongest institutions favour firms with short-term 
earnings rather than firms with long-term earnings. A suggestion might be that clients are more 
interested in short-term returns. 
Across the literature three categories of institutions are defined: transient, dedicated and 
quasi-indexers. Findings highlight that Xue and Zhang (2011) expect transient institutions to be 
more likely to trade on fundamental signals, and also the empirical results hold after controlling 
for other factors that may affect institutional investors’ trading decisions such as analyst forecast 
revisions and post-earnings announcement drift.  
Additionally, Xue and Zhang’s (2011) found that association of future abnormal returns 
and fundamental signals increases with transaction cost and arbitrage risk. The final part of their 
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analysis examined whether institutions trading on abnormal returns using financial statements 
have an impact, and in this they made progress by suggesting that transient investors tend to 
reduce abnormal returns associated with fundamental signals. The results suggest that 
institutional investors’ trading helps alleviate the market under-reaction to information contained 
in fundamental signals and improve market efficiency. 
Throughout their analysis, they examined 11 financial ratios that measure a firm’s 
profitability, operating efficiency and liquidity, and many of their fundamental signals concur with 
those in Piotroski (2000). However, in contrast with Piotroski, who is looking at only distressed 
firms, Xue and Zhang (2011) chose fundamental signals to describe the financial conditions of 
ordinary listed firms, and therefore included financial ratio that are most visible to investors. One 
difference between their fundamental signals and the one highlighted by Piotroski is that their 
measures are all industry adjusted whereas Piotroski’s ratio are benchmarked against zero. 
Another difference is that they do not include equity issuance and change in leverage ratio in 
their selection signals. These ratios are intended to measure changes in capital structure and a 
firm’s ability to meet future debt obligations.  
Therefore, each fundamental signal is assigned a score of one if the ratio is above its 
industry average in that year, indicating a positive signal about the firm’s outlook, or a zero 
otherwise. The industry average for each year is calculated using only firms’ 31st December fiscal 
year-end and industry years with fewer than five observations are deleted. All the 11 signals are 
aggregated into an F-score following the same observations made by Piotroski (2000). To verify if 
the F-score has the power to predict future abnormal returns, they constructed an equal 
weighted investment portfolio each year. The results showed that, of the 22 years from 1982 to 
2003, this trading strategy of buying high F-score and shorting low F-score generated positive 
market-adjusted returns in 18 years, with the average three-month (nine-month) market-
adjusted returns of 2.78% (7.62%). The annualized markets adjusted buy and hold returns are 
around 12%, which is lower than those documented by Piotroski of 23%.  
Lastly, they checked for robustness, calculated alternative measures of abnormal returns 
such as size-adjusted return and size, market beta, book to market and momentum-adjusted 
return and tested statistically.  
Regarding the data sample, they collected information data from Compustat industrial 
and research files, return data from CRSP monthly stock database for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
firms and institutional investment data from institutional investors. The analyst coverage and 
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forecast data are obtained from the summary file of the IBES database. Firms’ years missing any 
of the 11 fundamental signals as well as financial service and utility firms were excluded from the 
sample. The final sample was 2026 unique companies.  
Then, they examined firms’ market-adjusted buy and hold return over a three- and nine-
month horizon starting from 1st April after the previous fiscal year-end. As an alternative of 
abnormal return measures, they calculated size-adjusted return and four-factor-adjusted returns. 
Size-adjusted return is defined as the raw return less the return of the portfolio of the firms in the 
same size decile.  
Overall, they found that fundamental signals derived from publicly available financial 
statements have the power to predict future stock returns. This paper looked at abnormal returns 
by examining the trading behaviour of sophisticated investors, i.e., transient investors, and found 
that transient investors trade on fundamental signals. This finding is consistent with the 
explanation that the stock market under-reacts to financial statement information and that 
sophisticated investors take advantage of this arbitrage anomaly. The authors further explored 
role and limits to arbitrage and found that abnormal returns to fundamental signals increase with 
arbitrage cost – transaction cost and arbitrage risk. They provide documentary evidence that 
transient institutions’ trading and holdings help the stock market more quickly impound 
information contained in fundamental signals into stock prices.  
In summary, the results suggest that the F-score has the power to predict future stock 
returns and a fundamental analysis based on the F-score can earn abnormal returns.  
2.2.2.11 Discussion to see if the F-score can be used to predict 
institutional investor demand 
Choi and Sias’ (2010) goal was to develop a new test to see whether gradual 
incorporation of information contributes to the relationship between financial strength and 
subsequent returns. Using the F-score return model, Choi and Sias are able to contribute to the 
literature by showing that the F-score also predicts institutional investor demand, and their 
results are consistent with previous findings.  
The authors took a different approach as to whether or not financial information and 
strength forecast institutional demand. The method requires the calculation of all variables 
required for building the F-score at the end of each fiscal year, after removing all financials. 
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Also, they are screening for stocks with a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 and add two 
criteria:  firm has to have at least $25 million market capitalization and book to equity of at least 
$12.5 million.  
After carrying out the above, they partitioned the sample into three components: the 
portion attributed to future institutional demand as a proxy for expectations under the gradual 
incorporation of information, the portion attributed to future profitability as a proxy for expected 
profitability under the risk based explanation, and the portion unexplained either by future 
institutional demand or future profitability as a proxy for all other explanation; then they 
examined the relationship between F-score and each of the three future return components 
under different statistical tests.  
Using quarterly data from Compustat plus institutional ownership data over the period 
1983 to 2006, Choi and Sias (2010) suggested that institutions that trade actively to maximise 
short-term profits are responsible for driving prices long after the release of the information 
captured by F-score.   
Also, they found that the gradual incorporation of information explanation accounts for 
25% of the relation between the F-score and future returns and the risk-based explanation 
accounts for 75%. Their results showed that the gradual incorporation of information and risk-
based measures fully explained the relationship between the F-score and abnormal return.  
Solely, this test assumes a linear relation when assessing F-score and the method assumes 
that the change in market expectations and subsequent return is fully captured by institutional 
demand.  
As a conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated the use of the Piostroski F-score in our 
current environment providing all the literature related to the context i.e. the different market 
(universe) where the F-score or an alternative to the F-score has been used.  This enables us to 
apply the Piostroski F-score strategy to our universe and establish the novelty of our work by 
using a new approach when forming the F-score. 
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2.3 Data and methodology  
 
2.3.1 Where did we decide to collect the data? 
We decided to collect the data from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat North America 
database and from the CRSP US stock database, which provide both fundamentals data and 
returns on all listed NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ common stocks. The Standard & Poor’s North 
American data is unique in the sense that it is standardized to ensure comparability by removing 
reporting variability and bias to ensure that comparability exists among similar types of data. Data 
are collected from shareholders’ reports, 10-K reports and other reliable sources. Items include, 
as an example, annual and quarterly income statement, balance sheet, cash flow data, company 
name. The CRSP US stock database provides a unique research source; it includes CRSP’s unique 
identifier, allowing for clean and accurate backtesting analysis.  
To extract data we used SAS under a Linux43 server where we created a table to extract all 
the variables required to build the Piotroski screen from Compustat identified by global company 
name. Each fiscal year from 1991 to 2012, data are extracted for the S&P 1500. We excluded all 
financials using the SIC codes44 provided by Compustat. In order to avoid survivorship bias, stocks 
that were delisted during the period were also included. The sample contains 38,855 observations 
in total. 
Using SAS, the first step was to identify the appropriate “Mnemonics” for the company 
annual fundamental data group; the more key mnemonics specified the narrower the scope. We 
created a table where we requested the global company name denoted as “gvkey” included in 
the S&P 1500. Also, variables such as “Datadate” can be requested to define the period, such as 
fiscal year-end data.  
Extracting the data from specific data items enables the researcher to focus on the 
research, and learning about SAS as a programming language is certainly something that can 
benefit a later career.  
2.3.2 Building the F-score  
When it comes to building the F-score, we followed Piotroski (2000), which comprises 
nine fundamentals signals to distinguish winners from losers in a universe of stock. (Please refer 
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 An operating system.  
44
 Four-digit numerical codes that identify a company’s primary business. A company’s primary business is 
the industry from which the company derives its greatest revenue. 
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to the literature review regarding the choice of the different variables by Piotroski.) The model 
consists of a set of binary financial tests based on the profitability, leverage, liquidity and 
operating efficiency. The more tests a stock passes the better the investment is said to be. So a 
stock that passes all the tests out of an F-score of nine would be an excellent stock whilst a stock 
with a score of zero or one should be avoided. For every test the company passes it receives a 
one; in the case it fails in the test the company is assigned a zero. The maximum score a firm can 
be assigned is nine, meaning that the company has improved on all the metrics since it last 
reported. When we extract company variables we look for the last fiscal year-end period updates. 
Any stocks that score seven or above can be bought in the portfolio; the following year the test is 
re-run and the company that is no longer performing regarding the new variables just drops out 
of the portfolio. Later we test for the data migration and the stability of the F-score in order to 
understand the likelihood of the models and the volatility in the scores. Therefore, a company will 
stay in the portfolio as long as it keeps the momentum on beating its previous result in the range 
of seven to nine.  
2.3.2.1 Profitability 
Firstly, regarding the profitability the model uses four profitability measures: i) ROA, ii) 
CFO and iii) Δ ROA. ROA is calculated as net income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets, whilst CFO is cash flow from operations divided by total assets. If ROA is positive, the firm 
is said to be profitable and the firm scores one, otherwise it gets zero. The same notion applies to 
CFO. Improving profitability is done by simply looking at the year-on-year change in ROA where 
we let year be fiscal year applied to all our variables. If the current year ROA is greater than the 
previous year, the firm is awarded a score of one, zero otherwise. iv) If the change in CFO is 
greater than the change in ROA then the firm scores one, otherwise it gets zero. See for instance 
Sloan (1996), who shows that earning driven by positive accruals is a bad signal about future 
profitability and returns.  
Four profitability measures are considered: i) ROA, ii) CFO, iii) ∆ROA and iv) CFO > ROA 
2.3.2.2 Leverage, liquidity and the source of funds 
Piotroski identified three factors that would help avoid stocks running into financial 
difficulty and each of them is used today in an investor’s assessment. For instance, the three 
variables are leverage, liquidity and the source of funds, the v) Δ Leverage is the annual change in 
a company’s leverage as measured by the year-on-year change in the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets, vi) Δ Liquid concerns the short-term financing of the business and is measured as the 
annual change in the current ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities). A rise in the 
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current ratio potentially indicates the ability of the firm to service its debt costs, whilst a decline 
could potentially indicate some short problem financing. vii) Δ Finance is measured as the year-
on-year change in shares outstanding; the company scores one if the number of shares 
outstanding is no greater than a year ago, zero otherwise.   
Three balance sheet measures are considered: v) Leverage, vi) Liquidity and vii) Finance 
2.3.2.3 Operating efficiency 
The model includes two measures of the firm’s operating efficiency, i.e., an increase in 
operating margin denoted as viii) Δ Margin is measured as the year-on-year change in the gross 
operating margin; the firm scores one if the full year margin is greater than the previous one, 
otherwise zero. And the annual change in asset turnover denoted as ix) Δ Turnover is measured 
as the year-on-year change in turnover; the firm scores one if the percentage increase in sales 
exceeds the percentage increase in total assets, zero otherwise. This shows how much sales have 
increased relative to the size of the asset base. An increase of the sales at a greater speed to the 
change in asset base implies that a firm is generating more business from existing assets rather 
than simply making acquisitions. 
 
Two operating efficiency measures are considered: viii) Margin and ix) Turnover 
 
Thus, the composite F-score is the sum of the nine variables described as:  
F-score = F_ROA + F_CFO + F_ΔROA + F_ACCRUAL + F_LIQUID + F_ΔLEVER+ F_ΔFINANCE + 
F_ΔMARGIN + F_ΔTURN.  
2.3.3 Calculation of portfolio return 
We measure firm return on a year buy and hold return; the process starts by extracting all 
the companies with a high F-score comprised from 7 to 9. We expect these firms to have the best 
performance given the outcome of their fundamental analysis. This approach leads to a sample of 
4780 observation from 1991 to 2012. CRSP monthly returns are used to compute cumulative 
returns over three, six, nine and 12-month intervals to calculate efficiently the compounded 
returns on a rolling basis as of the end of every month; to produce an output we expect each 
common stock to have monthly records without any gaps. This way, for each rolling window, the 
preceding 12 records will contain missing or non-missing returns information during the last 12 
months.  
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CRSP monthly returns and Compustat sample are linked using the CRSP-Compustat 
Merged Product (CCM); however, the macro can produce inaccurate matches, leaving a bias 
when it comes to match the two identifiers. (Aware of the potential bias, we follow the process.)   
The macro CRSP/Compustat Merged Database includes Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
data, reformatted into CRSP’s proprietary CRSP Access database format, plus additional data 
tables that map the CRSP permanent company and security identifiers (PERMCO and PERMNO) to 
Compustat permanent company identifier (gvkey). 
A common misconception is that CCM is CRSP stock market data merged with Compustat 
accounting data. In fact, CCM contains only Compustat data items, but can be searched by CRSP’s 
“PERMNO” or PERMCO in addition to Compustat “gvkey”. The link tables are then merged. Solely 
for different reasons the researcher can be faced with incomplete matching results from the fact 
that the CRSP database covers stock prices on public stock exchange while Compustat does not 
require a company to have a traded stock. Another issue could be that there is a disagreement 
between CRSP and Compustat over which is the surviving company and, finally, the match 
between Compustat (gvkey) and CRSP (Permno) is not one to one. For example, a company might 
have multiple equity issues.  
If a security has been removed from the exchange, CRSP calculates a delisting return of 
this security by comparing the security’s value after it delists with its price on the last day of 
trading. In fact, the code accounts for possible delisting events such as bankruptcies, mergers and 
acquisitions, liquidity. Incorporation into the total buy and hold returns would help to avoid 
biases that would arise from the exclusion. For each stock, returns are compounded over various 
time intervals relative to the fiscal period end date specific to this company. The market return 
follows the same procedure and can be used to derive the excess return for every stock.  
2.3.4 Data migration methodology 
This section tries to describe the methodology used to perform a trend-following data 
approach which is part of our analysis regarding the stability and volatility of the Piotroski F-score 
across time. Using probability when assessing the task, the first step is to plot the actual observed 
numbers of F-score by year and form a basket of stocks that will remain in the sample across 
time.  
The purpose of this analysis is to explain in percentage how the Piotroski model is volatile 
and how the outcome of the F-score is changing over time. In fact, market turbulence and rising 
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doubts about the duration of the current environment have increased investor interest in lower 
risk and higher quality stocks.  
2.4 The data analysis 
2.4.1 Data migration and stability of the F-score over 1995 to 2012  
We present the approach developed in the section above. The sample is constituted of 
516 stocks each year from 1995 to 2012.   
Table 2.4-1 Performance of all the 516 stocks from the migration over 1995 to 2012 
 
1995-
2012 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0 25.0% 8.3% 8.3% 33.3% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 
1 5.7% 2.9% 8.6% 25.7% 20.0% 11.4% 11.4% 5.7% 8.6% 0.0% 
2 1.5% 0.8% 8.3% 11.3% 13.5% 15.8% 22.6% 18.0% 8.3% 0.0% 
3 0.0% 1.8% 4.5% 8.3% 14.4% 23.2% 24.3% 16.8% 6.7% 0.0% 
4 0.1% 0.5% 1.7% 5.9% 16.6% 26.1% 27.7% 16.0% 5.0% 0.4% 
5 0.0% 0.3% 1.2% 5.6% 14.9% 27.8% 29.0% 15.6% 5.2% 0.4% 
6 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 5.0% 16.5% 28.8% 26.7% 16.4% 5.3% 0.4% 
7 0.1% 0.1% 1.2% 4.2% 16.5% 28.1% 28.1% 15.6% 5.4% 0.7% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 7.1% 17.6% 30.2% 29.6% 9.2% 4.5% 0.6% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 28.2% 28.2% 25.6% 7.7% 5.1% 0.0% 
 
Table 2.4-1 shows the entire migration probability sample for 516 stocks; this is simply 
the number of times each F-score appeared; the probability is expressed as a percentage and is 
calculated by dividing a frequency by the total frequency and multiplying by 100. Please note that 
we let F-scores 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 be described as “F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, F-5, F-6, F-7, F-8, 
and F-9” when it comes to giving an explanation of the graphs or charts.  
This gives us a record of past outcome and an understanding of possible trend – a trend 
being the general movement in the data over time. If someone can understand past changes over 
time in the F-score then that same person/investor can consider ways of projecting these 
forwards and using such a projection as a measure for future forecasts in the likelihood of the F-
score.   
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An investment company might be particularly interested in the change of the F-scores 
when it comes to buy one of them. We can describe the relationship using a straight line of 
probabilities. Consider the following example: where an investor is interested in the volatility over 
time of an F-score of F-9. If we bought a stock with a score of F-9 the chances that it stays an F-9 
the following year are null; however, the investor has an 8% chance that the score becomes an F-
7 and therefore stays in his portfolio. Of course, when analyzing those figures, the investor should 
be careful as those F-scores might be influenced by a range of factors including the economic 
wisdom. The figures do, however, provide a useful guide. Overall, it can be expected that the high 
F-score decreases over time whilst an increase can be viewed in the bottom F-score. Taking 
another example, an investor who buys a stock rated an F-7 in the F-score is likely to have a 16% 
chance of this stock remaining an F-7; however, he has a 0% chance of the stock becoming an F-0.  
 
Figure 2.4-1 High F-score change. The histogram displays the distribution of the F-score by showing for each 
corresponding F-score the probability expressed in percentage 
This histogram in Figure 2.4-1 appears to have almost a perfect bell-shaped pattern: there 
are more data in the middle and less towards the two extremes, suggesting that the assumption 
of normality in the future can be tested using t-test.  
This histogram displays the change in a high F-score from 1995 to 2012 for a high F-score 
to become an F-5 or an F-6. In this way the histogram displays the entire distribution of the high 
F-scores. From this histogram we can see as well the low probability for a change in a low F-score 
(i.e., from F-0 to F-2). When we look at the shape of the F-7 the distribution appears to be almost 
normally distributed with the same probability for an F-score of F-7 to become an F-6 or F-5, as 
figures show the probability is 28% respectively. Also, an investor has an approximately 16% 
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chance for the F-7 to stay the same or 17% that it becomes an F-4. However, when looking at the 
F-8 we cannot draw the same conclusion as there is a 9% chance for the F-8 to become an F-7 and 
an approximately 18% or double chance for the F-8 to become an F-4. Overall, interesting 
conclusions can be draw out of this histogram. Also, please note the likelihood of the F-9 to 
become an F-4, an F-5, and an F-6 is approximately the same, around a 28% chance, meaning 
there might be some stability before the stock loses all its value. 
 
Figure 2.4-2 Low F-score change. The histogram displays the distribution of the F-score by showing for each 
corresponding F-score the probability expressed in percentage 
This histogram in Figure 2.4-2 displays the change in a low F-score from 1995 to 2012, for 
an F-0 to become an F-3. From this histogram we can see the absent probability for an F-0, F-1, F-
2, and F-3 to become an F-9, meaning that the F-score is quite stable. The ability of the F-2 and F-
3 to grow gradually should also be noted; a better picture will be displayed and discussed later. 
The linear upgrade in percentage chance can be seen in F-3, F-4, F-5, and F-6 when looking at 
those two scores; also, the same gradual decline is apparent in F-7 and F-8. 
In the histogram, it is also worth noticing the constant 8% chance for F-0 to become F-1, 
F-2, F-5, F-7, and F-8. As well, interestingly, the histogram is showing the absence of probabilities 
for F-0 to become either an F-4 or F-6, which might signify something perhaps when we run some 
econometric tests – those two scores might reveal another picture. Also, it is worth looking at the 
likelihood of F-3; indeed, the null probability chance for an F-3 to become F-0 can be seen, 
implying the idea that an investor interested in using an F-3 strategy has to screen in stocks rated 
F-1 to benefit from the potential upgrade over time.  
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Additionally, when looking at F-1 an investor has the same chance for F-1 to become 
either F-0 or F-7 with a 6% chance for each of them; the same observation can be applied for F-1 
to become F-2 or F-8 with a 9% chance.  
Figure 2.4-3 shows the migration of an F-score of 2 and 3 for the period 1995 to 2012; as 
discussed in the previous paragraph, the idea is to get a clearer picture. The y-axis represents the 
percentage chance that this occurrence appears. The percentage change for both F-scores grows 
gradually for an F-score of 2, 3, 4, and 6 with a corresponding fall in F-7 and F-8; this growth can 
be explained by some predominance for those two scores to gradually change over time, 
particularly the ability for those two scores previously rated as poor investment, due to them 
showing some ability to continuously improve the prospects of the firms. Some investment 
strategy might be interesting to develop out of this figure. The percentage chance for F-2 and F-3 
to become an F-7 or an F-8 is respectively 18% (8%) for F-2 and 17% (7%) for F-3. In contrast, the 
ability to become an F-6 is respectively 23% for F-2 and 24% for F-3. The decline after F-6 might 
be seen as a signal for a sell when buying an F-2 or F-3. Also, the ability to become F-9 for both of 
those two scores is null, meaning that buying an F-2 or F-3 will lose all its power after being 
upgraded as an F-8. As spotted earlier, the chance for F-3 to become F-0 is null.  
 
Figure 2.4-3 F-score of 2 and 3 change. The histogram displays the distribution of the F-score by showing for each 
corresponding F-score the probability expressed in percentage 
As described earlier, here in Figure 2.4-3 we have a clearer picture of the outcome of an 
F-score of F-2 or F-3 in our migration stability, highlighting some interesting pictures, as buying 
both of those two scores could lead gradually to a potential upgrade of the score, implying an 
eventual investment opportunity. 
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Figure 2.4-4– Medium F-score change. The histogram displays the distribution of the F-score by showing for each 
corresponding F-score the probability expressed in percentage 
When examining Figure 2.4-4, it can be seen that the histogram is centred around an F-
score of F-5 to F-6, the values vary from 15% to 30% and the shape of the distribution is quite 
normally distributed, which means that when an investor buys a score of F-5 to F-6 it has 
approximately the same chance to go either to the right or the left of the tail.  
The centres and spreads are not too different from the high F-score histogram in Figure 
2.4-4 but the shape appears to be slightly right skewed, while the high F-score appears to be left 
skewed with less probability on the F-9 and F-8. Please note the ability for F-4, F-5, and F-6 to 
become either F-3 or F-8 or F-4 or F-7, describing a bell shape. Also noticeable is the absence for 
F-4, F-5, F-6 to become F-0. 
Overall, these histograms provide an easy to understand summary of the distribution of 
the F-score migration. 
2.4.2 Evolution of F-score return year by year 
Here we present a table where we compute the return for each F-score between the 
various years for the period 1994 to 2012 and compare the results by plotting different graphs in 
order to get a better idea of the trend in each F-score. Table 2.4-2 gives a comparative insight of 
the return, which describes the evolution of the return throughout the period. An investor would 
expect to see all the negative returns located in the low F-scores and all the positive returns in the 
high F-scores. This table shows, in fact, the potential investment return for a one-year holding 
period for each individual score. At the bottom of the table, the reader will find the number of 
companies in each score for the whole period.  
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Table 2.4-2 – Return of all the F-scores individually over the period 1994 to 2012 fiscal year-end 
 fo f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 
2012 -28.20% -32.17% -0.06% 13.82% 15.41% 17.50% 17.44% 22.46% 31.83% 8.95% 
2011 -43.16% -41.98% -5.99% 0.61% -0.41% 1.78% 9.35% 10.18% 15.63% 3.90% 
2010 -0.04% -0.61% 5.79% 19.91% 15.76% 24.79% 29.41% 30.28% 31.69% 13.89% 
2009 -36.40% -13.01% 24.36% 34.21% 25.68% 39.76% 44.68% 56.95% 71.02% -7.18% 
2008 -55.75% -58.72% -45.88% -32.03% -34.59% -30.84% -26.40% -21.54% -9.67% -24.71% 
2007 -28.22% -32.98% -11.13% 2.29% -5.58% 1.56% 10.60% 14.01% 25.68% 15.22% 
2006 -28.43% -15.08% -9.88% 4.89% 10.69% 16.92% 16.04% 21.84% 30.65% 49.23% 
2005 -28.37% -13.24% -2.44% 6.81% 5.67% 8.04% 18.12% 29.41% 36.40% 36.32% 
2004 -40.12% -13.89% -1.76% 10.50% 13.60% 15.08% 26.06% 28.76% 35.33% 69.61% 
2003 25.66% 23.76% 39.45% 46.27% 37.88% 41.90% 40.58% 55.47% 59.67% 24.99% 
2002 -63.44% -52.48% -47.79% -27.14% -24.10% -12.80% -5.18% -3.55% -6.48% 11.93% 
2001 -5.82% -11.56% -15.85% 7.62% 2.40% 7.33% 19.46% 35.33% 14.08% 38.45% 
2000 -33.17% -8.78% 1.34% 18.84% 8.02% 14.19% 28.47% 24.83% 60.33% 94.24% 
1999 16.70% 30.37% 47.04% 26.25% 0.90% 8.17% 14.79% 34.87% 63.47% 53.78% 
1998 -10.03% -12.64% -6.53% -2.79% -5.32% 2.50% 5.38% 12.55% 30.66% 37.87% 
1997 -26.11% -8.88% 4.68% 22.87% 20.15% 24.10% 33.44% 32.25% 49.17% 48.05% 
1996 -18.32% -19.05% -5.13% 7.76% 7.96% 14.46% 22.44% 26.95% 42.04% 21.15% 
1995 -8.77% 0.22% -0.87% 24.59% 19.69% 22.91% 29.67% 43.08% 38.06% 42.20% 
1994 -40.47% -8.80% -20.50% -0.24% -6.23% 1.63% 4.56% 3.98% 11.54% 69.72% 
           
No of 
firms 
347 525 1045 4144 4419 7188 6805 3844 1207 105 
 
Here in Table 2.4-3 is a summary statistic of the average, median, maximum and 
minimum for each F-score. When looking at the average and the median number it can be seen 
that they coincide with the expectations that an investor is looking for. As demonstrated, 
investors should expect the minimum average return to be in F-0 whilst the highest average 
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return should be located in F-9 with F-0 average return equal to -23.57% and F-9 average return 
31.98%. The same story can be highlighted when looking at the median where F-0 equals -28.29% 
and F-9 median return equals 36.32%.  
Also, when taking a deeper look at the maximum and minimum, if someone had bought 
stock rated as F-0 they would have achieved a maximum return of 25.66% across all those years 
and a minimum return of -63.44%, whilst if investing in stock rated as F-9 an investor would have 
earned 94.24% across all those years and a minimum return of -24.71%. All of this shows once 
again the ability for the Piotroski model to earn abnormal returns when applied to a universe of 
stocks. There is strong evidence that the greater the quality of a stock as judged by its F-score the 
better the return. 
Table 2.4-3– Average, Median, Maximum and Minimum Metrics 
 
The Correlation matrix in Table 2.4-4 of the F-score return is computed into what is 
known as the correlation coefficient, which ranges between -1 and +1. This table gives us a better 
understanding of the correlation between the different f-scores. A perfect correlation implies that 
as one of the f-score return moves either up or down the other f-score will move in the same 
direction. If the correlation is equal to 0 the movements of the f-score are said to have no 
correlation. In this table the lowest correlation is between F-9 and F-0. When incremented by 
one, i.e., F-0 and F-1 or F-1 and F-2 or F-2 and F-3 or F-3 and F-4 or F-5 and F-6 or F-6 and F-7 or F-
7 and F-8, the correlation is high, proving the upgrade in the financial health of the company; 
however, when looking at F-8 and F-9 the story is slightly different with a correlation of 0.34. 
 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
Average  -23.57% -15.24% -2.69% 9.74% 5.66% 11.53% 17.84% 24.11% 33.22% 31.98% 
Median -28.29% -13.01% -2.44% 7.76% 7.96% 14.19% 18.12% 26.95% 31.83% 36.32% 
Max 25.66% 30.37% 47.04% 46.27% 37.88% 41.90% 44.68% 56.95% 71.02% 94.24% 
Min -63.44% -58.72% -47.79% -32.03% -34.59% -30.84% -26.40% -21.54% -9.67% -24.71% 
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Overall, all the F-scores are highly correlated, indicating the f-score is capturing gradually the 
return earned by companies.  
Table 2.4-4– Correlation matrix of the return between the different f-scores 
Correl fo f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 
fo  1          
f1 0.86 1.00         
f2 0.76 0.84 1.00        
f3 0.72 0.82 0.91 1.00       
f4 0.59 0.67 0.76 0.93 1.00      
f5 0.57 0.68 0.77 0.93 0.98 1.00     
f6 0.52 0.66 0.74 0.92 0.95 0.97 1.00    
f7 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.94 1.00   
f8 0.57 0.74 0.90 0.89 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.83 1.00  
f9 0.18 0.52 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.21 0.34 1.00 
 
 
Figure 2.4-5– Covering the period 1994 to 1999, evolution of the F-score return 
The graph in Figure 2.4-5 plots the return for the different F-scores from 1994 to 1999. 
This graph measures how the F-score return change over time. The x-axis of this graph shows the 
nine f-scores over the period 1994 to 1999 while the returns in percentage appear on the y-axis. It 
might be seen that the f-scores rose steadily to the F-8 after significantly dropping when it comes 
to the F-9, especially for 1996.  
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Overall, the data is generally increasing over time despite a few irregularities that we try 
to highlight in this paragraph. For example, when taking a deeper look at 1999 it appears that F-4 
displays one of the lowest returns, around 0.90%. Also F-0, F-1, F-2, and F-3 are all positive when 
one should really expect negative returns from these scores, reflecting some possible economic 
downturn.  
Also, when looking at F-9 there is a general decrease in the return – excluding for the 
following years 1994, 1998, and 1999 – with the lowest return in 1996 for F-9 at 21.15%.  
 
Figure 2.4-6– Covering the period 2000 to 2006, evolution of the F-score return across time 
The graph in Figure 2.4-6 shows the trend in the F-score return for the period 2000 to 
2006. It can be noticed that there is a poor performance return of F-score in 2002 where only F-9 
is positive. Also, some observations can be made when looking at 2003. All the F-scores are 
positive when really one should expect the picture to be negative for F-0, F-1, and F-2. 
Accordingly, F-9 is the lowest one after looking at 2002, perhaps highlighting some economic 
slowdown. Overall, there is a steady growth in the return for 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2006, 
even if in 2001 a drop in the return of F-8 can be noticed. 
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Figure 2.4-7 Covering the period 2007 to 2012, evolution of the F-score return across time 
The graph in Figure 2.4-7 shows the trend in the F-score return for the period 2007 to 
2012. It can clearly be seen that overall there is a large increase in the trend in all F-scores despite 
a general decrease in the F-9 for all the years. This indicates this criterion might contain 
information on future performance or likelihood of the market, as if it did not we should expect a 
continual increase in the f-scores. 
The returns for the following f-scores have continuously risen over the different time 
periods. In 2008 the trend in the f-score is continuously increasing even if the line for all the f-
scores is showing negative return, reflecting the downturn of the economic crisis. 2008 is the 
worst-performing return line in the graph, with the highest return in 2008 being achieved by an 
investor buying stocks rated F-8; the return is -9.67%. When looking at the F-9 in 2012 it might be 
possible to say that 2012 is in a recovery state as the return earned out of an F-9 is better than in 
2008, 2009 and 2011; however, it is slightly lower than in 2010 and 2007.  
Also, another point to note is that 2010 is the only period where the f-score for F-0 and F-
1 return is the lowest compared to any other years. Interestingly, the highest return is achieved in 
2009 with the F-8 at 71.02% following a massive drop in F-9, reinforcing the idea that economic 
downturn could have to be highlighted when looking at this picture. It is also worth noting that 
for all those periods there is a decreasing return in the F-4 when following a better performance 
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in F-3. That might be in line with intuitive economic reasoning, as the market completes its 
adjustment to earnings surprises at this time.  
2.4.3 Portfolio analysis given by a high F-score: F-7, F-8 and F-9 
Table 2.4-5 presents the performance of a buy and hold strategy when an investor buys 
stock in the basket of high f-score as defined by F-7, F-8 and F-9. The strategy appears to be 
robust across time.  
When it comes to the measurement of investment performance, an investor who pays 
someone to actively manage a portfolio with the hope of achieving superior performance usually 
requests the return that he is actually obtaining out of the market. The essential idea behind 
return measurement is to compare the returns using a portfolio of high F-score with those of a 
benchmark. In this case we measure the differential returns. Table 2.4-5 describes the 
performance return for the period 1994 to 2012; the first column give an insight of the return 
earned by a portfolio based on high F-score (where F-score is greater than or equal to 7); the next 
column gives the market return for the S&P 1500 over the period covered and, finally, the last 
column gives investors the excess return in values when forming this strategy.  
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Table 2.4-5 Portfolio returns and market return for a buy and hold strategy looking to buy into high F-score 
Year Return F-score 7-9 S&P 1500 
Market return 
Excess Returns against 
benchmark 
1994 6.08% 0.68% 5.40% 
1995 42.00% 33.73% 8.28% 
1996 31.16% 21.14% 10.02% 
1997 37.06% 31.71% 5.35% 
1998 18.57% 19.17% -0.60% 
1999 42.73% 23.29% 19.45% 
2000 37.66% -5.47% 43.13% 
2001 30.14% -12.88% 43.02% 
2002 -4.20% -19.97% 15.77% 
2003 55.79% 30.29% 25.50% 
2004 30.99% 12.79% 18.19% 
2005 30.79% 9.95% 20.84% 
2006 23.93% 15.00% 8.93% 
2007 16.55% 8.15% 8.40% 
2008 -19.67% -33.77% 14.09% 
2009 58.98% 28.58% 30.39% 
2010 30.43% 17.69% 12.74% 
2011 11.12% 2.87% 8.25% 
2012 24.52% 15.42% 9.10% 
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Figure 2.4-8 Performance of the portfolio displayed in a histogram 
Figure 2.4-8 documents one-year market-adjusted returns by fiscal year compared to a 
benchmark (the S&P 1500); the portfolio is taking a buy and hold position in high F-score (F-score 
greater than or equal to 7). 
The portfolio offers the exposure of a well-diversified US company. As stated, the 
portfolio is benchmarked against the S&P 1500 excluding financials and aims to outperform this 
over the long term. Also, we are not accounting for any cash in the asset allocation just for the 
purpose of the demonstration but a deep insight of portfolio analysis would be interesting to 
develop. The worst performance of the portfolio is in 2008, probably due to the crisis, where the 
portfolio underperforms by -19.67%; the second-worst performance is in 2002 where the return 
is -4.20%, reflecting the stock market downturn of 2002. Interestingly, the best performances are 
achieved following those two crises within 2009 a performance of 59.98% and in 2003 the 
portfolio return is 55.79%, reflecting that the strategy might perform better after the turmoil 
where investors lose confidence and therefore do not know into which company they should put 
their money. The portfolio is calculated on an equally weighted basis and compared to a value-
weighted benchmark in order to simplify the analysis (including dividends). 
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The portfolio is up 24.52% versus the S&P 1500 up 15.42% over the last 12 months in 
2012 and in 2008 the portfolio was down -19.67% versus -33.77%, still beating the market. We 
believe the return tends to come from stock selection, proving its efficiency as the portfolio tends 
to outperform the market – excluding 1998 where the market return is 19.17% versus 18.57% for 
the portfolio constituted of high f-scores. Clearly the portfolio, despite avoiding picking poor 
stocks due to its ability, has been better at limiting downside risk. In 2011 the portfolio returned 
11.12%, outperforming the benchmark return of 2.87% by 8.25%.  
Investing in high-quality companies that can differentiate themselves from the 
competition will help investors to outperform in most market conditions since the portfolio is 
driven by stock selection. Also, from this figure we believe the portfolio has characteristics for 
potential out-performance in both up and down markets.  
 
Figure 2.4-9 Investment Performance 
The graph in Figure 2.4-9 shows the investment performance of investing in a high F-
score (F-score greater than or equal to 7). We take $100 as a basis to get a better idea of the 
performance. The performance data highlighted in Figure 2.4-9 indicates that a portfolio of high 
F-scores (greater than or equal to 7) significantly outperforms the S&P 1500 over the review 
period. The high F-score portfolio experienced a cumulative return of 18% while the S&P 1500 
experienced a 15% return over the period. The portfolio twice declined below $100 whilst the 
benchmark declined four times, emphasizing previous comments about the robustness of the 
model to limit risk when the market drops significantly. 
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Chapter three –  Statistics 
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3.1 Financial characteristics 
 
One the primary work of this chapter is to provide descriptive statistics about the 
financial characteristics of the firms based on using the F-score. Here we expect firms with the 
highest F-score to have the best subsequent return performance given the strength and the 
consistency in the fundamental signals. In fact, different tests are formed to see whether the high 
F-score portfolio outperform the low F-score portfolio. Results are compared using market 
adjusted returns. Results are tested using both tradition t-statistics as well as implementing a 
bootstrapping approach to test for differences in portfolio returns. All the results can be found at 
the end of the chapter in the annexe. Using dummy variables in our panel data analysis we are 
interested at a cross sectional point of view. In fact we intend to understand which component is 
more efficient, more effective, and more proactive and on the other side with respect to the time 
we are interested in knowing which particular year is more efficient, more stable one. By 
including different variables in our regression we are able to report that the F-score remain 
significant. 
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Table 3.1-1 Financial characteristics 
                                                          
45 ME: the market value of equity (market value is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding at fiscal year-end times closing share price). 
46 TotalA: the total assets at the end of the fiscal year t.  
47 BM: book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t, scaled by ME. 
48 ROA: net income before extraordinary items for the fiscal year preceding portfolio formation 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.  
49 ∆ROA: change in annual ROA for the year preceding portfolio formation. ∆ROA is calculated as 
ROA for year t less the firm’s ROA for year t-1.  
50 ΔMargin: gross margin (net sales less cost of goods sold) for the year preceding portfolio 
formation scaled by net sales for the year, less the firm’s gross margin (scaled by net sales) from 
year t-1.  
51 CFOA: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t. 
52 ∆Liquid: change in the firm’s current ratio between the end of year t and year t-1. Current ratio 
is defined as total current assets divided by total current liabilities.  
53 ∆Lever: change in the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio between the end of year t and year t -1. The 
debt to asset ratio is defined as the firm’s total long-term debt (including the portion of long-term 
debt classified as current) scaled by average total assets.  
54 ∆Turn: change in the firm’s asset turnover ratio between the end of year t and year t-1. The 
asset turnover ratio is defined as net sales scaled by average. 
55 Accruals: net income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations, scaled by 
beginning of the year total assets. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
ME
45
 15940 5732.164 727.1765 21798.41 0 504239.6 
TotalA
46
 15936 7936.102 1728.418 28979.04 21 797769 
BM
47
 15940 0.3755611 0.2978223 0.7702286 -60.59971 8.503401 
ROA
48
 15940 0.0412894 0.0498574 0.1335711 -5.879727 0.7830853 
ΔROA
49
 15940 -0.0013463 0.001033 0.1395461 -5.879727 4.94685 
ΔMARGIN
50
 15940 0.0421825 0.0007067 2.184291 -30.10921 231.8289 
CFOA
51
 15940 0.1059095 0.1008921 0.087311 -1.171011 0.8677104 
ΔLIQUID
52
 15940 0.145588 0.0160509 1.507141 -27.65481 53.80119 
ΔLEVER
53
 15940 0.0230384 0 0.1866511 -1.197168 2.789499 
ΔTURN
54
 15940 0.2470787 0.0040003 21.24361 -472.2617 2601.254 
Accruals
55
 15940 -0.0646201 -0.0508745 0.116315 -5.640199 0.7163669 
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Table 3.1-1 provides descriptive statistics about financial characteristics of the portfolio of 
firms; for instance, the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum values are 
presented. As shown, we see that we have 15,940 observations; the mean of market value is 
$5,732.164 million and the standard deviation is $21,798.41 million. The minimum is 0, and the 
maximum is $504,239.6 million. There are only 15,936 observations on total assets, so some of 
the observations are missing. Firms have a mean (median) BM ratio of 0.3755 (0.2978223) as 
shown in the table; the average (median) ROA realization is 0.0412 (0.0498) and the average and 
median firms show a decline in ∆ROA for the average -0.0013 and median of 0.0010. Also, the 
table shows an increase in liquidity with an average (median) of 0.1455 (0.0160) and an increase 
in leverage of 0.0230 (0) average and median respectively. An increase in turnover can also be 
highlighted: the average (median) is 0.2470 (0.0040).  
3.2 Buy-and-hold returns from a high Piotroski F-score 
investment between 2000 to 2012 
Table 3.2-1 Summary statistics 
  Stats      Mean       10th 
Percentile 
     25th 
Percentile 
Median      75th 
Percentile 
    90th 
Percentile 
Raw
56
 0.1285448 -0.3792156 -0.148099 0.0863173 0.3228463 0.6350249 
Market-Adj
57
 0.0817551 -0.355995 -0.1760604 0.0217744 0.2489982 0.5392746 
 
Table 3.2-1 presents one-year buy and hold returns for a portfolio of high Piotroski F-
scores (7 to 9) along with the percentage of firms in the portfolio with positive raw and market-
adjusted returns over the respective investment horizon. The high Piotroski portfolios earn 
positive market-adjusted returns in the one year following portfolio formation. The average 
(median) of the market-adjusted return is 0.0817 (0.021) respectively. This reflects the ability for 
                                                          
56
 A raw return is calculated as a 12-month buy and hold of the firm. Return compounding ends the earlier 
of one year after return compounding starts or the last day of reported trading. IF the firm is delisted, the 
delisting return is assumed to be zero.  
57
 The market-adjusted return equals the firm’s 12-month buy and hold return less the buy and hold return 
on the value-weighted market index over the same investment horizon.  
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the high F-score portfolio to capture better subsequent returns, as it can be seen the 90th 
percentile of the portfolio earns an approximately 53% market-adjusted return whereas the 10th 
percentile of the portfolio earn an approximately -35% market-adjusted return.  
3.3 Correlation analysis between one-year stock return and 
market-adjusted return: the nine fundamental signals 
for a high score Piotroski portfolio above 7 
Table 3.3-1 Correlation matrix 
 SR12M MARET ROA VROA VMARGIN CFOA VLIQUID VLEVER VTURN Accruals EQOFFER Fscore 
             
SR12M 1.000            
MARET 0.931 1.000           
ROA 0.028 0.038 1.000          
VROA 0.158 0.136 0.133 1.000         
VMARGIN 0.028 0.022 -0.055 0.201 1.000        
CFOA 0.094 0.111 0.728 0.067 0.026 1.000       
VLIQUID 0.059 0.066 0.017 0.054 0.093 -0.012 1.000      
VLEVER -0.095 -0.089 -0.104 -0.219 -0.062 -0.121 0.076 1.000     
VTURN 0.017 0.007 -0.143 -0.061 0.249 -0.148 0.395 0.143 1.000    
Accruals -0.102 -0.115 0.118 0.058 -0.103 -0.594 0.038 0.053 0.046 1.000   
EQOFFER 0.000 -0.005 -0.135 -0.113 -0.006 0.154 -0.026 -0.016 -0.027 -0.382 1.000  
Fscore 0.058 0.064 -0.014 0.020 0.064 -0.041 0.107 0.099 0.106 0.042 0.063 1.000 
 
Table 3.3-1 presents a correlation analysis between one-year stock return, the market-
adjusted return and the nine fundamental signals attached to the construction of the F-score for a 
high Piotroski portfolio (7 to 9). As expected, F-score has a significant correlation with one-year 
stock return and market-adjusted return – 0.058 and 0.064 respectively. The two strongest 
explanatory variables are the ∆ROA and CFOA; in line with the findings provided by Piotroski 
(2000), these variables have a correlation of 0.136 and 0.111 respectively with one-year market-
adjusted returns. The sample represents 2489 observations between 2000 and 2012.  
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3.4 Table 4: One-year market-adjusted returns since 2000 
by F-score   
Table 3.4-1 Summary statistics for one-year market-adjusted return  
Fscore mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 N 
        
0 -0.290 -0.700 -0.557 -0.389 -0.089 0.272 79 
1 -0.200 -0.639 -0.507 -0.298 -0.020 0.404 165 
2 -0.010 -0.535 -0.354 -0.123 0.153 0.595 622 
3 0.030 -0.442 -0.270 -0.045 0.220 0.578 1932 
4 0.014 -0.395 -0.222 -0.029 0.179 0.442 2778 
5 0.070 -0.320 -0.160 0.017 0.222 0.484 4185 
6 0.127 -0.279 -0.114 0.067 0.277 0.565 3690 
7 0.184 -0.218 -0.072 0.112 0.336 0.621 1900 
8 0.256 -0.210 -0.052 0.149 0.413 0.825 550 
9 0.301 -0.318 -0.141 0.082 0.522 1.482 39 
High P (7-9) 
Low P  (0-3)                     
            0.201 
    -0.001              
  -0.219 
-0.501 
     -0.069 
     -.315 
    0.119 
  -0.082      
      0.353 
      0.186                
           0.672 
0.566 
   2489 
   2798 
Total 0.081 -0.356 -0.176 0.021 0.248 0.539 15940 
Bootstrap                              
(p-Value)                                
           (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
High – Low 
Bootstrap 
(p-value) 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Table 3.4-1 shows the mean, the median, the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentile for one-
year market-adjusted performance by F-score. For example, stocks scoring a maximum F-score of 
9 have an average (median) of 30.1% (8.2%) respectively; the 75th percentile stock delivered a 
return of 52.2% whilst the 25th percentile stock delivered a return of -14.1%. Most of the 
observations are clustered around F-scores between 3 and 7, meaning that a vast majority of the 
firms have conflicting performance signals. In contrast, 2489 firms are classified as high F-scores 
(scores of 7 to 9) and 2798 firms are classified as low F-scores (scores of 0 to 3). As can be 
noticed, high F-score firms significantly outperform low F-score firms as described: mean 
(median) market-adjusted returns of 20.1% (11.9%) versus -0.1% (-8.2%). Also, it can be noticed 
that the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, 75th percentile and 90th percentile returns of high F-score 
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are significantly higher than the corresponding returns of the low F-score. The model confirms 
our view that it is good at identifying potential winners from losers. It can be noticed that there is 
an overall steady improvement in performance in line with a rise in the F-score. For instance, 
there is a 24% difference between the 25th percentile performances in the low F-score versus the 
high F-score. Please find bootstrapping results in Appendix A.  
3.4.1 Bar charts of F-score by mean market-adjusted return 
 
Figure 3.4-1 Bar chart displays F-score by market-adjusted return 
This bar chart in Figure 3.4-1 describes the average market-adjusted return of buying the 
different F-scores. An investor would expect to see that steady growth in the returns, suggesting 
that the model is well adjusted and is distinguishing winners from losers. As can be noticed, the 
highest adjusted mean market return is earned when forming a portfolio of an F-score of 7 to 9 
and a negative return can be used in a short strategy to benefit from a portfolio of 0 to 3.  
The difference between the 0 and 9 F-score over the one-year market-adjusted return is 
about 60%.  
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3.4.2 Histogram description: histogram of market-adjusted 
return, log market equity and log book to market are 
displayed below 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4-2 Histogram of market-adjusted return 
Here in Figure 3.4-2, we check for the distribution of our dependent variables, so that we 
know its properties for when we want to conduct some regression analysis. From the histogram 
we can see that our dependent variable is reasonably normally distributed. The same analysis has 
been applied to two independent variables, the log market equity and the log book to market, 
which we present below. From the two histograms in figures 3.4-3 and 3.4-4 we can see that our 
independent variables are both reasonably normally distributed; especially, it is remarkable to 
see how the log market equity displays such tidy distribution characteristics.  
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Figure 3.4-3 Histogram of log market equity 
 
 
Figure 3.4-4 Histogram of log book to market 
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3.5 One-year market-adjusted58 buy and hold returns based 
on using the F-score by size partition59 
Table 3.5-1 Displays the F-score by size of the firms 
Fscore High firms Medium firms Low firms 
 mean median N mean median N mean median N 
          
0 -0.2887431 -0.3536437 39 -0.2373254 -0.3733679 19 -0.3416842 -0.434902 21 
1 -0.1729989 -0.3113576 89 -0.1146113 -0.187818 32 -0.3178241 -0.3419259 44 
2 0.068076 -0.0728179 341 -0.042889 -0.1235814 129 -0.1601509 -0.2001317 152 
3 0.0822197 -0.0130017 941 0.0351946 -0.0162737 588 -0.0971428 -0.1556682 403 
4 0.0349367 -0.0176967 1330 0.0263272 -0.0142387 874 -0.049297 -0.081667 574 
5 0.0924084 0.0312326 2065 0.0909248 0.032135 1277 -0.0160766 -0.0505634 843 
6 0.1481785 0.0784987 1908 0.1438068 0.0903078 1119 0.0392119 -0.0104748 663 
7 0.2275711 0.135344 1000 0.1725629 0.1215329 571 0.0725483 0.0314488 329 
8 0.3192376 0.2193965 277 0.2753888 0.1520601 153 0.0867398 0.0520699 120 
9 0.7009261 0.4379594 18 0.0228867 -0.012721 12 -0.1245719 -0.0867512 9 
High P 0.253758 0.1564943 1295 0.191498 0.1224708 768 0.0723931 0.0277475 458 
Low P 0.0524289 -0.0445295 1410  0.009095 -0.048336 736 -0.136534 -0.1865906 620 
 
Table 3.5-1 shows the market returns of our sample by distinguishing firms in low, 
medium and high book to market.  
The highest market-adjusted return is earned in the high book to market firms, 
emphasizing Piotroski’s (2000) idea that the F-score ability is more reliable on the high book to 
market firms. Our analysis emphasizes this point and highlights that when using the F-score 
strategy the strongest benefit from analyzing financial statement is concentrated on the high 
book to market firms, i.e., value firms. Return difference between the high F-score portfolio (7 to 
9) and a low F-score portfolio (0 to 3) in the high book to market sample is 20.13%. However, the 
shift in the mean and median returns is still significant in the medium portfolio. 
The question is whether the strategy earned subsequent returns across all categories. The 
book to market is defined as the book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t, scaled by market 
capitalization (ME).  
 
 
                                                          
58
 The market-adjusted return equals the firm’s 12-month buy and hold return less the buy and hold return 
on the value-weighted market index over the same investment horizon.  
59
 The 30 and 70 percentile cutoffs from the prior year’s distribution of firm book to market are used to 
classify the sample into high, medium and low firms each year.  
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3.5.1 Bar chart F-score and book to market against market-
adjusted return 
 
Figure 3.5-1 Displays a bar chart of the F-score by book to market and market-adjusted return 
This chart in Figure 3.5-1 emphasizes our previous point of view that the F-score strategy 
is more efficient in the high book to market firms rather than in the low ones, reflecting that an 
investor can earn high returns by focusing on the high book to market segment of the sample.  
This charts shows that returns based on book to market tend to have more positive 
returns in high book to market firms rather than in the low book to market ones. This explanation 
is consistent with a reversal effect and to some extent with small firms because high book to 
market firms tend to be small.  
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3.6 Analysis of variance 
Table 3.6-1 Summary of the variance 
 
Table 3.6-1 shows the analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the market-adjusted return. The sum 
of squares (SS) of the regression (108.482) is the portion of the variance of the dependent 
variable (MARET) that is explained by the independent variable (the BM and Fscore). The MS for 
the residual (0.1918) shows the variance of the unexplained portion of MARET (market-adjusted 
return), that is the portion of return that is independent of the F-score and the book to market.  
3.6.1 Box plot of market-adjusted return by F-score  
 
Figure 3.6-1 Displays a box plot by market-adjusted return and F-score 
Here we use a graph box in Figure 3.6-1; the main ingredient of a box plot is the 
eponymous box, used to indicate the lower and upper quartiles of the variables or group being 
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plotted against a magnitude scale. The median is represented by a line subdividing the box. The 
length of the box represents the interquartile range. The lines extending vertically from the boxes 
indicate variability outside the upper and lower quartiles, emphasizing that subsequent returns 
can be earned when an investor is focusing on buying stocks rated with an F-score of 7. This helps 
to indicate the degree of dispersion and skewness in the data and could help to identify outliers.  
3.6.2 Box plot of market-adjusted return by F-score and size 
 
Figure 3.6-2 Displays a box plot by market-adjusted return and by size 
This graph in Figure 3.6-2 describes a box plot of the market-adjusted return by F-score 
and size; the idea is to show that the F-score is more significant in small stocks than in big stocks, 
as highlighted by the magnitude of the different boxes.  
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3.6.3 Box plot of market-adjusted return by F-score and book to 
market 
 
Figure 3.6-3 Displays a box plot by book to market and market-adjusted return  
The graph in Figure 3.6-3 above uses a box plot; the main reason is to indicate that the 
strategy is more significant among high book to market firms instead of low book to market firms, 
showing that the F-score strategy is more profitable to an investor willing to invest in value 
stocks. The whiskers are the two vertical lines below and above the box which are terminated by 
small horizontal lines called the fences. The upper fence is the highest value of the distribution 
that is smaller than or equal to the third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range. The lower 
fence is the lowest value of the distribution that is greater than or equal to the first quartile minus 
1.5 times the interquartile range.  
Observations below the lower fence or above the upper fence are regarded as outliers 
and are plotted with single plot symbols. 
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3.6.4 Scatter diagram of market-adjusted return and book to market 
 
Figure 3.6-4 Displays a scatter plot by book to market and market-adjusted return 
This scatter diagram in Figure 3.6-4 is intended to analyze the relationship between the 
market-adjusted return and book to market. The market-adjusted variable is plotted on the 
vertical axis and the book to market is plotted on the horizontal axis. There is a weak positive 
correlation as the value of y increases slightly as the value of x increases. It appears that, as the 
variables on the horizontal axis change, the variables on the vertical axis seem to vary within a 
relatively small range, with the tendency to increase. This graph helps as well to outline outliers 
which tend to be far away from the sample.  
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3.6.5 Histogram to describe the market-adjusted return by sector and 
F-score 
 
Figure 3.6-5 Displays the F-score by sector and market-adjusted return 
This graph in Figure 3.6-5 shows in the form of a histogram the distributions that vary 
according to the sector exposure and to the F-score. The information technology sector seems to 
capture the F-score negative market-adjusted return for a low F-score (0 to 4) with a gradual 
increase in the return; the same can be noticed when looking at high F-scores (5 to 9). The 
consumer discretionary sector also seems to capture the F-score in a similar manner.  
 When someone is willing to invest in our strategy s/he will have more chance to earn 
subsequent returns on the health care sector if s/he wants to buy a stock rated out of 9. The 
same notion can be applied in the information technology sector as well as in the materials and 
consumer discretionary sectors.  
When an investor is willing to benefit from a low F-score portfolio such as selling stocks 
rated out with a 0, s/he should focus on the consumer discretionary, the energy and the 
telecommunication services. 
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A useful way to define industry groups is given by the North American Industry 
Classification System or NAICS codes60. 
3.6.6 Results by sector relative to a high F-score or a low F-score 
portfolio 
 
Figure 3.6-6 Displays the F-score by sector and low or high portfolio 
The two charts above in Figure 3.6-6 highlight the different sector exposure for the high 
F-score (7 to 9) and the low F-score (0 to 3) portfolio from 2000 to 2012. It suggests that an 
investor can benefit from higher returns by increasing the weights where the portfolio is 
performing better. Therefore, we would recommend investors to invest in information 
technology, materials and consumer discretionary when looking at the high F-score portfolio; the 
same sectors can be applied within the low F-score if the investor is willing to short stocks. In 
other words, the sector distributions are relatively similar in the sense that the F-scores for the 
low and high F-score portfolio capture the consumer discretionary, information technology and 
materials sectors. For instance, the consumer discretionary sector accounts for 27% of the high F-
                                                          
60
 These codes are used for firms operating inside the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 
region which includes the US, Mexico and Canada. NAICS codes replaced the Standard Industry 
Classification or SIC codes previously used in the US.  
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score and -5% of the low F-score portfolio. Information technology accounts for 29% of the high 
F-score portfolio and -9% of the low F-score and, finally, materials account for 24% of the high F-
score portfolio and -2% of the low F-score portfolio. It can be seen as well that, in the sector 
distribution of our two portfolios, we intentionally removed the financials sectors as the strategy 
is not appropriate to understand financial statements from the firms’ part of the financial sectors 
due to different complexity. 
3.7 Descriptive statistics for the high and low F-score portfolios 
and the complete sample 
Table 3.7-1 Displays statistics for the low and high portfolio 
 All Firms High F-score Low F-score Difference High - Low 
ME61     
Mean 5732.164 7771.266 2335.693 5435.573 
Median  727.1765 1108.555 417.1557 691.3943 
BM ratio62     
Mean 0.3755611 0.3576918 0.3637779 -0.00609 
Median  0.2978223 0.2809939 0.2844 -0.00341 
∆Leverage63     
Mean 0.0230384 0.0471115 0.0848551 -0.03774 
Median  0 0.0140261 0 0.014026 
Accruals64     
Mean -0.0646201 -0.0547397 -0.0891148 0.034375 
Median  -0.0508745 -0.0482923 -0.056751 0.008459 
 
                                                          
61 ME: the market value of equity (market value is calculated as the number of shares outstanding 
at fiscal year-end times closing share price). 
62 BM: book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t, scaled by ME. Stocks are allocated to two 
size groups (small or big) based on whether that particular stock’s market equity is below or 
above the median ME for the NYSE stocks in the stock universe. Stocks also are allocated 
independently to three BE/ME groups (low, medium and high). The break points are the bottom 
30%, middle 40%, and the top 30% BE/ME values of the NYSE stocks in the stock universe 
63 ∆Lever: change in the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio between the end of year t and year t -1. The 
debt to asset ratio is defined as the firm’s total long-term debt (including the portion of long-term 
debt classified as current) scaled by average total assets.  
64 Accruals: net income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations, scaled by 
beginning of the year total assets. 
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This table, 3.7-1, shows the differences in the mean and median realization between the 
high and low F-score portfolio. The difference in the average (median) in the market equity value 
is 5935.573 (691.3943) respectively; the difference in the book to market ratio for the average 
(median) is -0.00609 (-0.00341). Also, using the same method of description, the difference in the 
average (median) in the change in leverage is -0.03774 (0.014026). Finally, the difference in the 
accruals components for the average (median) is 0.034375 (0.008459). 
Following Piotroski(2000) work it conveys here to present the results using a panel data 
analysis.  
3.8 Panel data analysis 
Table 3.8-1 Panel data regression – linear regression 1 
Linear regression: 
 
 
Model 1: 𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑻𝒊 = α + 𝜷𝟎 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑴𝑬𝒊)+ 𝜷𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑩𝑴𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑𝑭𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆+ 𝜺𝒊 
The pooled model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=301.62, p<0.000). R² of 
0.0803 says that this model accounts for 8% of the total variance. The model has the intercept 
of -0.1812343 and slope of -0.1441 for logBM and -0.005106 for logME. The coefficient on F-
score indicates that after controlling for size and book to market a one-point improvement in the 
aggregate score is associated with a 3.8% increase in the one-year market-adjusted return. 
Notice that the logME is only significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 3.8-2 Panel data regression – linear regression 2 
 
Model 2: 𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑻𝒊  = α + 𝜷𝟎 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑴𝑬𝒊) + 𝜷𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑩𝑴𝒊)  + 𝜷𝟑𝑭𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  + 𝜷𝟒𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  + 
𝜷𝟓𝑬𝑸𝑶𝑭𝑭𝑬𝑹+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
The addition of variables designed to capture accrual reversal, and a prior equity issuance 
has no impact on the robustness of the F-score to predict future returns. The pooled model fits 
the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=188.73, p<0.000). R² of 0.0835 says that this models 
accounts for 8% of the total variance. Also, the coefficient on F-score is indicating that, after 
controlling for size and book to market, accruals and equity offering a one-point improvement in 
the aggregate score are associated with a 3.8% increase in the one-year market-adjusted return. 
Notice that the EQOFFER (issues of new shares) is not significant. 
Panel Data analysis:  
Fixed-effects: 
Panel data, also called longitudinal data or cross-sectional time series data, are data 
where the same entities’ (panels) firms were observed at multiple points in time. We first apply a 
fixed-effect regression to control for omitted variables that differ among panels but are constant 
over time. We assume that there are other effects that are different among firms but constant 
over time.  
Model 3:  𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑻𝒊𝒕 = α + 𝜷𝟎 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕)+ 𝜷𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟑𝑭𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
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Table 3.8-3 Fixed-effects regression 
 
The output shows that it is a fixed-effects regression, with a group variable Idd. There are 
a total of 10,366 observations and 1375 groups (firms). The observations are per group; in this 
case year ranges from 1 to 13. Plugging the coefficients into the above model we have: 
𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑻𝒊𝒕 = -0.350 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕)+ −𝟎. 𝟑𝟔𝟕 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕) + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟖𝑭𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
39.4% of the variance is due to the differences across panels as shown by ‘Rho’.  
The intercept, trend and coefficient on market-adjusted return are allowed to vary with 
the country.  
Time fixed-effects: 
In this case we assume that there are unobserved effects that vary across time rather 
than across firms that can impact the market-adjusted return. For example, macroeconomic 
events may impact firms in the same sector in the same way but may be different at different 
points in time. For instance, we run a time fixed-effects regression so that the model looks like: 
Model 4: 𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑻𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒕 + 𝜷𝟎 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕)+ 𝜷𝟏 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝟑𝑭𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
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So the intercept includes the variation of time rather than panels. In stata, you can run 
time fixed effect model using “areg” and have “year” as the variable to be observed. 
Table 3.8-4 Time fixed-effects regression 
 
In the time fixed-effects model we are assuming that the slope for market-adjusted 
return is the same for all years but the intercept is different. Please find regression below for each 
year. Time effect is needed it as a joint test following Piotroski (2000) to see if the dummies for all 
years are equal to zero. In the case they are , no fixed effect test is needed.  
Table 3.8-5 Statistics regression for each year 
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Random-effects regression: 
Here we apply a Random-effects regression.  
Table 3.8-6 Random-effects regression 
 
Choosing between the fixed and random-effects:  
Greene (2008) said: “The crucial distinction between fixed and random-effects is whether 
the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in 
the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not” (p. 183, Econometric Analysis). 
Here we use the Hausman test: 
H: (𝛽𝐹𝐸 − 𝛽𝑅𝐸) [var(𝛽𝐹𝐸) − var(𝛽𝑅𝐸)]−1 (𝛽𝑅𝐸 −  𝛽𝑅𝐸) ≈  𝜒2 (𝐾) 
Where (𝛽𝐹𝐸 −  𝛽𝑅𝐸) is the vector of the difference between the estimates of the 
coefficients from both the random and fixed-effects specifications and [var(𝛽𝐹𝐸) − var(𝛽𝑅𝐸)]−1 
is the difference in their variances. The test is distributed as 𝜒2 (𝐾) with K equal to the number of 
coefficients of the model.  
The hypothesis HO is that estimates by random-effects are not different from those for 
fixed-effects. Therefore, they are consistent and the random-effects should be preferred. The H1 
hypothesis states that estimates by random-effects are different from those for fixed-effects. 
Therefore, they are not consistent and the random-effects estimators are not appropriate.  
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The Hausman test  
Table 3.8-7 Hausman test  
 
 
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
random-effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed-effects estimator. If 
they are, then it is more suitable to use random-effects; however, if a statistically significant P-
value is obtained, it is more suitable to use fixed-effects. The P-value is statistically significant 
therefore fixed-effects is more appropriate.  
In that case we regressed: Model 3:  𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡  = α + 𝛽0 log(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛽1 log(𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡) + 
𝛽3𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 by restricting the year greater than or equal to 2007. The results show that all our 
variables are significant.  
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Fixed-effects regression when year is >= 2007  
Table 3.8-8 Fixed-effects regression when year is greater than 2007 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=280.71, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1822 says that this model accounts for 18% of the total variance. The model has an intercept 
of -1.17 and slope of -0.34 for the logBM and 0.11 for the logME. Coefficient of the F-score 
indicates that after controlling for size and book to market effects a one-point improvement in 
the aggregate score is associated with a 2% increase in the market-adjusted return. Notice that 
we have restricted the sample year to be 7 years.  
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Random-effects regression when year is >=2007 
Table 3.8-9 Random-effects regression when year is greater than 2007 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=535.81, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1603 says that this model accounts for 16% of the total variance. The model has an intercept 
of -0.32 and slope of -0.158 for the logBM and 0.015 for the logME. Coefficient of the F-score 
indicates that after controlling for size and book to market effects a one-point improvement in the 
aggregate score is associated with a 2.8% increase in the market-adjusted return. Notice that we 
have restricted the sample year to be before 2007.  
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The Hausman test  
Table 3.8-10 Hausman test 
 
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
random-effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed-effects estimator. If 
they are, then it is more suitable to use random-effects; however if a statistically significant P-
value is obtained it is more suitable to use fixed-effects. The P-value is statistically significant 
therefore fixed-effects is more appropriate.  
Fixed-effects regression when year is < = 2007  
In this case we try to reproduce the same approach but here we are restricting the 
sample year as less than or equal to 2007. We run first a fixed-effects regression as previously 
applied.  
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Table 3.8-11 Fixed-effects regression when year is less than 2007 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=412.84, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1925 says that this model accounts for 19% of the total variance. The model has an 
intercept of -0.35 and slope of -0.48 for the logBM and -0.011 for the logME. Coefficient of the 
F-score indicates that after controlling for size and book to market effects a one-point 
improvement in the aggregate score is associated with a 2.7% increase in the market-adjusted 
return. Notice that we have restricted the sample year to be after 2007.  
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Random-effects regression when year is <=2007 
Table 3.8-12 Random-effects regression when year is less than 2007 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=716.39, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1684 says that this model accounts for 16% of the total variance. The model has an intercept 
of -0.22 and slope of -0.21for the logBM and -0.006 for the logME. Coefficient of the F-score 
indicates that after controlling for size and book to market effects a one-point improvement in the 
aggregate score is associated with a 3.8% increase in the market-adjusted return. Notice that we 
have restricted the sample year to be after 2007. 
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The Hausman test 
Table 3.8-13 Hausman test  
 
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
random-effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed-effects estimator. If 
they are, then it is more suitable to use random-effects; however if a statistically significant P-
value is obtained it is more suitable to use fixed-effects. The P-value is statistically significant 
therefore fixed-effects is more appropriate.  
Finally, we run the regression by excluding 2008 from our sample and by including new 
variables such as world q65 and dividend yield and accruals. Even after including those variables, 
the F-score is significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65
 For each firm in country j, q is computed annually as total assets less the book value of equity plus market 
value of equity, all divided by book value of total assets. See for instance: Doidge et al. (2013).  
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Fixed-effects regression excluding 2008  
Table 3.8-14 Fixed-effects regression excluding 2008 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=263.52, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1617 says that this model accounts for 16% of the total variance. The model has an 
intercept of -0.22 and slope of -0.40 for the logBM and -0.019 for the logME.  
Coefficient of the F-score indicates that after controlling for size and book to market 
effects a one-point improvement in the aggregate score is associated with a 3.1% increase in the 
market-adjusted return. Notice that we have restricted the sample year by excluding 2008 to 
avoid the effect of the crisis.   
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Random-effects regression excluding 2008 
Table 3.8-15 Random-effects regression excluding 2008 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=1073.07, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1460 says that this model accounts for 14% of the total variance. The model has an intercept 
of -0.19 and slope of -0.20 for the logBM and -0.0069 for the logME.  
Coefficient of the F-score indicates that after controlling for size and book to market 
effects a one-point improvement in the aggregate score is associated with a 3.7% increase in the 
market-adjusted return. Notice that we have restricted the sample year by excluding 2008 to 
avoid the effect of the crisis.   
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The Hausman test  
Table 3.8-16 Hausman test 
 
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
random-effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed-effects estimator. If 
they are, then it is more suitable to use random-effects; however if a statistically significant P-
value is obtained it is more suitable to use fixed-effects. The P-value is statistically significant 
therefore fixed-effects is more appropriate.  
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Fixed-effects regression including Altman Z-score  
We run the regression by including a new variable such as Altman Z-score (1968) from our 
sample to see whether after including such a variable the F-score is still significant.  
Table 3.8-17 Fixed-effects regression including Altman Z-score 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=282.70, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1588 says that this model accounts for 16% of the total variance. The model has an intercept 
of -0.29 and slope of -0.36 for the logBM and -0.0039 for the logME.  
Coefficient of the F-score indicates that after controlling for size and book to market 
effects a one-point improvement in the aggregate score is associated with a 2.8% increase in the 
market-adjusted return.  
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Random-effects regression including Altman Z-score 
Table 3.8-18 Random-effects regression including Altman Z-score 
 
The model fits the data at the 0.05 significance level (F=1169.46, p<0.000). The within 𝑅2 
of 0.1446 says that this model accounts for 14% of the total variance. The model has an intercept 
of -0.18 and slope of -0.19 for the logBM and -0.0049 for the logME.  
Coefficient of the F-score indicate that after controlling for size and book to market 
effects a one-point improvement in the aggregate score is associated with a 3.5% increase in the 
market-adjusted return.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
130 
 
The Hausman test  
Table 3.8-19 Hausman test 
 
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
random-effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed-effects estimator. If 
they are, then it is more suitable to use random-effects; however if a statistically significant P-
value is obtained it is more suitable to use fixed-effects. The P-value is statistically significant 
therefore fixed-effects is more appropriate.  
To conclude, most of the observations are clustered around F-score between 3 and 7, indicating 
that a vast majority of the firms have conflicting performances signals. Overall, the F-score is able 
to distinguish between winners and losers and enable us to follow to our next chapter by forming 
a market neutral portfolio.  
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3.9 Appendices 
3.9.1 Appendix A: Bootstrapping results 
Bootstrapping results for F-score and market-adjusted return; we are reporting results for 
the median, the 10th, the 25th, the 75th and 90th percentiles.  
Table 3.9-1 Bootstrap regression by percentile 
Bootstrap, Median regression 
 
Bootstrap, 10th percentile regression 
 
Bootstrap, 25th percentile regression 
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Bootstrap, 75th percentile regression 
 
Bootstrap, 90th percentile regression 
 
Bootstrapping results for high F-score (7 to 9) minus low F-score (0 to 3); we are reporting 
results for the median, the 10th, the 25th, the 75th and 90th percentiles.  
Bootstrap, Median regression 
 
Bootstrap, 10th percentile regression 
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Bootstrap, 25th percentile regression 
 
Bootstrap, 75th percentile regression 
 
Bootstrap, 90th percentile regression 
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3.9.2 Appendix B: Time series number of companies by year and F-
score 
Table 3.9-2 Number of companies every year 
Year F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 Low High 
2000 13 26 84 199 240 325 220 113 41 8 322 162 
2001 10 15 84 171 217 342 277 114 40 4 280 158 
2002 7 15 30 133 177 318 317 192 71 2 185 265 
2003 6 19 55 131 204 293 335 171 43 4 211 218 
2004 9 13 39 152 236 314 298 160 44 4 213 208 
2005 9 15 51 171 217 324 312 132 30 4 246 166 
2006 3 7 45 166 254 306 250 167 45 0 221 212 
2007 5 15 32 157 217 326 294 135 45 2 209 182 
2008 5 13 82 181 229 330 239 104 21 1 281 126 
2009 3 5 21 100 144 343 334 210 57 4 129 271 
2010 2 7 27 126 203 309 324 162 53 3 162 218 
2011 7 11 43 147 235 368 256 109 23 1 208 133 
2012 0 4 29 98 205 287 234 131 37 2 131 170 
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     Chapter four – Implementing a 
market-neutral strategy 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Market neutral strategy is often associated as part of one of the strategies implemented 
among the long-short hedge fund strategy. Long-short equity strategies can be traced back to the 
late 1940s where undoubtedly the first hedge fund introduced in the literature started with W. 
Jones’ investment partnership in 1949. Jones started to short sell securities in part to offset the 
systematic risk introduced by the long position in the portfolio. It was later refined by Nunzio 
Tartaglia at Morgan Stanley in the late 1980s, where he was known for his pair-trading strategies 
approach. Since the 1960s, the hedge fund industry has grown with the rise of star hedge fund 
managers such as George Soros and Julian Robertson.  
The current form of most US hedge funds is now a limited partnership in which the 
investors are limited partners and the managers are general partners or a limited liability 
company established to invest in public securities. As general partners, the hedge fund managers 
invest a significant amount of their personal wealth to ensure the alignment of economic 
interests among the partners. Also, there has been a shift in the type of investor in hedge fund 
vehicles from an individual investor to an institutional investor, such as pension funds which 
invest in hedge funds for diversification purposes.  
The market neutral equity strategy has started to become popular among practitioners 
since the end of 2000 within the tech bubble. Instead of correctly forecasting underlying market 
moves, market neutral strategies seek to profit from detecting mispricing in individual securities 
by constructing hedge portfolios that deliver the excess returns associated with those securities. 
Therefore, the main goal of this chapter is to apply a market neutral equity strategy to our 
Piotroski F-score. By consequence, the novelty of this chapter is to construct a market neutral 
portfolio using our F-score composite and if efficient this should shift the distribution earn by an 
investors. This has not been done in this way in the past and we highly believe that an investor 
and the literature can benefit from our findings. 
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows: the first part of the chapter gives a brief 
insight into the hedge fund industry given the recent rise in flows of money into the industry, and 
the second part summarizes the literature on the market neutral strategies and gives a broader 
picture of hedge funds in general. The third part of the chapter reviews the characteristics on the 
role of market neutral strategies, including benefits such as the diversification that can be 
obtained from implementing these strategies as well as the limitations. The fourth part describes 
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different risk-adjusted performance measures used to assess our results. Finally, the last part 
presents the empirical results gained from implementing the strategy based on stocks selected by 
our model.  
4.2 Hedge fund overview  
 
In 2013, with reference to “Eurekahedge”, the hedge fund industry had a good rally, 
attracting $127.4 billion net asset flows, yielding the current assets under management of the 
industry at $1.99 trillion. Over the last thirteen years the hedge fund industry has advocated 
different patterns such as period of growth, downfall and period where the market bounced back.  
Figure 4.2-1 below shows that the hedge fund industry has increased since 2000 where 
the assets under management were around $330 billion with more than 2000 funds. Until 2007, 
the hedge fund industry knew continuous growth in the assets managed and the flows of funds, 
leading the total industry to $1.95 trillion by mid-2008. The number of assets under management 
rebounded after the financial crisis due to a decline in performances and an outflow of money 
from investors worried about the turmoil. Since then, the industry has been going back towards 
the high of 2007 with 1.30 trillion of assets under management. Practitioners expect the industry 
to grow to $1.5 trillion by 2016 given the recent strong performance and downfall protection 
provided by hedge fund managers.  
 
Figure 4.2-1 Industry growth over the years 
Source: Eurekahedge(2013) 
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The graph in Figure 4.2-2 below describes the global hedge funds’ performance since 
2006 in $; there is roughly a 35% increase in performance between 2006 and 2013. The year 2009 
describes the financial crisis where hedge funds had a decline in performance due to a big hit on 
the market.  
 
Figure 4.2-2 Global Hedge funds’ performance 
Source: Eurekahedge(2013) 
Figure 4.2-3 provides some comprehension of strategies well used in the hedge fund 
industry and by number of assets under management. Asset flows were mixed among the various 
strategies with the long-short66 equities seeing the largest percentage of global assets under 
management with 31.5%; the second biggest strategy used in the industry is the multi-strategy67 
with 15.4% of the global asset under management. Event driven68, CTAs/Managed futures69 and 
Macro70 funds are well-used vehicles in the hedge fund industry with approximately 10% of global 
                                                          
66
 Buying long equities that are expected to increase in value and selling short equities that are expected to 
decrease in value 
67
 The use of several strategies within the same pool of assets. 
 
68
 Taking significant positions in companies with special situations. 
69
 Going long or short in futures contracts in areas such as metal, grains, equity, and soft commodities as 
well as foreign currency and US government bond futures. 
70
 Holdings primarily based on overall economic and political views of various countries. 
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assets under management each. Finally, fixed income71 and arbitrage72 strategies account for 
roughly 7% of the global assets under management. 
Given the increasing interest in stock picking, investors expect the long-short equity 
strategy to attract more inflows of money with an estimated $67.1 billion attracted in 2013. 
 
 
Figure 4.2-3 Assets under management expressed as a percentage 
Source: Eurekahedge(2013) 
4.3 Literature review 
 
We review in this part a large literature on hedge fund performance including a 
comparison between long-short and long-only, correlation provided by using such vehicles, a 
cointegration technique, the alpha interpretations, the persistence in the performance of hedge 
funds, the risk and reward obtained from hedge funds, some diversification benefits – especially 
when used in a portfolio – and, finally, we review the survivorship bias.   
                                                          
71
 Exploits arbitrage opportunities in interest rate securities or it could be strategies concerning 
convertibles securities: buy convertibles long and sell the underlying stocks of the convertible short. 
72
 Exploits the price differentials that exist as a result of market inefficiencies. 
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4.3.1 Long-short over long-only 
Several studies have tried to understand long-short funds by comparing them to 
something more familiar, like long-only funds. Both of them are investment vehicles but the 
investment strategy differs from one to the other.  
Long-only funds employ mainly buy-and-hold strategies, where they only take long 
positions in liquid assets and their returns are compared to a benchmark index. Hedge funds 
employ more dynamic trading strategies, where they take both long and short positions in 
sometimes liquid or illiquid assets and have an absolute return.  
In one of the most comprehensive studies on long-short equity, Bruce and Levy (1995) 
examined various aspects of a long-short strategy, reporting three ways of implementing long-
short equity: “market neutral”, which implies holding long and short in equal dollar balance; 
“equitized”, which suggests adding permanent stock index futures as well as holding stocks long 
and short in equal dollar balance; and the last way is through a “hedge strategies” based on 
implementing a variable equity market exposure such as stock index futures. Across their paper, 
they present the different aspects of implanting long-short strategies. Consistent with this 
approach, John and Miller (1996) suggested presenting a quantitative method to build a long-
short portfolio using rules; the model has previously been reported to generate a 3.5% excess 
return per quarter.  
BARRA RogersCasey (2000) presented a paper on the various advantages attached to the 
use of market neutral long-short equity strategies. The paper discusses both positive and negative 
aspect of market neutral investment strategy focusing especially on long-short equity market 
neutral strategies, and the ability for investors to generate higher return per unit of risk. 
In a descriptive article, Michaud (1993) showed that, for any given level of risk, the return 
to a long-short strategy is associated with higher return than a long-only portfolio. As stated: 
“Long-short portfolio consisting of long positions in undervalued stocks and short positions in an 
equal value portfolio of overvalued stocks, where market risk is minimized can achieve twice the 
expected active return of the conventional long-only portfolio with minimal risk” (p. 44, Are Long-
Short Equity Strategies Superior?). In addition, Liang (2000) found that hedge funds have higher 
returns than mutual funds. The average monthly return from 1992 to 1996 for hedge funds was 
1.10% compared to 0.85% for mutual funds and the standard deviation was 2.40% for hedge 
funds and 1.91% for mutual funds. 
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There is some significant evidence that, even if the long-short funds appear to yield 
abnormal returns to investors, long-only funds – if efficiently driven – can dominate long-short 
strategies at levels of risk. When focusing on long-short strategies, investors are generally often 
over-optimistic about the characteristics obtained and the strategy can turn out to be much more 
risky. Liang (1999) found that hedge funds (long-short funds) have on average a higher Sharpe 
ratio than mutual funds (long-only funds). This means the mean-variance frontier is higher for 
hedge funds than for mutual funds. The benefits of using a long-short strategy instead of a long-
only portfolio were discussed by Jacobs et al. (1999), who highlighted the different characteristics 
attributed to this strategy. For instance, the authors stated that: “A long-plus-short portfolio thus 
offers benefit over a long-only portfolio only if there is a less than one correlation between the 
alphas of its long and short sides. In that case the long plus short portfolio will enjoy greater 
diversification and reduced risk relative to a long only portfolio” (p. 24, Long-Short Portfolio 
Management: An Integrated Approach). Arnott et al. (1994) reassessed the long-short strategies, 
making the observation that if the correlation between long and short securities approaches 1 a 
long-short strategy may not considerably improve the characteristics of a long-only portfolio. See 
also Jacobs and Levy (1999) who, in a descriptive paper, reviewed 20 myths regarding long-short 
advantages against a simple long-only portfolio.  
In summary, the extensive points of view regarding the ability of implementing a long-
short strategy over a long-only one are not completely agreed upon among practitioners and it 
remains an investor’s choice in his/her pursuit of risk and return.  
4.3.2 Correlation 
There is some evidence that hedge funds take beta bets to generate returns. Beta is the 
return of fund related to the exposure to different asset classes; investors would expect beta to 
be close to zero if the hedge funds manager tries to hedge out the risk in the market. A fund is 
said to be market neutral if it generates returns that are uncorrelated with the returns on some 
market indices.  
Brooks and Kat (2001) revealed strong evidence of significant correlation of classic long-
short equity hedge funds indices with equity market indices such as S&P500, Dow Jones, Russell 
2000 and Nasdaq. Patton (2009) highlighted evidence against the neutrality to market risk of 
hedge funds, stating, for instance: “The most commonly used risk based definition of neutrality is 
based on correlation or beta: a fund may be said to be market neutral if it generates returns that 
are uncorrelated with the returns on some market index, or a collection of market risk factors”. 
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(p. 2296, Are Market Neutral Hedge Funds really Market Neutral?), and concludes that many 
hedge funds that label themselves as market neutral are in fact not market neutral.  
Liang (1999) found low correlation for hedge fund vehicles with the market using an 
eight-asset class factor model including factors like equity, debt, currency, commodities and cash. 
The low correlation indicates that hedge funds are less correlated with the market compared to 
traditional vehicles such as mutual funds. Using a return-based analysis, Fung and Hsieh (1997) 
found that mutual funds have high correlation with asset classes whereas hedge funds have low 
correlation.   
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) examined the performance of hedge funds and commodity 
funds in bear and bull markets by looking at the correlation with the market. Sixteen different 
investment strategies used by hedge funds and commodity funds were analyzed, and the authors 
reached the conclusion that commodity funds provide greater downside protection than hedge 
funds and have generally an inverse correlation with stock returns in bear markets.  
In addition, studies have suggested that hedge funds exhibit generally more positive 
correlation with stock returns in bear markets than in bull markets. Also, the market neutral, the 
event driven and the macro hedge fund strategies provide protection to investors during periods 
of downward trends on the stock market.  
Schneeweis et al. (1996) suggested as well that the addition of CTAs (Commodity Trading 
Advisors or firm who provides individualized advice regarding the buying and selling of future 
contracts) to a portfolio due to its low return correlation can add value to it. This is in line with 
Markowitz (1952), who showed that investors can obtain steadier returns by combining assets 
with roughly similar expected returns but low correlation in the same portfolio.  
Moreover, Schneeweis and Spurgin (2000) made a distinction between good, bad and 
stable correlation regarding if the correlation is high during periods when the market is up or 
compared during periods when the market is down due to different patterns in the market. 
Correlations between -0.3 and +0.3 are thought to be non-correlated, which means that the two 
asset classes move independently from each other, with non-correlated assets; when one is rising 
in price, the other may be rising, falling, or maintaining its current price.  
In summary, a properly allocated portfolio has a mix of investments that do not behave 
the same way. To maximize the portfolio benefits derived from correlations, one would need to 
incorporate investments with negative correlations, low positive correlations, or even assets that 
have non-correlations.  
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4.3.3 Cointegration technique  
Recent studies suggest that academicians try to develop new techniques when building 
strategies. 
The cointegration technique was first introduced by Engle and Granger (1987). The 
method consists of finding long-term relations between assets. Another major contribution made 
in the literature about the cointegration technique was the one discussed by Johansen (1988), 
which allows testing for cointegration among more than two asset prices.  
For instance, Alexander and Dimitriu (2002) suggested using a different approach – a 
cointegration technique instead of a correlation technique; the cointegration technique was 
revealed to produce good results by focusing on its key characteristics such as mean reverting and 
tracking error. Evidence has demonstrated that a better use of information is exploited by the 
cointegration technique, allowing for more flexibility in the design of various strategies. As an 
example, this technique is suitable for index tracking or even long-short strategies. 
Focusing on the cointegration technique, Alexander and Dimitriu (2002) presented two 
applications of using cointegration technique-based trading strategies: an index tracking strategy 
and a long-short equity market neutral strategy, showing that the characteristics of the 
cointegration technique allow once again for a better use of the information contained in stock 
prices.  
Also, Burgess (2003) used the cointegration method to hedge an equity portfolio. 
Moreover, Lin et al. (2006) developed a new statistical approach in order to exploit mispricing 
between two assets based on the cointegration technique.  
Additionally, Smedts and Smedts (2006) investigated the investment dynamics employed 
by hedge fund managers using a rolling-over regression technique to capture the time variability 
present in the different strategies used among hedge fund managers, indicating that the inclusion 
of time variability is important as the risk exposures change over time. 
Therefore, when forming a long-short strategy investors can refer to different techniques, 
in particular the cointegration technique highlighted here which enables a better understanding 
of the risk compared to more traditional metrics such as beta.   
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4.3.4 Alpha interpretation 
Although there is evidence that hedge fund strategies display subsequent returns, also 
called “Alpha”, the alpha is the return of the hedge fund that cannot be explained by exposure to 
systematic risk. It is generally referred to in the literature and by practitioners as return attributed 
to the manager’s skills. See, for example, Alexander and Dimitriu (2002), who provided evidence 
that in the hedge fund industry alpha is a proxy for excess return to active management adjusted 
for risk (Jensen 1969).  
Jacobs and Levy (1999) throughout their paper demonstrated that, once alpha is 
generated through the use of long-short market neutral strategies, it can be transported to other 
market instruments such as the use of derivatives. In order to transport alpha, investors can 
possibly use derivatives, for instance futures, as well as swap to exchange returns from, for 
example, small cap for large cap returns; alpha offers investors flexibility in pursuit of return and 
control of risk. For instance, in 1999, Jacobs and Levy said: “The investor’s asset allocation 
decision comes down to a choice between sacrificing security selection return in favour of asset 
class performance, or sacrificing asset class performance in favour of security selection return.” 
(p. 3, Alpha Transport with Derivatives).  
In addition, Michaud (1993) advised investors that alpha can be dangerous: a strategy 
that offers two positive alphas can be attractive whereas two negative alphas can be painful for 
hedge fund managers. Smedts and Smedts (2006) questioned whether hedge fund managers are 
still able to generate alpha and found that they can still outperform the market partly due to 
successful market timing. Amenc and Martellini (2002) found that hedge funds’ dispersion in 
alphas is very large and it is difficult to measure the dispersion with a degree of certainty. 
Hence, hedge funds display interesting aspects, such as alpha generator attributable to 
the superior resources available to hedge funds manages. Even if hedge funds charge more fees, 
investing through them can improve an investor’s utility.  
4.3.5 Persistence in the performance of hedge funds  
If the superior return of hedge funds is attributable to better manager skill then one 
would expect the same funds to have persistence in returns year after year.  
Investors are therefore questioning the literature as to whether hedge funds are still 
delivering performances; see for instance Bares et al. (2001), who have analyzed whether the 
performance of hedge funds in delivering subsequent returns is persistent across different time 
windows. Using a non-parametric approach (Kernel or Bayesian models) over the period January 
  
145 
 
1992 to December 2000, they studied whether hedge fund managers added value to the 
performance delivered to investors by investigating different investment strategies and different 
time horizons. 
Based on a different point of view, which stipulates that hedge funds may exhibit a higher 
degree of non-normality as well as a non-linear relationship with the stock markets, Kat and Amin 
(2003) developed a new approach using new dynamic trading-based performance measures 
instead of using the Sharpe ratio or even the Jensen alpha, suggesting that those traditional 
performance measures are no longer suitable to evaluate hedge fund performance. On the other 
hand, Agarwal and Naik (2004) examined the persistence of performance in hedge fund returns 
using a one-year moving average. Their results suggested that there is persistence in return by 
recreating the payoff distribution and compare the cost of the strategy with the price of a fund 
participation. 
Previously, Agarwal and Naik (2000) had investigated the performance of returns in 
hedge funds using a multi-period framework, i.e. the performance of hedge funds is short term or 
long term. They examined short-term and long-term persistence by investigating their pre-fee 
and post-fee returns over quarterly, half year and yearly timeframe periods; also, the persistence 
was assessed by investigating the series of wins and losses for two, three and more consecutive 
time periods. They reached the conclusion that strong persistence can be noticed in the quarterly 
horizon and the persistence slowly starts to reduce when shifting towards yearly persistence, 
indicating that persistence among the hedge fund industry is primarily short term, in contrast 
with the finding of mutual funds or fund of funds where investors should preconize long-term 
persistence in the return up to two years. Additionally, they added that the persistence is 
sensitive to the return measurement interval: persistence decreases as the return measurement 
interval increases.  
In addition, Baquero et al. (2005) suggested controlling for the look-ahead bias tests of 
persistence as standard persistence in hedge funds may be biased if the fund’s survival depends 
on historical performances. They have created by the use of information what would not have 
been known during the period analysed.  
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) examined the persistence in hedge fund performance over 
the period January 1990 to August 1998 using alphas from a six-factor risk model( T-bill, HML, 
SMB, WML, long term debt corporate bond). Employing both a parametric and a non-parametric 
model they found persistence in the performance over one-year and two-year periods and 
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suggested that the degree of persistence might vary with the investment strategy put in place. 
Also, Bares et al. (2003) appraised the persistence of hedge fund performance over short- and 
long-term horizons.  
Ackerman et al. (1999) found that hedge funds earned better return than mutual fund 
over the period 1988 to 1995 despite hedge funds exhibiting more volatility than mutual funds. 
On the performance of hedge funds, Liang (1999) examined the relationship between hedge fund 
performance and fund characteristics such as the nature of watermark, hurdle rate73, and 
leverage. The results compared hedge fund against mutual fund. By using an asset class factor 
model and a mean variance efficient analysis, the paper tried to provide deep insight among the 
evaluation of hedge funds in terms of performance and risk. Liang reached the conclusion that 
hedge funds dominate mutual funds in the mean-variance and are different from mutual funds in 
the way they display their strategy. The results also found significant difference between the 
return of hedge funds with high watermarks74 and those without watermarks, and reveal as well 
that an incentive fee provides managers with strong incentive schemes; the higher the incentive 
fee, the better the fund performance.  
Capocci and Hubner (2004) investigated hedge funds’ performance levels and persistence 
using various asset-pricing models. In the 1980s performance measures were based on the CAPM 
like the Jensen’s alpha (1969); it is with the recent interest in multi-factor models on the cross-
sectional variations in stocks return that researchers have started to identify factors such as size, 
leverage, earnings/price, book to market, etc, as the US shows little relation to the betas of 
Sharpe (1964). Lintner (1965) stated, however, that there is no unanimously accepted model 
across the literature. 
In the same manner, Capocci et al. (2005) tested the performance of hedge funds over a 
period of bullish and bearish market using the same methodology developed by Capocci and 
Hubner (2004) by applying a ten-factor composite performance model that appeared to achieve 
significant results. Their results indicated that most hedge funds outperformed the market during 
the whole period and no significant underperformances were observed during periods of 
downfall.  
                                                          
73
 Managers can collect incentive fees only if the cumulative returns can make up for previous losses and 
exceed the hurdle rate.  
74
 A high watermark ensures that a fund manager does not get paid large sums for poor performances. For 
instance, if the fund manager loses money over a period, s/he must get the fund above the high watermark 
before receiving a performance bonus.  
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Furthermore, investigating hedge funds’ performance through portfolio strategies that 
incorporate predictability in managerial skills, fund risk loading and benchmark returns was 
studied by Avramov et al. (2011). They examined the out-of-sample investment opportunity set 
and found that there exist subgroups of ex-ante identifiable hedge funds that can deliver 
subsequent return. The strategy of selecting those hedge funds based on the criteria set up are 
robust to various considerations such as backfill bias, incubation bias, illiquidity-induced serial 
correlation, fund fees, closed funds, alternative benchmark, etc.  
Finally, by revisiting stylized facts about hedge funds Joenvaara et al. (2012) found 
evidence that on average hedge funds deliver economically and statistically abnormal return on 
an equal and value-weighted basis even after examining for different size, investment strategies 
and domiciles. Also, they suggested that hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons. 
Findings are in line with previous results suggested by Kosowski et al. (2007).   
Koh et al. (2003) suggested exploring the persistence outside the US, by investigating 
persistence in the performance of hedge funds that invest in Asia and found that persistence 
occurs mainly at monthly horizons and at quarterly horizons.  
To conclude, studies differ in the point of view regarding the persistence of performance 
in hedge funds; however, despite numerous studies using different approaches, the main caveats 
might be that hedge fund persistence in performance seems to be more present over a short-
term window.   
4.3.6 Risk-adjusted return 
Several studies have made evident that the hedge fund industry has known different 
changes over the years; as an illustration, risk factor is certainly the one that has been subject to 
the biggest metamorphosis.  
Market neutral funds actively seek to avoid major risk factors but take bets on relative 
price movements. Fung and Hsieh (1999) declared: “Market neutral funds refer to those funds 
that actively seek to avoid major risk factors, but take bets on relative price movements utilizing 
strategies such as long-short equity, stock index arbitrage, convertible bond arbitrage and fixed 
income arbitrage” (p. 10, Is Mean Variance Analysis Applicable to Hedge Funds?). By contrast with 
this idea, Michaud (1993) said that, for any given level of risk, long-short strategy can yield to 
higher risk. “Active returns are generally accompanied by increases in active risk” (p. 48, Are Long-
Short Equity Strategies Superior?), emphasizing that long-only portfolios when used efficiently can 
dominate long-short strategies at level of risk. In other words, investors when forming a long-
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short strategy are generally over-optimistic about the characteristics obtained by the strategy, 
which is no more than a long-only portfolio with more risks.  
Kat and Amin (2001) investigated whether hedge funds offer investors a superior risk-
adjusted return trade-off and revealed that stand-alone hedge funds do not offer higher risk 
return. Understanding hedge fund risk extends much beyond a simple linear exposure to market 
risk; for instance, Amenc and Martillini (2002) stated that hedge funds are not only exposed to 
market risk, but are exposed to volatility risk, default risk and liquidity risk. Amenc et al. (2003) 
provided evidence that even hedge funds following a zero-beta non-directional approach are 
exposed to a variety of risks such as volatility risk, liquidity risk and credit risk.  
Liang (2001) stated: “The year 1998 was a disaster for the hedge fund industry. On August 
17, Russia defaulted on its ruble debt and domestic dollar debt causing a panic among investors 
and resulting In widened spreads between high quality debt and risky debt” (p. 14, Hedge Funds’ 
Performance: 1990-1999). The impact of financial crisis on hedge funds has demonstrated that 
hedge funds were heavily affected, leading to high risk in the market. In fact, a couple of funds 
had to close because of poor performances.  
Since then, the literature has tried to understand hedge fund risk. Fung and Hsieh (2001) 
presented a vast methodology to understand hedge fund risk by focusing on trend-following 
strategy; to do so they used CTAs75 funds because they are said to be trend-following strategies. 
The goal of this article was to model how trend-followers’ funds achieved returns and in 
consequence define the characteristics for assessing the systematic risk of their strategy. In a 
similar manner, Siegmann and Stefanova (2009) examined whether the inflows of money into the 
US stock market after 2003 had impacted hedge fund exposure to systematic risk. Systematic risk 
results from conditions, events and trends occurring outside the scope of the investment; 
investors should understand the rules to reduce the risk. Agarwal and Naik (2004) suggested that 
the expected tail losses identified by the mean variance can be underestimated by as high as 54% 
compared with M-CVaR optimal portfolios, suggesting that ignoring the tail risk of hedge funds 
can result in significantly higher losses during market downturns.  
Ackerman et al. (1999) examined the components that suggested hedge funds are more 
risky than mutual funds by providing insights analysis. Also, they provided significant results that 
US hedge funds could be more risky than offshore hedge funds even after controlling for 
                                                          
75
 CTAs are individuals or trading organizations registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) through membership in the National Futures Association, who trade primarily futures contracts on 
behalf of a customer. 
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differences in the categories. Cassar and Gerakos (2011) examined the determinants and 
effectiveness of methods that hedge funds use to manage portfolio risk and revealed that risk 
management practices are a function of hedge fund characteristics, such as leverage, number of 
positions and the capital invested. Also, they found that hedge funds that did use normal 
portfolio risk metrics did well during the 2008 crisis. Billio et al. (2012) examined dynamic risk 
exposure of hedge funds to various risk factors during different market volatility conditions using 
the regime-switching beta model. They find that during times of high volatility in the market most 
of the strategies are negatively exposed to the large-small and credit spread risk and change in 
VIX (volatility index), suggesting that liquidity risk and credit risk are common factors in downturn 
of the market. Indeed, these factors are important in accessing hedge fund risk during downturn 
in the market. Solely, exposure can be different during up or down markets.  
Several studies have observed that hedge funds are important providers of risk-adjusted 
performances. Brown et al. (1999) examined the performance of offshore hedge funds over the 
period 1989 to 1995, using a database that includes both delisted funds and currently operating 
funds, by investigating whether the returns to hedge fund investors are predictable from past 
reported returns. When investigating this pool of offshore funds, they found significant results 
regarding positive risk-adjusted performance measure by the Sharpe ratios76 and by Jensen’s 
alpha77.  
Liang (2000) found that hedge funds have a higher Sharpe ratio than mutual funds. The 
average Sharpe ratio was 0.44 for hedge funds compared to 0.26 for mutual funds. Ackermann et 
al. (1999) also found that the average Sharpe ratio for hedge funds is higher than for mutual 
funds and reported a figure of 21% higher. Furthermore, there is evidence that hedge funds are 
important providers of liquidity in various financial markets. Siegmann and Stefanova (2011) 
found a positive relationship between market illiquidity and the market exposure prior to 2003 
for hedge funds. As stated: “Before 2003, hedge fund acted as suppliers of liquidity, having a 
higher market exposure when stocks are undervalued due to low liquidity” (p. 20, Market 
Liquidity and Exposure of Hedge Funds).  
Also, Boyson et al. (2010) examined evidence that hedge fund contagion can be linked to 
liquidity shocks, whilst Bekaert et al. (2005) said contagion can be defined as: “Correlation over 
                                                          
76
 Sharpe ratio is a measure of risk used to evaluate fund performances; the higher the Sharpe ratio the 
better are the fund risk-adjusted returns. 
77
 Jensen’s alpha is the difference between a series and its expected return on the market; in other words, 
it is the excess return above the market. 
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and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals” (p. 66, Market Integration and 
Contagion). 
Recently, Ribeiro and Santos (2011) examined whether market neutral strategies are 
exposed to the equity market and if so whether they are in part neutral to that market. Using 
data from January 1998 to December 2008 they formed an analysis of market neutral strategies. 
To do so, they examined what kind of strategies consistently outperform over time considering 
four strategies of market neutral hedge funds. Their results suggested that the strategy does not 
perform differently than the traditional capital market, suggesting that the neutrality given by 
hedge funds is not entirely accurate. Also, they stated: “Our results lead us to conclude that 
arbitrage and pure alpha strategies in hedge funds are not as accurate as their name and 
investment styles may imply, and their neutrality facing the securities market seems 
compromised” (p. 20, Market Neutral Hedge Funds Strategies: Are they Really Neutral?).  
The authors also added a critical view to the neutrality displayed by hedge funds 
suggesting that diversified hedge funds are not market neutral; during the period under review 
the strategy exhibited significant market exposure. Despite market neutral, event driven, macro 
and short selling types of hedge funds performing reasonably well during periods of downturn in 
the market, commodity funds can offer greater insights during a bear market.  
In short, risk measures including illiquidity risk exposure are a challenge for hedge funds. 
Despite the fact that systematic risk is likely to increase, in the future hedge funds managers 
would have to develop new techniques in order to fully understand the constituents of the 
market.  
4.3.7 Diversification benefits  
There is evidence that hedge funds are important providers of diversification when used 
in a portfolio. Kat and Amin (2001) found that when hedge funds are used in a portfolio investors 
can benefit from the diversification of such a vehicles. Sharing the same idea, Amenc et al. (2003) 
found strong benefits associated with the used of hedge funds in a portfolio to obtain various 
diversification. Ackermann et al. (1999) suggested that the low beta values on hedge funds make 
them a potentially valuable addition to many investor portfolios. Empirical studies have 
highlighted the characteristics of dynamic trading strategies. Fung and Hsieh (1997) applied a 
Sharpe’s style analysis to a large sample of hedge funds and CTAs, suggesting that the 
incorporation of hedge funds in a portfolio could significantly improve its risk-return profile. 
Amenc and Martellini (2002) found that the inclusion of hedge funds in a portfolio can 
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significantly decrease the volatility of the portfolio without leading to a significant change in the 
return.  
Lhabitant and Learned (2002) suggested building equally weighted portfolios of randomly 
selected hedge funds and showed that diversification works well in a mean variance space. 
Increasing the number of hedge funds in a portfolio decreases the portfolio’s volatility while 
maintaining its average return level. Also, downside risk is reduced in a larger-sized hedge fund 
portfolio. Additionally, Hagelin and Promberg (2003) examined the returns and investment 
policies for portfolios of stocks and bonds with and without hedge funds. They found that the 
gains from adding hedge funds to a portfolio of stocks and bonds were statistically significant for 
most of the strategies involved.  
Capocci (2006) investigated the exposure to the equity market for market neutral funds 
covering a sample period from January 1993 to December 2002. The author suggested that the 
top and bottom deciles funds have the highest market exposure to equity but most market 
neutral funds are not significantly exposed to the equity market. Fung and Hsieh (1999) added 
that a strategy is said to be market neutral if it generates returns which are independent of the 
relevant market returns.  
Accordingly, Patton (2009) has presented evidence against the neutrality to market risk 
for hedge funds by testing different concepts of neutrality to capture the exposure of those 
funds. “The methods proposed in this paper may be interpreted as tests of the purity of the 
portable alpha strategy” (p. 2297, Are Market Neutral Hedge Funds really Market Neutral?). The 
results suggest that many of those hedge funds are not market neutral even if they are said to be 
“market neutral” but in some extent, compared to other types of hedge funds, they are market 
neutral; however, different points of view are exposed in this paper; only one-quarter of hedge 
funds in the market neutral category are significantly non-neutral at the 0.05 level significant.  
Therefore, the full diversification that investors seek and rely on by investing in hedge 
funds may not be as efficient as supposed. As stated: “The dependence between hedge fund 
returns and market returns is often significant and positive, even for market neutral funds. The 
widely cited diversification benefits from investing in hedge funds thus may not be as great as 
first thought” (p. 2526, Are Market Neutral Hedge Funds really Market Neutral?). Market neutral 
strategies are known to present interesting properties such as low exposure and relatively low 
volatility, which can help investors to diversify their portfolio.  
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4.3.8 Survivorship bias  
Given that hedge fund managers are not required to report data on their performance, 
there are some natural biases in all hedge fund databases.  
We would like to finish this literature review by focusing on survivorship bias. Liang 
(2000) examined survivorship bias in hedge fund returns by comparing two databases. He found 
that survivorship bias exceeds 2% per year partly due to the fact that major hedge fund databases 
contain different amounts of dissolved funds and started to cover dissolved funds in 1994. The 
author studied as well survivorship by investment styles and found that biases are different 
across styles.  
Fund and Hsieh (1997) found that the inclusion of defunct funds helps guard against 
“survivorship bias” in the case of estimating returns of trend-following trading style. Schneeweis 
et al. (1996) analyzed the differential risk return performance of survivor and nonsurvivor CTA 
and, using both cross-sectional and traditional abnormal return methodology, revealed that the 
return differential between survivor and nonsurvivor is due primarily to underperformance in the 
months prior to the dissolution; however, the impact of using a database that contains survivor 
bias has only a minor impact on traditional measures of risk and return performance.  
Additionally, Malkiel and Saha (2005) analyzed potential bias that can influence measures 
of hedge fund performance. They showed that the practice of voluntary reporting and the 
adjournment of only favourable past results can cause returns calculated from hedge fund 
databases to be biased. They found that after correcting for the bias hedge funds have a lower 
return than the one reported, suggesting the importance for investors to take this caveat into 
account when selecting hedge funds. 
In summary, hedge fund databases can potentially suffer from several of these biases, 
which can have a significant impact on the performance measures.  
4.4 Characteristics of market neutral strategies 
 
In a market neutral equity strategy, the investor buys expected winners that are 
supposed to do well over the investment horizon and sells short losers that are expected to 
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perform poorly. In other words, a market neutral equity strategy holds long78 stocks that are 
expected to appreciate in value and sells short79 a roughly equivalent amount of stocks that are 
expected to perform poorly.  
As an example, in a well-constructed market neutral portfolio, if you are long one dollar, 
you will be short one dollar, leaving no dollars exposed to the market. In the case stocks are 
behaving as expected with the long outperforming the shorts, this spread80 will result in a positive 
return from security selection. 
Because of this occurrence of buying and selling, market neutral strategies are often 
named “arbitrage” strategies.  
The chart below in Figure 4.4-1 is for illustrative purposes and shows how hedge fund 
managers implement long and short positions in an attempt to offset market risk exposure. For 
example, returns would be positive in rising markets in the case longs rise more than shorts and 
returns would be positive in declining markets if longs fall less than shorts. We present three 
states of the market, a rising market, a declining market and, finally, a flat market. As can be 
noticed in each case the strategy enables investors to make profits regarding market conditions.  
 
Figure 4.4-1 Hypothetical $100 investment in various market conditions 
                                                          
78
 The long position, where the investor is a buyer of stocks: in this case the investor can benefit from 
profits when the stocks in the portfolio rise and lose when the stocks’ prices fall. 
79
 The short position, where the investors borrow stocks from another lender and then sells the stocks to 
generate the short portfolio. In this portfolio (short) the investors make profits when the prices of the 
constituents fall and lose when these stocks rise in price. 
80
 Market neutral equity strategy only makes sense if pricing inefficiencies are larger or more frequent for 
potential short positions, i.e. among stocks that tend to be overpriced than for stocks that tend to be 
under-priced. 
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“R” defines a rising market condition, “D” a declining market and “F” a flat market.  
Market neutral strategies are often used as a tool for diversification to the extent that 
they neutralize underlying market risk; in fact, they are said to be market neutral strategy to the 
point that they generate returns that are uncorrelated with the returns on some markets or other 
risk factors such as interest rate, liquidity and volatility. Therefore, investors would expect the 
beta with respect to the market to be close to zero if they hedge out the market risk. In this case 
of integrating market neutral hedge funds as well as convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage 
or short selling, investors will benefit from a decrease in the portfolio volatility due to the low 
exposure of those strategies to the market risk.  
By contrast, some hedge funds exhibit a high level of correlation81 with the market, and 
offer returns that are relatively high. Adding that type of fund to a portfolio asset allocation made 
of equity and bonds would result in an increase in the expected return while retaining a high 
degree of volatility.  
Also, trading a market neutral equity portfolio is said to be more complicated than 
trading a long-only portfolio; despite statistical models using a number of factors such as 
correlation and beta to help them determine how much equity to purchase or to sell short, 
managing a market neutral strategy remains an active management.  
Indeed, the values and market sensitivities of the aggregate long and aggregate short 
positions must be kept in balance on a real-time basis in order to provide market neutrality. If 
imbalances occur, the hedge fund is open to a minimum amount of market risk and in 
consequence may have to sell long or shorts stocks covered until balance is restored. Derivatives 
may also be used to correct temporary imbalances.  
Therefore, correlations are a key factor to take into account when rebalancing and 
trading a market neutral strategy. However, the success of a market neutral strategy depends 
merely on picking stocks, also called in the industry “seeking alpha”. Most people think of alpha in 
terms of excess return relative to an underlying market but, in the hedge fund industry, alpha is a 
proxy for excess return to active management with all factors said to be neutral; the only issue 
                                                          
81 Correlation is the technical term used to measure and describe how closely the prices of two investments 
move together over time. Positively correlated assets move in the same direction, both up or down, and 
negatively correlated assets move in the opposite directions. Correlations between two assets are scaled 
between +1 and -1.  
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that should remain is whether the portfolio manager is good at stock picking82 – both long and 
short.  
Thus, the overall return to a market neutral equity strategy has two components: an 
interest component and an equity component. The performances of the stocks held long and sold 
short will determine the equity component and an interest component received on the cash 
proceeds from the short sales.  
The return is defined as the difference between the long and short portfolios such as  
RLS = RL − RS 
Where RL and RS denote the excess returns of the long and short portfolios.  
Hedge fund managers when maintaining their market neutral strategy have at their 
disposal a liquidity buffer. The liquidity buffer serves as a pool to meet cash demands on account 
and, in general, a liquidity buffer equal to 10% of the initial investment. The liquidity buffer may 
also be used to reimburse stock lenders for any dividends paid on the short positions even if in 
most cases these payments can be made from the dividends on the long positions.  
For hedge funds managers looking to maximize their bets, leverage is usually employed to 
purchase more of the investment and sell short more of the market. The results of the security 
selection are thus magnified. By increasing the size a position in a strategy can take, hedge fund 
managers are subsequently increasing the risk taken but, as well as the return in the case that the 
strategy is performing well, the effect results in more money invested than its original capital.  
In summary, the risk of the strategy will depend on the degree of leverage employed.  
Long-short equity displays interesting aspects such as being independent of market 
direction and uncorrelated to major asset classes; in addition, the strategy utilizes information 
more efficiently leading to higher alpha per unit of risk. When a portfolio combines equal long 
and short positions, stock picking becomes the main driver of performance. In consequence, the 
strategy will depend merely on how successful the manager is at selecting longs likely to 
appreciate more rapidly in rising markets and shorts that are more likely to decline faster in 
falling markets.  
                                                          
82
 Ability of the hedge fund manager to always identify stocks that s/he believes are either overvalued or 
undervalued. 
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Using long buys and shorts sells to take offsetting positions in a specific sector or industry 
is known as hedging. For example, a manager may hedge exposure to the health care sector by 
purchasing long health care stocks expected to perform well and selling short health care stocks 
expected to perform poorly. This strategy seeks to reduce overall portfolio risk and enhance 
return potential by neutralizing exposure to broad market movements, also called “beta”. 
Performance correlations are a critical factor to consider when building a diversified portfolio; as 
an illustration, negative correlations make excellent diversification allowing investors to pursue 
increased returns from assets that respond differently to changing conditions.  
To conclude, we describe briefly the characteristics displayed by a market neutral 
strategy; we try to present a long plus short strategy following risk-adjusted property of the 
market neutral strategy. Solely, results appear to reflect a much more risky portfolio rewarded 
with greater returns.  
4.5 Risk-adjusted performance measures 
 
Higher returns are usually associated with higher risks; in this part we describe in detail 
measures used to evaluate the strategy such as Sharpe ratio, Information ratio, Maximum 
drawdown, Treynor ratio and the Sortino ratio.  
Information ratio: 
The Information ratio is a widely used measure among academicians and practitioners 
which provides investors with an idea of how the strategy is performing; an annualized 
Information ratio of 2 means that the strategy is performing well almost every month.  
Information ratio is calculated as:  
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑅
𝜎
  
Where R is the average return obtained from the strategy and 𝜎 is the standard deviation 
of return of the strategy. Both are calculated using the same time frame, in our case 252 trading 
days.  
 
 
  
157 
 
Sharpe ratio: 
The Sharpe ratio is the best-known risk-adjusted return ratio introduced by Sharpe (1966) 
and differs from the Information ratio by adding a risk-free rate in the numerator.  
The Sharpe ratio is a reward to variability ratio and is defined for any portfolio as:  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑅 − 𝑟
𝜎
 
Where R is the expected return on portfolio, 𝜎 is the standard deviation of return or the 
variance of the portfolio and r is the risk-free rate.  
The Sharpe ratio measures the slope of the risk-free assets and is widely used to compare 
alternative strategies such as stock picking or market timing with passive strategies such as 
tracking the S&P 1500 and to compare the performance of different portfolio strategies.  
Maximum drawdown: 
The maximum drawdown is another indicator of the risk taken by a portfolio. It measures 
the largest single drop in the value of a portfolio an investor can suffer if s/he enters the market 
at the worst time. Maximum drawdown is an ex-ante proxy for downside risk that computes the 
largest drawdown over all intervals of time that can be formed within a specified interval of time.  
It is defined as:  
𝑀𝑖𝑛 [𝑟𝑡 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (∑ 𝑟𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
)] 
 
Treynor ratio: 
The Treynor ratio was first introduced by Treynor (1965) in an attempt to measure how 
well an investment has compensated its investors given its level of risk. The higher the Treynor 
ratio the better the performance of the portfolio or stock being analyzed. It is a widely used 
measure of market-related risk in a stock or collection of stocks. 
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It is defined as:  
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝑅𝑖 − 𝑟
𝛽𝑖
 
It is a measure of the ex-ante excess return per unit of risk but this time the risk is 
measured by the incremental portfolio risk given by the portfolio-beta. Similar to the Sharpe 
ratio, the Treynor ratio is used to compare performance of different alternative portfolios and the 
best portfolio is defined as that with the highest Treynor ratio.   
Sortino ratio: 
The Sortino ratio is a modification of the Sharpe ratio in the sense that, instead of 
considering the general volatility in a portfolio, the Sortino ratio focuses only on the downside 
volatility. A large Sortino ratio indicates that there is a low chance of a large loss occurring in the 
portfolio.  
 
It is defined as:  
𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑅 − 𝑟
𝜎𝑑
 
Where R is the expected return on portfolio, 𝜎𝑑 is the standard deviation of negative asset return 
and r is the risk-free rate.  
 
4.6 Empirical results  
 
We start this part by demonstrating how we combine a list of stocks generated by our 
Piotroski F-score model and CRSP for stock and market index return information.  
The code starts by matching our company list with the CRSP Permco83 identifier using 
primary issue identifier Linkscore to resolve duplicate links. Then we get daily stock data and add 
market return. Keeping only common stock identified by CRSP as share code (10, 11) we calculate 
                                                          
83
 A unique permanent identifier assigned by CRSP to all companies with issues on a CRSP file. This number 
is permanent for all securities issued by this company regardless of name changes. 
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daily return over a one-year period starting 90 days after fiscal period year-end to ensure that the 
necessary annual financial information is available to investors at the time of portfolio formation; 
this correspond roughly to the annual report filing date, expected to be within 90 days of the 
fiscal period end.  
Also, returns are calculated including distributions as a value-weighted return. CRSP84 
tracks all securities listed on the NYSE, AMEX, ARCA and NASDAQ exchanges and results were 
obtained for the period 1991 to 2012. 
 
 
Here in Figure 4.6-1 is an example of the return retrieved from the database:  
 
Figure 4.6-1 Example of how we extract data from CRSP 
 
                                                          
84
 CRSP provides the date of delisting return and the classification code of the event type. “After a security 
has been removed from the exchange, CRSP calculate a delisting return of this security by comparing the 
security’s value after it delists with its price on the last day of trading. The value after delisting can be an 
off-exchange price, an off-exchange bid-ask spread, or the sum of a series of distribution payments”. In 
order to avoid biases, incorporating delisting returns would help to assess components of any portfolio 
more accurately. 
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The objective of this part is to achieve a market neutral strategy by investing in 
companies, primarily based on our Piotroski replication model. To do so, we are creating two 
portfolios, i.e. a long portfolio with stocks ranked above 7. In other words, we constitute a 
portfolio of high Piotroski with scores of 7 to 9. The same approach is taken for the short portfolio 
except in that case we are creating a portfolio of low Piotroski scores of 0 to 3.  
The reference benchmark for the long-short market neutral strategy is the S&P 1500 
index only used for indicative purposes. As the long-short portfolio follows an unconstrained 
strategy, returns and risk metrics will differ from the one expected by a pure market neutral 
strategy.  
We believe that holding stocks on a rolling three-year basis the strategy would not deliver 
an annualized excess return versus the benchmark; however, we define an investment window of 
3 months, 7 months and 12 months for investors willing to benefit from our strategy. The purpose 
is to highlight that our strategy is more accurate in a short-term window, especially on a 3-month 
window, as it is limiting the downside risk and delivering great returns. 
 
 
Figure 4.6-2 Investment performance from 2008 to 2012 formulated on a 12-month window 
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The graph in Figure 4.6-2 above represents the cumulative performance over 22 years in 
dollars. It shows the value as of beginning of fiscal year 1991 of a $1,000 investment made on our 
portfolio when we are holding stocks on a 12-month basis. For comparative purposes, the 
performance of the S&P 1500 index is used as a benchmark.  
 We show that the strategy has outperformed the benchmark over the long term, by 
delivering an alpha investment. This market neutral strategy has demonstrated skills across the 
market cycle and this approach gives the portfolio a higher risk profile than the benchmark but 
with considerably greater returns. However, this past performance should not be taken as an 
indication of future performance, which will vary according to market conditions; as we 
demonstrate later, the strategy appears to underperform during pre-crisis time. Over the past 22 
years an investor who would have invested $1,000 in our portfolio would be worth more or less 
$1,000,000. 
We feel that our replication of the Piotroski score allows us to distinguish between high-
quality stocks and distressed stocks, supporting us to differentiate ourselves from the 
competition, which will enable us to outperform in most market conditions. One of the 
environments in which our portfolio will tend to underperform is during a “pre-crisis” market. The 
primary reason for this is that we use a fundamentally stock-picking approach providing a “double 
alpha” play and if the market is in an euphoric state, i.e. the volatility is high, then we will be likely 
to underperform the benchmark. 
4.6.1 Excess return  
In this part, we describe the excess return obtained when forming a long-short market 
neutral strategy. Three time windows are presented: 12 months, 7 months and 3 months.  
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Figure 4.6-3 Long-short portfolio versus the market across a 12-month window 
In Figure 4.6-3, we display the long-short portfolio annual performance in returns for 
each fiscal year over the period shown in the chart, i.e. from 1991 to 2012. It is expressed as a 
percentage. Here the S&P 1500 is used as a benchmark, which is reflected in the chart in red. The 
chart shows as well that, during the period on display, the strategy is not returning positive excess 
returns to investors for five periods out of twenty-two. In other words, this means that investors 
would have above a 77% chance that we will return money if they were investing in our strategy 
over a 12-month window.  
From each down period the strategy long-short seems to react well as we recover from 
massive losses. The strategy performed particularly well in the crisis years of 2002, 2008 and 2011 
with gains of +93.53%, +109.49% and +44.46% over these three years compared with 29.52%, 
37.34% and 5.01% respectively for the benchmark S&P 1500. In 2012 the strategy has 
outperformed with 56.02%, compared with 23.14% for the benchmark S&P 1500. The excess 
return earned above the market is about 32.89%. (Refer to Appendix A). 
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Figure 4.6-4 Details of the return that constitutes our long-short strategy (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-4, we show graphically how each portfolio is doing over the benchmark S&P 
1500. The idea is to highlight years where perhaps we could have increased weights in one of the 
two portfolios, long or short.  
In 1993 the long portfolio has generated 14.95% and the short portfolio -9.51% versus 
10.56% for the benchmark S&P 1500. This results overall in an excess return of 13.70%. The same 
can be described for the year 2001, where the long portfolio is underperforming as well as the 
short portfolio. During that year the long portfolio has returned -16.97% whilst the short portfolio 
has returned +13.59%, leading to a long-short return of -30.56% versus the benchmark S&P 500 
of -15.64%.  
Another example can be used to describe the small return earned in year 2010. The long 
portfolio is offsetting the loss of the short portfolio; for instance, the long portfolio delivered a 
return of 5.14% and the short portfolio 3.11%, leading to a small positive return for our long-short 
strategy of 2.03% versus the market delivering a return of 5.01% on average over 12 months. 
(Refer to Appendix A). 
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Figure 4.6-5 Long-short portfolio versus the market across a 7-month window 
In Figure 4.6-5, we display the long-short portfolio 7-month annualized performance in 
returns for each fiscal year over the period shown in the chart, i.e. from 1991 to 2012. It is 
expressed as a percentage. Here the S&P 1500 is used as a benchmark, which is reflected in the 
chart in red. The chart shows as well that, during the period on display, the strategy is not 
returning positive excess returns to investors for five periods out of twenty-two. In other words, 
this means that investors would have above a 77% chance that we will return money if they were 
investing in our strategy over a 7-month window.  
From each down period the strategy long-short seems to react well as we recover from 
massive loss. The strategy performed particularly well in the crisis years of 2002, 2008 and 2011 
with gains of +114.41%, 127.56% and 16.41% over these three years compared with 35.60%, 
41.20% and 9.31% respectively for the benchmark S&P 1500. In 2012 when looking at the 7-
month annualized return the strategy long-short has outperformed with 50.96%, compared with 
21.03% for the benchmark S&P 1500. The excess return earned above the market is about 29.92% 
on average over seven months. (Refer to Appendix A). 
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Figure 4.6-6 Details of the return that constitutes our long-short strategy (7-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-6, we show graphically how each portfolio is doing over the benchmark S&P 
1500 over a 7-month annualized window. The idea is to highlight years where perhaps we could 
have increased weights in one of the two portfolios, long or short.  
In 1993 the long portfolio has generated 8.36% and the short portfolio -6.15% versus 
4.99% for the benchmark S&P 1500. This results overall in an excess return of 9.51%. The same 
can be described for the year 2001 where the long portfolio is underperforming as well as the 
short portfolio. During that year the long portfolio has returned -22.72% whilst the short portfolio 
has returned +25.89%, leading to a long-short return of -48.61% versus the benchmark S&P 500 
of -23.69%.  
Another example can be used to describe the small loss earned in year 2010. Compared 
to a 12-month annualized window where the year 2010 was still positive, on a 7 month-window 
we were not able to return a positive return to the investor. For instance, the long portfolio 
delivered a return of -0.91% and the short portfolio +5.42%, leading to a small negative return for 
our long-short strategy of -6.33% versus the market delivering a return of 2.16% on average over 
three months. (Refer to Appendix A). 
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Figure 4.6-7 Long-short portfolio versus the market across a 3-month window 
In Figure 4.6-7, we display the long-short portfolio 3-month annualized performance in 
returns for each fiscal year over the period shown in the chart, i.e. from 1991 to 2012. It is 
expressed as a percentage. Here the S&P 1500 is used as a benchmark, which is reflected in the 
chart in red. The chart shows as well that, during the period on display, the strategy is not 
returning positive excess returns to investors for six periods out of twenty-two. In other words, 
this means that investors would have above a 72% chance that we will return money if they were 
investing in our strategy over a 3-month window.  
From each down period the strategy long-short seems to react well as we recover from massive 
loss.   
Previously, our results showed years that were recovering from previous loss using a 12-
month and a 7-month window – especially in the crisis years of 2002, 2008 and 2011. However, 
this pattern was not true in 2011 for our 3-month window, perhaps because we have not left 
enough time for stocks to increase their value. 
The strategy performed particularly well in the crisis years of 2002 and 2008 with gains of 
141.21% and 122.32% over these two years compared with 44.04% and 32.38% respectively for 
the benchmark S&P 1500. In 2012 when looking at the 3-month annualized return the strategy 
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long-short has outperformed with 31.53%; this is the lowest return earned among the three 
period windows even if still significant, compared with 11.72% for the benchmark S&P 1500. The 
excess return earned above the market is about 19.81%. (Refer to Appendix A). 
 
Figure 4.6-8 Details of the return that constitutes our long-short strategy (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-8, we show graphically how each portfolios is doing over the benchmark S&P 
1500 over a 3-month annualized window. The idea is to highlight years where perhaps we could 
have increased weights in one of the two portfolios long or short.  
In 1993 the long portfolio has generated 4.19 and the short portfolio -3.57% versus 1.84% 
for the benchmark S&P 1500. This results overall in an excess return of 5.93%. The same can be 
described for the year 2001 where the long portfolio is underperforming as well as the short 
portfolio. During that year the long portfolio has returned -16.01% whilst the short portfolio has 
returned +9.34%, leading to a long-short return of -25.34% versus the benchmark S&P 500 
of -28.00%. In that case, the three months’ time window benefits our investors as this is the 
lowest loss over the three different periods.  
Previously, the strategy in 2010 over a 7-month window was returning a negative return 
compared to the 12-month window. Here, the return earned on the long-short portfolio is slightly 
greater than the one on the 12-month window. For instance, the long portfolio delivered a return 
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of +3.35% and the short portfolio +0.51%, leading to a small positive return for our long-short 
strategy of 2.83% versus the market delivering a return of 2.37%. (Refer to Appendix A). 
4.6.2 Drawdown 
In this part, we present the maximum drawdown over the different time horizons.  
 
Figure 4.6-9 Maximum drawdown (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-9, we present the maximum drawdown of our strategy over a 12-month 
horizon window for the period 1991 to 2012. Maximum drawdown is by definition the maximum 
percentage loss. The worst drawdown for our portfolio is -143.94% in 2007 compared to -73.67% 
for the benchmark; here the S&P 1500 is identified in the chart by “MARK 12”. The second largest 
drawdown of our strategy occurs in 2001 with a drawdown of -67.94% compared to the 
benchmark of -29.18% the same year. The third largest drawdown is in 1997, -62.11% compared 
to -15.04% respectively for the benchmark.  
Historically, long-short equity portfolios have to some extent limited the downside risk 
during downwards markets. Our main concern is therefore why the maximum drawdown is 
somehow showing a more risky strategy for our long-short portfolio compared to the S&P 1500 
index used as a benchmark here. (Refer to Appendix B). 
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One way to justify this is by highlighting that we have inside our portfolio a two-
dimensional bet and, as spotted by the literature, this is not a pure market neutral play as we are 
looking for return on the long portfolio and the short portfolio, thereby justifying the higher 
drawdown of our strategy. Those maximum losses appear to be during pre-crisis times where our 
portfolio is losing on both sides of the two-dimensional bet. In summary, due to the absolute 
return investment approach, also called a double alpha strategy by practitioners, our portfolio 
exhibits higher risk compensated by significant return expectations for our investors.   
 
Figure 4.6-10 Maximum drawdown (7-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-10, we present the maximum drawdown of our strategy over a 7-month 
horizon window for the period 1991 to 2012. Maximum drawdown is by definition the maximum 
percentage loss. The worst drawdown for our portfolio is -128.59% in 2007 compared to -62.27% 
for the benchmark; here the S&P 1500 is identified in the chart by “MARK 7”. The second largest 
drawdown of our strategy occurs in 2001 with a drawdown of -67.94% compared to the 
benchmark of -29.18% the same year. The third largest drawdown is in 1997 -62.11% compared 
to -15.04% respectively for the benchmark. (Refer to Appendix B). 
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Figure 4.6-11 Maximum drawdown (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-11, we present the maximum drawdown of our strategy over a 3-month 
horizon window for the period 1991 to 2012. Maximum drawdown is by definition the maximum 
percentage loss. The worst drawdown for our portfolio is -22.43% in 2007 compared to -9.94% for 
the benchmark; here the S&P 1500 is identified in the chart by “MARK 3”. The second largest 
drawdown of our strategy occurs in 2001 with a drawdown of -21.77% compared to the 
benchmark of -12.68% the same year. The third largest drawdown is in 2000, -14.33% compared 
to -7.81% respectively for the benchmark.  
To some extent as the maximum drawdown occurs gradually we would have been able to 
leave the strategy at this point in time in order to limit the downside risk. (Refer to Appendix B). 
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4.6.3 Beta 
In this part, we describe beta over the different time horizons. 
 
Figure 4.6-12 Beta (12-month window) 
We present above in Figure 4.6-12 beta computed for a 12-month horizon window for 
three portfolios, i.e. the long portfolio denoted in “blue”, the short portfolio in “red” and our 
long-short portfolio in “green”.  
By definition beta is the measurement of volatility of a portfolio in relation to the market. 
A portfolio with a beta of one will tend to move in line with the market; by contrast, a portfolio 
with a beta higher than one will be more volatile; inversely, a portfolio with a beta of less than 
one will be less volatile than the market.  
A market neutral strategy will tend to have a beta close to zero; hence this symmetrical 
beta for the long and short portfolio. For example, in 2010 the beta on the long portfolio of 1.32 
shows that the portfolio has performed 32% better than the benchmark, here the S&P 1500. The 
reverse if the market is falling.   
Also, in 2010 the beta on the short portfolio of -1.23 shows that the short portfolio has 
performed 23% better than the benchmark on the downside. Inversely, in 1997 the beta on the 
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long portfolio of 0.81 shows that the portfolio is expected to perform 19% worse than the market 
during up markets and 19% better during down markets.  
Regarding our long-short portfolio we are adding on both betas, such as in 2010, for 
example, the portfolio has a beta of -0.09. 
Long-short equity portfolio managers are looking to increase their alpha and this is 
expressed by higher return above the market; the other way is to decrease your beta. (Refer to 
Appendix C). 
 
Figure 4.6-13 Beta (7-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-13, we illustrate the beta for a 7-month horizon window for three portfolios, 
i.e. the long portfolio denoted in “blue”, the short portfolio in “red” and our long-short portfolio 
in “green”. 
For example, in 2010 the beta on the long portfolio of 1.31 shows that the portfolio has 
performed 31% better than the benchmark, here the S&P 1500. The reverse if the market is 
falling.   
Also, in 2010 the beta on the short portfolio of -1.22 shows that the short portfolio has 
performed 22% better than the benchmark on the downside. Inversely, in 1997 the beta on the 
long portfolio of 0.85 shows that the portfolio is expected to perform 15% worse than the market 
during up markets and 15% better during down markets. (Refer to Appendix C.) 
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Regarding our long-short portfolio we are adding on both betas, such as in 2010, for 
example, the portfolio has a beta of -0.10. Long-short equity portfolio managers are looking to 
increase their alpha and this is expressed by higher return above the market; the other way is to 
decrease your beta.  
 
Figure 4.6-14 Beta (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-14, we illustrate the beta for a 3-month horizon window for three portfolios, 
i.e. the long portfolio denoted in “blue”, the short portfolio in “red” and our long-short portfolio 
in “green”. 
For example, in 2010 the beta on the long portfolio of 1.10 shows that the portfolio has 
performed 10% better than the benchmark, here the S&P 1500. The reverse if the market is 
falling.   
Also, in 2010 the beta on the short portfolio of -1.19 shows that the short portfolio has 
performed 19% better than the benchmark on the downside. Inversely, in 1997 the beta on the 
long portfolio of 0.91 shows that the portfolio is expected to perform 9% worse than the market 
during up markets and 9% better during down markets.  
Regarding our long-short portfolio we are adding on both betas, such as in 2010, for 
example, the portfolio has a beta of -0.09. (Refer to Appendix C.) 
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Long-short equity portfolio managers are looking to increase their alpha and this is 
expressed by higher return above the market; the other way is to decrease beta. (Refer to 
Appendix D.) 
4.6.4 Sharpe ratio/Information ratio/Sortino ratio/Treynor ratio 
In this part, we analyze the different ratios over the different time horizons.  
 
Figure 4.6-15 Sharpe ratio (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-15, the Sharpe ratio is used to express how much return is achieved for the 
amount of risk taken in an investment; when interpreting Sharpe ratios investors look at the 
highest one, as the higher the ratio the better the fund.  
As an illustration, the above chart shows the Sharpe ratios calculated for our long-short 
portfolio over the different years on a 12-month annualized window. For demonstration 
purposes, in 2012 the portfolio is offering a reward of 2.906% per annum per unit of volatility, 
which corresponds to a Sharpe ratio of 2.906; by contrast, a Sharpe ratio below 1 as identified in 
2010 (0.049) indicates a return on investment that is less than the risk taken. Also, a Sharpe ratio 
just above 1 will indicate a return proportional to the risk taken as, for example, in 2009 (1.133). 
In this chart the Sharpe ratio ranges from -0.868 in 2001 to 4.522 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 1.6. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 4.6-16 Information ratio (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-16, the Information ratio is another measure of risk; it indicates how 
successful the portfolio has been at taking risk relative to the benchmark. When comparing funds 
using the same investment style the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a manager 
who has been more efficient at picking stocks. For example, in 2007 the Information ratio is 
negative, -0.736, highlighting our poor ability during crisis times to identify good stocks. In this 
chart, the Information ratio ranges from -0.864 in 2001 to 4.514 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 1.6. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 4.6-17 Sortino ratio (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-17, the Sortino ratio which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio with a 
measure of downside deviations confirms the superiority of our strategy over the different years. 
In this chart, the Sortino ratio ranges from -1.479 in 2001 to 5.642 in 2002. The mean and the 
median are both around 2.5. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 4.6-18 Treynor ratio (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-18, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit of risk 
using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted return. It is 
useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar return. In 
this chart, the Treynor ratio ranges from -0.250 in 2007 to 0.430 in 2008. The mean and the 
median are both around 0.130. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 4.6-19 Sharpe ratio (7-month window) 
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In Figure 4.6-19, we present the Sharpe ratios calculated for our long-short portfolio over 
the different years on a 7-month annualized window. For demonstration purposes, in 2012 the 
portfolio is offering a reward of 2.556% per annum per unit of volatility, which corresponds to a 
Sharpe ratio of 2.556; by contrast, a Sharpe ratio below 1 as identified in 1999 (0.945) indicates a 
return on investment that is less than the risk taken. Also, a Sharpe ratio just above 1 will indicate 
a return proportional to the risk taken as, for example, in 2005 (1.045). In this chart, the Sharpe 
ratio ranges from -2.234 in 2007 to 4.588 in 1994. The mean and the median are both around 1. 
(Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 4.6-20 Information ratio (7-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-20, the Information ratio is another measure of risk; it indicates how 
successful the portfolio has been at taking risk relative to the benchmark. When comparing funds 
using the same investment style the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a manager 
who has been more efficient at picking stocks. For example, in 2007 the Information ratio is 
negative, -2.223, highlighting our poor ability during crisis times to identify good stocks. In this 
chart, the Information ratio ranges from -2.223 in 2007 to 4.570 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 1. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 4.6-21 Sortino ratio (7-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-21, the Sortino ratio which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio with a 
measure of downside deviations confirms the superiority of our strategy over the different years. 
In this chart, the Sortino ratio ranges from -3.041 in 2007 to 6.382 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 1.5. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 4.6-22 Treynor ratio (7-month window) 
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In Figure 4.6-22, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit of risk 
using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted return. It is 
useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar returns. In 
this chart, the Treynor ratio ranges from -0.622 in 2007 to 0.490 in 2008. The mean and the 
median are both around 0.080. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 4.6-23 Sharpe ratio (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-23, we present the Sharpe ratios calculated for our long-short portfolio over 
the different years on a 3-month annualized window. For demonstration purposes, in 2012 the 
portfolio is offering a reward of 1.388% per annum per unit of volatility, which corresponds to a 
Sharpe ratio of 1.388; by contrast, a Sharpe ratio below 1 as identified in 2010 (0.127) indicates a 
return on investment that is less than the risk taken. Also, a Sharpe ratio just above 1 will indicate 
a return proportional for the risk taken as, for example, in 2003 (1.286). In this chart, the Sharpe 
ratio ranges from -1.304 in 2007 to 6.696 in 1994. The mean and the median are both around 1.4. 
(Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 4.6-24 Information ratio (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-24, the Information ratio is another measure of risk; it indicates how 
successful the portfolio has been at taking risk relative to the benchmark. When comparing funds 
using the same investment style the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a manager 
who has been more efficient at picking stocks. For example, in 2007 the Information ratio is 
negative, -1.288, highlighting our poor ability during crisis times to identify good stocks. In this 
chart, the Information ratio ranges from -1.288 in 2007 to 6.627 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 1.4. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 4.6-25 Sortino ratio (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-25, the Sortino ratio, which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio with a 
measure of downside deviations, confirms the superiority of our strategy over the different years. 
In this chart, the Sortino ratio ranges from -2.098 in 2007 to 10.687 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 2. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 4.6-26  Treynor ratio (3-month window) 
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Finally, in Figure 4.6-26, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit 
of risk using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted 
return. It is useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar 
returns. In this chart, the Treynor ratio ranges from -0.180 in 2007 to 1.154 in 1998. The mean 
and the median are both around 0.100. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
4.6.5 Correlation 
In this part, we present a chart and a summary results table obtained for the correlation 
of our portfolios, i.e. the long portfolio, the short portfolio and the long-short portfolio against 
the market.  
Correlation is a useful metric when measuring how the returns of two investments move 
in relation to each other; we display below a chart on a 3-month window with the correlation for 
the long portfolio, the short portfolio and the long-short portfolio. The results display a 
symmetrical correlation for both long and short portfolio. The same can be observed on a 7-
month or a 12-month window.  
In general, long-short equity portfolios tend to have long bias and are in consequence less 
correlated with the market; this is reflected in our graph with the low correlation obtained for our 
long-short portfolio.  
 
Figure 4.6-27 Correlation (3-month window) 
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In Figure 4.6-27, we display the correlation chart for our 3-month annualized window. It 
presents the correlations between our portfolios and the S&P 1500. The correlation overall is 
quite low with, for example, in 2012 the long portfolio exhibiting a positive correlation of 0.89 
with the S&P 1500 whilst the short portfolio exhibits a negative correlation the same year of -0.76 
with the S&P 1500. The correlation of our long-short portfolio is -0.08, indicating that the 
portfolio is neutral and offering diversification for investors willing to use our portfolio in a fund. 
(Refer to Appendix E.) 
4.6.6 Volatility  
We show in this part graphics representing the return on our long-short portfolio against 
the market and the volatility for both. This helps us to understand to what extent our strategy is 
more volatile by comparing returns for the risk taken. The results show that for not a much higher 
volatility our strategy is able to generate higher return than the market.  
 
Figure 4.6-28 Return and volatility for long-short portfolio against market (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-28, we present annualized returns and annualized volatility on a 12-month 
window horizon. The results show that for not a much greater volatility we are able to generate 
higher return. For illustration purposes, during periods of high market volatility investors are 
likely to see return to be negative, for instance in 2007, 2001 or 1997. It should also be noted that 
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during those crisis times our portfolio is facing a double volatility on both sides of the portfolio, 
i.e. the long portfolio and the short portfolio. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
As an example, in 2007 the portfolio has a negative return of -54.81% for a volatility of 
74.25% whilst the market has a negative return of -38.11% for a volatility of 29.83%, meaning that 
our strategy relative to the market is not very risky even during crisis times.  
In the following figure, 4.6-29, we represent a scatter diagram with, on the y-axis, the 
return of our long-short portfolio against the market and on the x-axis the volatility of our long-
short portfolio against the volatility of the market on a 12-month annualized window. 
 
Figure 4.6-29 Scatter diagram return and volatility (12-month window) 
Figure 4.6-29 displays the risk return scatterplot to illustrate the risk versus the return of 
our long-short portfolio. The return is on the y-axis while the risk is on the x-axis. Here the risk is 
defined as the standard deviation (volatility). The scatterplot shows as well the risk return of the 
benchmark for illustration purposes. From the scatterplot, investors will be able to understand 
that for the same level of risk our strategy is delivering a higher return, as suggested by the 
concentration on around 20% standard deviation. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
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Figure 4.6-30 Return and volatility for long-short portfolio against market (7-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-30, we present annualized returns and annualized volatility on a 7-month 
window horizon. The results are showing that for not a much greater volatility we are able to 
generate higher returns. For illustration purposes, during periods of high market volatility 
investors are likely to see returns to be negative, for instance in 2007, in 2001 or in 1997. It 
should also be noted that during those crisis times our portfolio is facing a double volatility on 
both sides of the portfolio, i.e. the long portfolio and the short portfolio. 
As an example, in 2007 the portfolio has a negative return of -134.83% for a volatility of 
60.37% whilst the market has a negative return of -68.48% for a volatility of 25.71%, meaning that 
our strategy relative to the market is not very risky even during crisis times.  
In the following figure, 4.6-31, we represent a scatter diagram with, on the y-axis, the 
return of our long-short portfolio against the market and on the x-axis the volatility of our long-
short portfolio against the volatility of the market on a 7-month annualized window. (Refer to 
Appendix F.) 
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Figure 4.6-31 Scatter diagram return and volatility (7-month window) 
Figure 4.6-31 displays the risk return scatterplot to illustrate the risk versus the return of 
our long-short portfolio. The return is on the y-axis while the risk is on the x-axis. Here the risk is 
defined as the standard deviation (volatility). The scatterplot shows as well the risk return of the 
benchmark for illustration purposes. From the scatterplot, investors will be able to understand 
that for the same level of risk our strategy is delivering a higher return, as suggested by the 
concentration on around 20% standard deviation. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
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Figure 4.6-32 Return and volatility for long-short portfolio against market (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.6-32, we present annualized returns and annualized volatility on a 3-month 
window horizon. The results are showing that for not a much greater volatility we are able to 
generate higher returns. For illustration purposes, during periods of high market volatility 
investors are likely to see return to be negative, for instance in 2007, in 2001 or in 1997. It should 
also be noted that during those crisis times our portfolio is facing a double volatility on both sides 
of the portfolio, i.e. the long portfolio and the short portfolio. 
As an example, in 2007 the portfolio has a negative return of -38.37% for a volatility of 
29.45% whilst the market has a negative return of -17.41% for a volatility 11.36%, meaning that 
our strategy relative to the market is not very risky even during crisis times.  
In the following figure, 4.6-33, we represent a scatter diagram with, in the y-axis, the 
return of our long-short portfolio against the market and on the x-axis the volatility of our long-
short portfolio against the volatility of the market on a 3-month annualized window. (Refer to 
Appendix F.) 
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Figure 4.6-33 Scatter diagram return and volatility (3-month window) 
Figure 4.6-33 displays the risk return scatterplot to illustrate the risk versus the return of 
our long-short portfolio. The return is on the y-axis while the risk is on the x-axis. Here the risk is 
defined as the standard deviation (volatility). The scatterplot shows as well the risk return of the 
benchmark for illustration purposes. From the scatterplot, investors will be able to understand 
that for the same level of risk our strategy is delivering a higher return, as suggested by the 
concentration on around 20% standard deviation. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
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4.7 Refinement of Piotroski F-score by removing one criterion 
 
4.7.1 Refinement by removing the lowest percentage criterion 
Following our long-short portfolio performance based on using Piotroski F-score, we 
decided to see whether it was possible to drop one criterion highlighted by the F-score and add a 
small constraint before buying or shorting stocks to another portfolio based on the rationale that 
investors might be willing to buy a stock rated with a 7 or an 8 only if this one has had a good rally 
before portfolio formation; also, the same logic was applied for the short portfolio. 
The first step consisted of identifying which criteria were perhaps less significant in 
generating returns. To do so, we identified firms having positive returns and negative returns 
within the stocks rated with a 7 and 8 or a 9 and analyzed which criteria contributed the most, i.e. 
what the firms scored in all criteria (0 to 9).  
Eventually, if a firm did not score in a particular criterion but still generated significant 
return this criterion could potentially be removed from the Piotroski F-score. In both analyses, 
results suggested that criteria number 7: “Shares outstanding is not greater than the previous 
year, the firm scores one otherwise it is a zero” is less significant than any other criteria. (Please 
find below the results from our analysis.) In other words, only 1/3 of the firms scored in F7.  
The second step was then to investigate whether by removing these criteria our portfolio 
was close to generate subsequent return. To do so, we are buying stocks rated with a 7 or an 8 
and we are shorting stocks rated with a score of 0 to 3. We will call this portfolio “Portfolio 2” for 
illustration purposes.  
The last step was to add a constraint to this new “Portfolio 2” to see whether it was 
possible to maximize return and for comparability purposes. Therefore, we have decided to buy 
or sell stocks on the basis of those that have generated a positive return for the long portfolio and 
a negative return for the short portfolio before portfolio formation. In other words, in the case of 
the long portfolio, if the stocks generated a positive return from 0 to 90 days and are rated with a 
7 or an 8 than we buy the stocks.  
Accordingly, the same approach has been taken on the other side (short side) where we 
look at negative return for stocks rated 0 to 3 before portfolio formation (0 to 90 days). “Portfolio 
3” presented a mix of results.  
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Solely after investigation, the original portfolio (also called  ”Portfolio 1” for simplification 
purposes) offered better returns and less drawdown, even if regarding the investment window 
our two other portfolios might reflect better results; also, when taking a look at risk-adjusted 
metrics “Portfolio 1” is able to offer a better risk-adjusted return to investors. Overall, we draw 
the conclusion that “Portfolio 1” outperforms “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
This part is described as follows: first we present findings relative to factor F7 and second 
we compare our three portfolios using different metrics.   
Table 4.7-1 Criteria relevancy for stocks rated either by a 7 an 8 or a 9 with a positive return (absolute numbers) 
 
Total 
Positive  
Return  
Stocks F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
2012 147 147 147 99 141 104 125 32 142 131 
2011 91 91 90 72 87 70 79 27 82 57 
2010 113 113 113 98 111 69 98 26 108 88 
2009 211 206 211 145 209 116 201 54 195 195 
2008 105 105 105 71 103 88 96 29 95 63 
2007 37 36 37 29 37 26 29 9 33 34 
2006 101 99 101 70 98 64 83 47 89 78 
2005 121 120 120 104 118 65 104 57 111 81 
2004 159 158 159 142 154 67 126 75 147 124 
2003 154 145 154 129 149 79 135 66 135 121 
2002 259 252 259 212 255 147 215 102 225 221 
2001 61 58 61 45 59 40 51 30 53 48 
2000 125 125 125 95 119 84 112 57 112 88 
1999 148 146 148 108 134 101 116 79 131 108 
1998 133 130 133 101 131 87 97 71 122 108 
1997 117 117 117 87 110 67 93 66 106 92 
1996 208 205 208 159 197 151 165 104 180 156 
1995 159 158 158 124 152 104 123 82 142 113 
1994 145 142 145 123 139 97 116 53 125 110 
1993 107 106 107 86 103 58 86 48 93 88 
1992 106 102 106 88 102 53 92 51 95 75 
1991 55 52 55 41 53 33 45 18 53 46 
 
In Table 4.7-1, the left hand side contains the number of stocks with a positive return and 
the right hand side contains the nine criteria and how many of the stocks score in the different 
criteria.  
Below we display a table in percentage, which is perhaps more representative, where we 
divide each criterion’s number by the total each year and multiple by 100 in order to get 
percentages.  
If someone wants to interpret this table, the best way is to take an example: for instance, 
for illustration purposes, only 32 stocks out of 147 stocks in 2012 scored in F7, implying that only 
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22% of the 147 stocks in 2012 generated a positive return partly due to this criterion, meaning 
that, if this is recurrent throughout the years, then this criterion could potentially be removed 
from the selection process.   
Table 4.7-2 Criteria relevancy for stocks rated either by a 7 an 8 or a 9 with a positive return (percentage numbers) 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
2012 100% 100% 67% 96% 71% 85% 22% 97% 89% 
2011 100% 99% 79% 96% 77% 87% 30% 90% 63% 
2010 100% 100% 87% 98% 61% 87% 23% 96% 78% 
2009 98% 100% 69% 99% 55% 95% 26% 92% 92% 
2008 100% 100% 68% 98% 84% 91% 28% 90% 60% 
2007 97% 100% 78% 100% 70% 78% 24% 89% 92% 
2006 98% 100% 69% 97% 63% 82% 47% 88% 77% 
2005 99% 99% 86% 98% 54% 86% 47% 92% 67% 
2004 99% 100% 89% 97% 42% 79% 47% 92% 78% 
2003 94% 100% 84% 97% 51% 88% 43% 88% 79% 
2002 97% 100% 82% 98% 57% 83% 39% 87% 85% 
2001 95% 100% 74% 97% 66% 84% 49% 87% 79% 
2000 100% 100% 76% 95% 67% 90% 46% 90% 70% 
1999 99% 100% 73% 91% 68% 78% 53% 89% 73% 
1998 98% 100% 76% 98% 65% 73% 53% 92% 81% 
1997 100% 100% 74% 94% 57% 79% 56% 91% 79% 
1996 99% 100% 76% 95% 73% 79% 50% 87% 75% 
1995 99% 99% 78% 96% 65% 77% 52% 89% 71% 
1994 98% 100% 85% 96% 67% 80% 37% 86% 76% 
1993 99% 100% 80% 96% 54% 80% 45% 87% 82% 
1992 96% 100% 83% 96% 50% 87% 48% 90% 71% 
1991 95% 100% 75% 96% 60% 82% 33% 96% 84% 
Average 98% 100% 78% 97% 63% 83% 41% 90% 77% 
 
As previously illustrated, Table 4.7-2 describes Table 4.7-1 in terms of percentages. On 
average only 41% of the companies scored in F7 throughout the years.  
Also, it can be noticed that on average F1 and F2, which are ROA (Return On Assets) and 
CFO (Cash Flow from Operations) respectively, are significantly more relevant than any other 
criteria, suggesting that companies that have generated positive returns have had a positive ROA 
and CFO.  
Also, it appears that in general criteria that are less significant on average are all related 
to change in leverage where the firm is signalling its inability to generate sufficient funds 
internally.  
After drafting the hypothesis that potentially factor 7 could be eventually removed, we 
decided to conduct the same approach for stocks with negative returns. Please refer to the tables 
below: 
 
  
193 
 
Table 4.7-3 Criteria relevancy for stocks rated either by a 7 an 8 or a 9 with a negative return (absolute numbers) 
 
Total 
Negative 
Return 
Stocks F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
2012 22 22 22 15 22 16 20 3 19 19 
2011 26 26 26 23 25 17 20 8 25 18 
2010 74 72 74 66 70 41 66 24 68 59 
2009 29 25 29 25 29 13 26 6 27 29 
2008 8 8 8 7 7 6 7 2 8 5 
2007 129 128 129 96 127 86 112 36 115 108 
2006 99 96 99 79 94 62 80 42 87 78 
2005 34 33 34 28 34 11 28 19 28 28 
2004 42 42 42 32 40 20 34 22 38 34 
2003 62 58 62 52 62 31 57 20 56 50 
2002 9 8 9 9 7 8 9 1 8 5 
2001 102 96 102 69 100 72 89 45 86 87 
2000 41 41 41 31 37 25 33 27 37 30 
1999 93 92 92 73 86 61 73 43 86 74 
1998 106 106 106 74 101 79 82 48 99 89 
1997 131 129 130 94 118 100 99 62 116 105 
1996 27 26 27 25 23 18 20 15 25 19 
1995 44 43 44 30 39 35 34 23 36 34 
1994 15 15 15 12 15 9 10 5 14 14 
1993 49 48 48 37 43 24 42 29 46 39 
1992 54 52 54 38 51 31 44 33 44 43 
1991 17 17 17 12 15 13 17 4 17 14 
 
This table, 4.7-3, can be interpreted in the same manner as the one displayed above, such 
as out of the stocks rated with a 7, an 8 or a 9 only 22 in 2012 generated a negative return and 
out of those 22 only three scored in F7, emphasizing our previous hypothesis that potentially 
factor 7 can be avoided.  
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Table 4.7-4 Criteria relevancy for stocks rated either by a 7 an 8 or a 9 with a negative return (percentage numbers) 
 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
2012 100% 100% 68% 100% 73% 91% 14% 86% 86% 
2011 100% 100% 88% 96% 65% 77% 31% 96% 69% 
2010 97% 100% 89% 95% 55% 89% 32% 92% 80% 
2009 86% 100% 86% 100% 45% 90% 21% 93% 100% 
2008 100% 100% 88% 88% 75% 88% 25% 100% 63% 
2007 99% 100% 74% 98% 67% 87% 28% 89% 84% 
2006 97% 100% 80% 95% 63% 81% 42% 88% 79% 
2005 97% 100% 82% 100% 32% 82% 56% 82% 82% 
2004 100% 100% 76% 95% 48% 81% 52% 90% 81% 
2003 94% 100% 84% 100% 50% 92% 32% 90% 81% 
2002 89% 100% 100% 78% 89% 100% 11% 89% 56% 
2001 94% 100% 68% 98% 71% 87% 44% 84% 85% 
2000 100% 100% 76% 90% 61% 80% 66% 90% 73% 
1999 99% 99% 78% 92% 66% 78% 46% 92% 80% 
1998 100% 100% 70% 95% 75% 77% 45% 93% 84% 
1997 98% 99% 72% 90% 76% 76% 47% 89% 80% 
1996 96% 100% 93% 85% 67% 74% 56% 93% 70% 
1995 98% 100% 68% 89% 80% 77% 52% 82% 77% 
1994 100% 100% 80% 100% 60% 67% 33% 93% 93% 
1993 98% 98% 76% 88% 49% 86% 59% 94% 80% 
1992 96% 100% 70% 94% 57% 81% 61% 81% 80% 
1991 100% 100% 71% 88% 76% 100% 24% 100% 82% 
Average 97% 100% 79% 93% 64% 84% 40% 90% 79% 
 
In Table 4.7-4 once again the lowest average percentage throughout the years is F7, 
which is equal to 40%.  
When looking at the literature, researchers such as Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), Pontiff 
and Woodgate (2008), or even when you take a deeper look at the work of Myers and Majluk 
(1984) and Miller and Rock (1985), have all reported some form of cross section in returns with 
equity issuance. 
This results, in other words, in asymmetric information which is considered in our case as 
a bad signal as in fact firms are signalling their inability to generate sufficient internal funds to 
service current debt. In fact, it has been suggested that managers may take advantage of issuance 
when information in the market is low; moreover, when the information is high issuance this will 
result in a fall in stock prices.  
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Below we display results for our three portfolios with: 
 “Portfolio 1” defined as long Piotroski stocks rated with a 7, an 8 or a 9 and short 
stocks 0 to 3. 
 “Portfolio 2” defined as long Piotroski stocks rated with a 7, an 8 or a 9 and short 
stocks 0 to 3 after removing shares’ outstanding criteria.  
 “Portfolio 3” defined as Portfolio 2 but adding a constraint in the return before 
portfolio formation. In other words, we are screening stocks in the long portfolio that 
generated a positive return from 0 to 90 days and, in the case of the short portfolio 
stocks, that generated a negative return from 0 to 90 days.  
4.7.2 Portfolio performances (long-short portfolios)  
4.7.2.1 Portfolio performances in terms of returns (12-month window) 
 
 
Figure 4.7-1 Long-short portfolios (12-month window) 
In Figure 4.7-1 we display our three long-short portfolios’ annual performance over a 12-
month window for each fiscal year over the period 1991 to 2012. Returns are expressed in 
percentage. The blue bar corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 2” and the green 
bar to “Portfolio 3”. Please refer to the table below for a better understanding of which portfolio 
is more efficient.  
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Table 4.7-5 Statistical summary LS (12-month window) 
> L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 22 15 10 
L/S 12 Port2 7 22 7 
L/S 12 Port3 12 15 22 
    
    > L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 68.18% 45.45% 
L/S 12 Port2 31.82% 
 
31.82% 
L/S 12 Port3 54.55% 68.18% 
  
Table 4.7-5 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix how 
many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this case 
“Portfolio 1” has generated 15 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 2”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 68.18%, compared to “Portfolio 3”; whilst “Portfolio 1” is only 
greater 10 times out of 22, which is equal to 45.45%.  
In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 3” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 2”. 
 
Figure 4.7-2 Long portfolios (12-month window) 
We display here in Figure 4.7-2 the behaviour of the three portfolios focusing on the long 
side to see which one generates higher returns. Once again we will use the table below for 
statistical description as this gives a better idea of the results.  
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Table 4.7-6 Statistical summary L (12-month window) 
> L 12 Port1 L 12 Port2 L 12 Port3 
L 12 Port1 22 11 10 
L 12 Port2 11 22 10 
L 12 Port3 12 12 22 
    
    > L 12 Port1 L 12 Port2 L 12 Port3 
L 12 Port1 
 
50.00% 45.45% 
L 12 Port2 50.00% 
 
45.45% 
L 12 Port3 54.55% 54.55% 
  
Table 4.7-6 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix how 
many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this case 
“Portfolio 1” has generated 11 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 2”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 50.00%, compared to “Portfolio 3”; whilst “Portfolio 1” is only 
greater 10 times out of 22, which is equal to 45.45%.  
In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 3” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 2”. 
The same approach is done by taking a look at the behaviour of the short portfolio over 
our three strategies.  
 
Figure 4.7-3 Short portfolios (12-month window) 
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This figure, 4.7-3, describes our three portfolios’ behaviour on the short side. The blue bar 
corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 2” and the green bar to “Portfolio 3”. 
Please refer to the table below for statistics on the short portfolio.  
Table 4.7-7 Statistical summary S (12-month window) 
< S 12 Port1 S 12 Port2 S 12 Port3 
S 12 Port1 22 12 12 
S 12 Port2 10 22 8 
S 12 Port3 10 14 22 
    
    < S 12 Port1 S 12 Port2 S 12 Port3 
S 12 Port1 54.55% 54.55% 
S 12 Port2 45.45% 
 
36.36% 
S 12 Port3 45.45% 63.64% 
  
Table 4.7-7 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix how 
many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this case 
“Portfolio 1” has generated 11 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 2”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 50.00%, compared to “Portfolio 3”; whilst “Portfolio 1” is only 
greater 10 times out of 22, which is equal to 45.45%.  
In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 1” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 2” despite that “Portfolio 3” over “Portfolio 2” might be better 
than “Portfolio 1” over “Portfolio 2”.  
4.7.2.2 Portfolio performances in terms of returns (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-4 Long-short portfolios (7-month window) 
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In this figure, 4.7-4, we display our three long-short portfolios’ annual performance over a 
7-month window for each fiscal year over the period 1991 to 2012. Returns are expressed in 
percentage. The blue bar corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 2” and the green 
bar to “Portfolio 3”. Please refer to the table below for a better understanding of which portfolio 
is more efficient.  
Table 4.7-8 Statistical summary LS (7-month window) 
> L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 
L/S 7 Port1 22 13 14 
L/S 7 Port2 9 22 10 
L/S 7 Port3 8 12 22 
    
    > L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 
L/S 7 Port1 
 
59.09% 63.64% 
L/S 7 Port2 40.91% 
 
45.45% 
L/S 7 Port3 36.36% 54.55% 
  
Table 4.7-8 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix how 
many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this case 
“Portfolio 1” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 2”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%, compared to “Portfolio 3”; whilst “Portfolio 1” is greater 
14 times out of 22, which is equal to 63.64%.  
In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 1” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”. 
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Figure 4.7-5 Long portfolios (7-month window) 
We display here in Figure 4.7-5 the behaviour of the three portfolios focusing on the long 
side to see which one generates higher returns. Once again we will use the table below for 
statistical description as it gives a better idea of the results.  
Table 4.7-9 Statistical summary L (7-month window) 
> L7 Port1 L7 Port2 L7 Port3 
L7 Port1 22 9 11 
L7 Port2 13 22 12 
L7 Port3 11 10 22 
    
    > L7 Port1 L7 Port2 L7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 
 
40.91% 50.00% 
L 7 Port2 59.09% 
 
54.55% 
L 7 Port3 50.00% 45.45% 
  
Table 4.7-9 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix how 
many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this case 
“Portfolio 2” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 1”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%; by contrast to “Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 2” is only greater 
12 times out of 22, which is equal to 54.55%.  
In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 2” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 3”. 
The same approach is done by taking a look at the behaviour of the short portfolio over 
our three strategies.  
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Figure 4.7-6 Short portfolios (7-month window) 
This figure, 4.7-6, describes our three portfolios’ behaviour on the short side. The blue bar 
corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 2” and the green bar to “Portfolio 3”. 
Please refer to the table below for statistics on the short portfolio.  
Table 4.7-10 Statistical summary L (7-month window) 
< S 7 Port1 S 7 Port2 S 7 Port3 
S 7 Port1 22 15 14 
S 7 Port2 7 22 9 
S 7 Port3 8 13 22 
    
    < S 7 Port1 S 7 Port2 S 7 Port3 
S 7 Port1 
 
68.18% 63.64% 
S 7 Port2 31.82% 
 
40.91% 
S 7 Port3 36.36% 59.09% 
     
 
Table 4.7-10 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix 
how many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this 
case “Portfolio 1” has generated 15 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 2”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 68.18; by contrast to “Portfolio 3” where “Portfolio 1” is only 
greater 14 times out of 22, which is equal to 63.64%.  
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In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 1” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”. 
4.7.2.3 Portfolio performances in terms of returns (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-7 Long-short portfolios (3-month window) 
In this figure, 4.7-7, we display our three long-short portfolios’ annual performance over a 
3-month window for each fiscal year over the period 1991 to 2012. Returns are expressed in 
percentage. The blue bar corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 2” and the green 
bar to “Portfolio 3”. Please refer to the table below for a better understanding of which portfolio 
is more efficient.  
Table 4.7-11 Statistical summary LS (3-month window) 
> L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
L/S 3 Port1 22 12 12 
L/S 3 Port2 10 22 11 
L/S 3 Port3 10 11 22 
    
    > L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
L/S 3 Port1 
 
54.55% 54.55% 
L/S 3 Port2 45.45% 
 
50.00% 
L/S 3 Port3 45.45% 50.00% 
  
Table 4.7-11 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix 
how many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this 
case “Portfolio 1” has generated 12 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 2”; this 
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corresponds to a percentage of 54.55%, compared to “Portfolio 3”, whilst “Portfolio 1” is also 
greater 12 times out of 22, which is equal to 54.55%.  
In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 1” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”. 
 
Figure 4.7-8 Long portfolios (3-month window) 
We display here in Figure 4.7-8 the behaviour of the three portfolios focusing on the long 
side to see which one generates higher returns. Once again we will use the table below for 
statistical description as it gives a better idea of the results.  
Table 4.7-12 Statistical summary L (3-month window) 
> L 3 Port1 L 3 Port2 L 3 Port3 
L 3 Port1 22 11 17 
L 3 Port2 11 22 17 
L 3 Port3 5 5 22 
    
    
> L 3 Port1 L 3 Port2 L 3 Port3 
L 3 Port1 
 
50.00% 77.27% 
L 3 Port2 50.00% 
 
77.27% 
L 3 Port3 22.73% 22.73% 
  
Table 4.7-12 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix 
how many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this 
case “Portfolio 2” has generated 11 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 1”; this 
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
R
e
tu
rn
 (
%
) 
Long Portfolios (3-month window) 
L 3 Port1 L 3 Port2 L 3 Port3
  
204 
 
corresponds to a percentage of 50.00; by contrast to “Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 2” is greater 17 
times out of 22, which is equal to 77.27%.  
In this case we can consider that both “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 1” generate higher 
returns over the years compared to Portfolio 3”. 
The same approach is done by taking a look at the behaviour of the short portfolio over 
our three strategies.  
 
Figure 4.7-9 Short portfolios (3-month window) 
This chart in Figure 4.7-9 describes our three portfolios’ behaviour on the short side. The 
blue bar corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 2” and the green bar to “Portfolio 
3”. Please refer to the table below for statistics on the short portfolio.  
Table 4.7-13 Statistical summary S (3-month window) 
< S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 22 15 10 
S 3 Port2 7 22 8 
S 3 Port3 12 14 22 
    
    < S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 
 
68.18% 45.45% 
S 3 Port2 31.82% 
 
36.36% 
S 3 Port3 54.55% 63.64%  
 
Table 4.7-13 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix 
how many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this 
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case “Portfolio 1” has generated 15 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 2”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 68.18%, by contrast to “Portfolio 3”; whilst “Portfolio 1” is only 
greater 10 times out of 22, which is equal to 45.45%.  
In this case we can consider that “Portfolio 3” generates higher returns over the years 
than “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 2”.  
4.7.3 Maximum drawdown (long-short portfolios) 
4.7.3.1 Maximum drawdown (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-10 Maximum drawdown (12-month window) 
In this figure, 4.7-10, we present the maximum drawdown of our three portfolios over a 
12-month window for the period 1991 to 2012. Please refer to the statistics in the table below for 
a better understanding of which portfolio has the lowest drawdown.  
Table 4.7-14 Statistical summary LS (12-month window) 
< L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 22 14 19 
L/S 12 Port2 8 22 17 
L/S 12 Port3 3 5 22 
    
    
< L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 
 
63.64% 86.36% 
L/S 12 Port2 36.36% 
 
77.27% 
L/S 12 Port3 13.64% 22.73% 
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In this table, 4.7-14, “Portfolio 1” has generated 14 times out of 22 years less drawdowns 
than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 63.64%, by contrast to “Portfolio 3”; whilst 
“Portfolio 1” generated 19 times out of 22 less drawdowns, which is equal to 86.36%. This 
suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with less drawdown than 
“Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
4.7.3.2 Maximum drawdown (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-11 Maximum drawdown (7-month window) 
In this figure, 4.7-11, we present the maximum drawdown of our three portfolios over a 
7-month window for the period 1991 to 2012. Please refer to the statistics in the table below for 
a better understanding of which portfolio has the lowest drawdown.  
Table 4.7-15 Statistical summary LS (7-month window) 
< L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 
L/S 7 Port1 22 14 20 
L/S 7 Port2 8 22 17 
L/S 7 Port3 2 5 22 
    
    < L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 
L/S 7 Port1 
 
63.64% 90.91% 
L/S 7 Port2 36.36% 
 
77.27% 
L/S 7 Port3 9.09% 22.73% 
  
In this table, 4.7-15, “Portfolio 1” has generated 14 times out of 22 years less drawdowns 
than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 63.64%, by contrast to “Portfolio 3”; whilst 
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“Portfolio 1” generated 20 times out of 22 less drawdowns, which is equal to 90.91%. This 
suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with less drawdown than 
“Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
4.7.3.3 Maximum drawdown (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-12 Maximum drawdown (3-month window) 
In this figure, 4.7-12, we present the maximum drawdown of our three portfolios over a 
7-month window for the period 1991 to 2012. Please refer to the statistics in the table below for 
a better understanding of which portfolio has the lowest drawdown.  
Table 4.7-16 Statistical summary LS (3-month window) 
< L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
L/S 3 Port1 22 16 18 
L/S 3 Port2 6 22 16 
L/S 3 Port3 4 6 22 
    
    < L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
L/S 3 Port1 
 
72.73% 81.82% 
L/S 3 Port2 27.27% 
 
72.73% 
L/S 3 Port3 18.18% 27.27% 
  
In this table, 4.7-16, “Portfolio 1” has generated 16 times out of 22 years less drawdowns 
than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 72.73%, by contrast to “Portfolio 3”; whilst 
“Portfolio 1” generated 18 times out of 22 less drawdowns, which is equal to 81.82%. This 
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suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with less drawdown than 
“Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
4.7.4 Risk-adjusted measures (long-short portfolios)  
4.7.4.1 Sharpe ratio (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-13 Sharpe ratio (12-month window) 
In this figure, 4.7-13, the Sharpe ratio is used to express how much return is achieved for 
the amount of risk taken in an investment; when interpreting Sharpe ratio investors look at the 
highest one, as the higher the ratio the better the fund. Once again we try by using some forms of 
summary statistics to see which portfolio is better at generating higher Sharpe ratios.  
Table 4.7-17 Statistical summary LS (12-month window) 
> L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 22 14 13 
L/S 12 Port2 8 22 13 
L/S 12 Port3 9 9 22 
    
    > L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 
 
63.64% 59.09% 
L/S 12 Port2 36.36% 
 
59.09% 
L/S 12 Port3 40.91% 40.91% 
  
In this table, 4.7-17, “Portfolio 1” has generated 14 times out of 22 years greater Sharpe 
ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 63.64%, by contrast to “Portfolio 3”; 
whilst “Portfolio 1” generated 13 times out of 22 greater Sharpe ratios, which is equal to 59.09%. 
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This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher Sharpe ratios 
than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
4.7.4.2 Sharpe ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-14 Sharpe ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-18 Statistical summary LS (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 22 13 15 
L 7 Port2 9 22 12 
L 7 Port3 7 10 22 
    
    
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 
 
59.09% 68.18% 
L 7 Port2 40.91% 
 
54.55% 
L 7 Port3 31.82% 45.45% 
  
In this table, 4.7-18, “Portfolio 1” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater Sharpe 
ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%, by contrast to “Portfolio 3”; 
whilst “Portfolio 1” generated 15 times out of 22 greater Sharpe ratios, which is equal to 68.18%. 
This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher Sharpe ratios 
than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.7.4.3 Sharpe ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-15 Sharpe ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-19 Statistical summary LS (3-month window) 
> S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 22 13 16 
S 3 Port2 9 22 14 
S 3 Port3 6 8 22 
    
    > S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 
 
59.09% 72.73% 
S 3 Port2 40.91% 
 
63.64% 
S 3 Port3 27.27% 36.36% 
  
In this table, 4.7-19, “Portfolio 1” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater Sharpe 
ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%, by contrast to “Portfolio 3”; 
whilst “Portfolio 1” generated 16 times out of 22 greater Sharpe ratios, which is equal to 72.73%. 
This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher Sharpe ratios 
than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.7.4.4 Treynor ratio (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-16 Treynor ratio (12-month window) 
In this Figure 4.7-16, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit of 
risk using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted return. 
It is useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar 
returns. Please refer to the table below for comparative purposes between portfolios.  
Table 4.7-20 Statistical summary LS (12-month window) 
> L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 22 10 5 
L/S 12 Port2 12 22 5 
L/S 12 Port3 17 17 22 
    
    > L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 
 
45.45% 22.73% 
L/S 12 Port2 54.55% 
 
22.73% 
L/S 12 Port3 77.27% 77.27% 
  
In this table, 4.7-20, “Portfolio 3” has generated 17 times out of 22 years greater Treynor 
ratios than “Portfolio 1”; this corresponds to a percentage of 77.27%. The same is achieved from 
“Portfolio 3” to “Portfolio 2”, which generated 16 times out of 22 greater Treynor ratios, which is 
equal to 72.73%. This suggests that “Portfolio 3” is more efficient at providing investors with 
higher Treynor ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.7.4.5 Treynor ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-17 Treynor ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-21 Statistical summary LS (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 22 13 9 
L 7 Port2 9 22 10 
L 7 Port3 13 12 22 
    
    > L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 
 
59.09% 40.91% 
L 7 Port2 40.91% 
 
45.45% 
L 7 Port3 59.09% 54.55% 
  
In this table, 4.7-21, “Portfolio 3” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater Treynor 
ratios than “Portfolio 1”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%, whereas, compared to 
“Portfolio 2”, “Portfolio 3” generated 12 times out of 22 greater Treynor ratios, which is equal to 
54.55%. This suggests that “Portfolio 3” is more efficient at providing investors with higher 
Treynor ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.7.4.6 Treynor ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-18 Treynor ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-22 Statistical summary LS (3-month window) 
> S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 22 12 11 
S 3 Port2 10 22 9 
S 3 Port3 11 13 22 
    
    > S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 
 
54.55% 50.00% 
S 3 Port2 45.45% 
 
40.91% 
S 3 Port3 50.00% 59.09% 
  
In this table, 4.7-22, “Portfolio 3” has generated 11 times out of 22 years greater Treynor 
ratios than “Portfolio 1”; this corresponds to a percentage of 50.00%, whereas, compared to 
“Portfolio 2”, “Portfolio 3” generated 13 times out of 22 greater Treynor ratios, which is equal to 
59.09%. This suggests that “Portfolio 3” is more efficient at providing investors with higher 
Treynor ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.1.1.1 Information ratio (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-19 Information ratio (12-month window) 
In this figure, 4.7-19, the Information ratio is used to compare portfolios using the same 
investment style; the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a manager who has been 
more efficient at picking stocks. Please refer to the table below for comparative purposes 
between portfolios. 
Table 4.7-23 Statistical summary LS (12-month window) 
> L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 22 14 13 
L/S 12 Port2 8 22 13 
L/S 12 Port3 9 9 22 
    
    > L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 
 
63.64% 59.09% 
L/S 12 Port2 36.36% 
 
59.09% 
L/S 12 Port3 40.91% 40.91% 
  
In this table, 4.7-23, “Portfolio 1” has generated 14 times out of 22 years greater 
Information ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 63.64%, whereas, 
compared to “Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 1” generated 13 times out of 22 greater Information ratios, 
which is equal to 59.09%. This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors 
with higher Information ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.1.1.2 Information ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-20 Information ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-24 Statistical summary LS (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 22 13 15 
L 7 Port2 9 22 12 
L 7 Port3 7 10 22 
    
    
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 
 
59.09% 68.18% 
L 7 Port2 40.91% 
 
54.55% 
L 7 Port3 31.82% 45.45% 
  
In this table, 4.7-24, “Portfolio 1” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater 
Information ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%, whereas, 
compared to “Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 1” generated 15 times out of 22 greater Information ratios, 
which is equal to 68.18%. This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors 
with higher Information ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.1.1.3 Information ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-21 Information ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-25 Statistical summary LS (3-month window) 
> S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 22 13 16 
S 3 Port2 9 22 14 
S 3 Port3 6 8 22 
    
    > S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 
 
59.09% 72.73% 
S 3 Port2 40.91% 
 
63.64% 
S 3 Port3 27.27% 36.36% 
  
In this table, 4.7-25, “Portfolio 1” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater 
Information ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%, whereas, 
compared to “Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 1” generated 16 times out of 22 greater Sortino ratios, 
which is equal to 72.73%. This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors 
with higher Information ratio than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.1.1.4 Sortino ratio (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-22 Sortino ratio (12-month window) 
 
In this figure, 4.7-22, the Sortino ratio which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio 
with a measure of downside deviations is used to evaluate which portfolio is better at generating 
higher Sortino ratio. Please refer to the table below for comparative purposes.  
Table 4.7-26 Statistical summary LS (12-month window) 
> L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 22 15 13 
L/S 12 Port2 7 22 10 
L/S 12 Port3 9 12 22 
    
    > L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 
L/S 12 Port1 
 
68.18% 59.09% 
L/S 12 Port2 31.82% 
 
45.45% 
L/S 12 Port3 40.91% 54.55% 
  
In this table, 4.7-26, “Portfolio 1” has generated 15 times out of 22 years greater Sortino 
ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 68.18%, whereas, compared to 
“Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 1” generated 13 times out of 22 greater Sortino ratios, which is equal to 
59.09%. This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher 
Sortino ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.1.1.5 Sortino ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-23 Sortino ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-27 Statistical summary LS (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 22 14 16 
L 7 Port2 8 22 11 
L 7 Port3 6 11 22 
    
    > L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 
L 7 Port1 
 
63.64% 72.73% 
L 7 Port2 36.36% 
 
50.00% 
L 7 Port3 27.27% 50.00% 
  
In this table, 4.7-27, “Portfolio 1” has generated 14 times out of 22 years greater Sortino 
ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 63.64%, whereas, compared to 
“Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 1” generated 16 times out of 22 greater Sortino ratios, which is equal to 
72.73%. This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher 
Sortino ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.1.1.6 Sortino ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.7-24 Sortino ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.7-28 Statistical summary LS (3-month window) 
> S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 22 13 15 
S 3 Port2 9 22 14 
S 3 Port3 7 8 22 
    
    
> S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
S 3 Port1 
 
59.09% 68.18% 
S 3 Port2 40.91% 
 
63.64% 
S 3 Port3 31.82% 36.36% 
  
In this table, 4.7-28, “Portfolio 1” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater Sortino 
ratios than “Portfolio 2”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59.09%, whereas, compared to 
“Portfolio 3”, “Portfolio 1” generated 15 times out of 22 greater Sortino ratios, which is equal to 
68.18%. This suggests that “Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher 
Sortino ratios than “Portfolio 2” and “Portfolio 3”.  
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4.8 Refinement of Piotroski F-score by removing three criteria 
4.8.1 Refinement by removing the highest percentage criteria 
Due to unsatisfactory results we decided to rerun the criteria relevancy matrix focusing 
on the whole sample. We create a long portfolio based on a contrary hypothesis to the one 
above: instead of dropping the factor with the lowest percentage we drop the highest one, 
implying that it is more difficult for a company to score in those criteria with the lowest 
percentage.  
Eventually, this should shift the distribution earned by a simple Piotroski approach and, if 
efficient, investors will be able to focus on our refinement of the Piotroski score.  
For illustration purposes we compare our new long portfolio against the long “Portfolio 
1”, which is a simple use of Piotroski F-score 7 to 9. Our new long portfolio will consist of buying 
stocks rated with a 6 out of a score where the maximum a firm can obtain is a score of 6 as we 
removed 3 criteria such as F1, F2 and F4 of Piotroski F-score.  
Please refer to the table below for descriptive results on the relevancy of the criteria; 
also, notice the symmetry percentage-wise regardless of whether they generated positive or 
negative return. 
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Table 4.8-1 Criteria relevancy for all stocks regardless of their F-score with a positive return (Absolute numbers) 
 
Total 
Positive 
Return 
Stocks F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
1991 558 482 543 118 501 136 146 51 163 180 
1992 503 428 476 268 441 170 222 125 272 235 
1993 491 411 472 245 427 171 213 115 268 278 
1994 767 697 725 375 650 218 257 105 358 294 
1995 725 645 679 357 586 270 314 143 352 290 
1996 841 757 795 463 708 296 374 209 414 362 
1997 406 363 385 200 346 166 172 119 239 179 
1998 462 391 439 192 385 217 169 111 235 278 
1999 538 501 522 256 470 236 223 101 272 278 
2000 513 464 483 242 428 195 234 65 221 203 
2001 223 181 211 86 196 94 115 42 78 124 
2002 605 491 571 333 540 234 293 116 313 402 
2003 581 504 546 312 513 173 324 90 280 271 
2004 564 518 537 347 480 127 266 123 291 214 
2005 581 529 554 322 503 179 248 110 238 188 
2006 373 349 356 201 295 130 192 56 189 164 
2007 169 142 162 72 146 76 73 17 71 86 
2008 602 474 569 215 508 320 329 56 244 205 
2009 1005 802 981 398 943 297 599 118 549 778 
2010 755 691 729 486 654 237 351 67 467 326 
2011 919 829 875 483 760 359 393 58 381 333 
2012 976 853 933 413 845 376 440 74 492 558 
 
In Table 4.8-1 we show the number of stocks with a positive return that have scored in 
each F-score criterion. The following table displays the same type of picture but instead we are 
looking at percentage figures to get a better idea.  
In this table it can be noticed that, for example, only 51 companies out of 558 in 1991 
scored in F7; in other words, only 9% of the 558 stocks scored in this criterion.  
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Table 4.8-2 Criteria relevancy for all stocks regardless of their F-score with a positive return (percentage numbers) 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
1991 86% 97% 21% 90% 24% 26% 9% 29% 32% 
1992 85% 95% 53% 88% 34% 44% 25% 54% 47% 
1993 84% 96% 50% 87% 35% 43% 23% 55% 57% 
1994 91% 95% 49% 85% 28% 34% 14% 47% 38% 
1995 89% 94% 49% 81% 37% 43% 20% 49% 40% 
1996 90% 95% 55% 84% 35% 44% 25% 49% 43% 
1997 89% 95% 49% 85% 41% 42% 29% 59% 44% 
1998 85% 95% 42% 83% 47% 37% 24% 51% 60% 
1999 93% 97% 48% 87% 44% 41% 19% 51% 52% 
2000 90% 94% 47% 83% 38% 46% 13% 43% 40% 
2001 81% 95% 39% 88% 42% 52% 19% 35% 56% 
2002 81% 94% 55% 89% 39% 48% 19% 52% 66% 
2003 87% 94% 54% 88% 30% 56% 15% 48% 47% 
2004 92% 95% 62% 85% 23% 47% 22% 52% 38% 
2005 91% 95% 55% 87% 31% 43% 19% 41% 32% 
2006 94% 95% 54% 79% 35% 51% 15% 51% 44% 
2007 84% 96% 43% 86% 45% 43% 10% 42% 51% 
2008 79% 95% 36% 84% 53% 55% 9% 41% 34% 
2009 80% 98% 40% 94% 30% 60% 12% 55% 77% 
2010 92% 97% 64% 87% 31% 46% 9% 62% 43% 
2011 90% 95% 53% 83% 39% 43% 6% 41% 36% 
2012 87% 96% 42% 87% 39% 45% 8% 50% 57% 
Average 87% 95% 48% 86% 36% 45% 17% 48% 47% 
 
In Table 4.8-2 we display results in terms of percentage. It can be highlighted that on 
average factors that have the highest percentage are F1, F2 and F4, suggesting that it is easy for a 
company to score in that particular criterion. The same can be noticed when looking at negative 
returns across the whole sample. Please find the results below.  
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Table 4.8-3 Criteria relevancy for all stocks regardless of their F-score with a negative return (absolute numbers) 
 
Total 
Negative 
Return 
Stocks F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
1991 213 179 196 34 167 50 53 20 50 69 
1992 215 191 204 101 176 76 94 57 112 133 
1993 222 191 208 126 177 67 100 54 125 113 
1994 154 132 129 55 99 38 39 17 41 44 
1995 233 188 203 93 162 95 100 59 103 110 
1996 108 88 92 43 74 47 47 31 54 57 
1997 421 371 393 211 339 202 191 103 219 205 
1998 335 298 316 159 272 151 127 85 182 170 
1999 207 186 190 104 171 84 85 65 118 108 
2000 168 153 153 81 130 53 73 47 70 77 
2001 431 336 404 120 378 206 226 79 151 244 
2002 28 24 26 19 24 12 19 5 16 15 
2003 195 151 174 108 158 53 96 24 94 103 
2004 195 164 173 112 159 56 87 34 98 64 
2005 160 140 146 94 129 59 69 32 77 58 
2006 337 295 315 178 274 128 152 46 177 144 
2007 500 451 477 258 429 212 228 54 244 264 
2008 45 32 39 19 34 17 25 1 20 12 
2009 164 120 154 87 150 49 91 16 89 113 
2010 394 333 373 261 326 103 161 41 238 155 
2011 208 182 197 100 170 83 87 17 86 93 
2012 124 105 117 51 110 47 61 9 69 71 
 
In Table 4.8-3 we show the number of stocks with a negative return that have scored in 
each F-score criterion. In this table it can be noticed that, for example, only 20 companies out of 
213 in 1991 scored in F7; in other words, only 9% of the 213 stocks scored in this criterion.  
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Table 4.8-4 Criteria relevancy for all stocks regardless of their F-score with a negative return (percentage numbers) 
 
Table 4.8-4 can be interpreted in the same manner as the one displayed above; once 
again the factors with the highest percentage are F1, F2 and F4.  
4.8.2 Portfolios’ performances (long portfolios) 
In this part we compare our two long portfolios with “Port 1” considered as the long 
original use of Piotroski F-score (Long 7 to 9) and “Port 4” corresponding to the refinement of the 
Piotroski F-score where we buy stocks rated with a 6 out of 6.  
  
1991 84% 92% 16% 78% 23% 25% 9% 23% 32% 
1992 89% 95% 47% 82% 35% 44% 27% 52% 62% 
1993 86% 94% 57% 80% 30% 45% 24% 56% 51% 
1994 86% 84% 36% 64% 25% 25% 11% 27% 29% 
1995 81% 87% 40% 70% 41% 43% 25% 44% 47% 
1996 81% 85% 40% 69% 44% 44% 29% 50% 53% 
1997 88% 93% 50% 81% 48% 45% 24% 52% 49% 
1998 89% 94% 47% 81% 45% 38% 25% 54% 51% 
1999 90% 92% 50% 83% 41% 41% 31% 57% 52% 
2000 91% 91% 48% 77% 32% 43% 28% 42% 46% 
2001 78% 94% 28% 88% 48% 52% 18% 35% 57% 
2002 86% 93% 68% 86% 43% 68% 18% 57% 54% 
2003 77% 89% 55% 81% 27% 49% 12% 48% 53% 
2004 84% 89% 57% 82% 29% 45% 17% 50% 33% 
2005 88% 91% 59% 81% 37% 43% 20% 48% 36% 
2006 88% 93% 53% 81% 38% 45% 14% 53% 43% 
2007 90% 95% 52% 86% 42% 46% 11% 49% 53% 
2008 71% 87% 42% 76% 38% 56% 2% 44% 27% 
2009 73% 94% 53% 91% 30% 55% 10% 54% 69% 
2010 85% 95% 66% 83% 26% 41% 10% 60% 39% 
2011 88% 95% 48% 82% 40% 42% 8% 41% 45% 
2012 85% 94% 41% 89% 38% 49% 7% 56% 57% 
Average 84% 92% 48% 80% 36% 45% 17% 48% 47% 
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4.8.2.1 Comparing our two long portfolios while focusing on returns (12-
month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-1 Long portfolios (12-month window) 
 In Figure 4.8-1 we display our two long portfolios’ annual performance over a 12-month 
window for each fiscal year over the period 1991 to 2012. Returns are expressed in percentage. 
The blue bar corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 4”. Please refer to the table 
below for a better understanding of which portfolio is more efficient. In general, it can be noticed 
that our refinement of Piotroski F-score simulated by “Port 4” shows ability to outperform “Port 
1”. In fact in 2008, for example, we outperform significantly “Port 1”; however, one caveat could 
be that on the downside “Port 1” generates less negative return.  
Table 4.8-5 Statistical summary L (12-month window) 
> L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 
L 12 Port1 22 10 
L12 Port4 12 22 
   > L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 
L 12 Port1 
 
45% 
L12 Port4 55% 
  
Table 4.8-5 summarizes in terms of absolute and in percentage as a form of a matrix how 
many times a portfolio generated higher returns than another portfolio. For example, in this case 
“Portfolio 4” has generated 12 times out of 22 years greater returns than “Portfolio 1”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 55%. This suggests that “Portfolio 4” is more efficient at providing 
investors with higher return on a 12-month basis than “Portfolio 1”.  
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4.8.2.2 Comparing our two long portfolios while focusing on returns (7-
month window)  
 
Figure 4.8-2 Long portfolios (7-month window) 
In Figure 4.8-2 we display our two long portfolios’ annual performance over a 7-month 
window for each fiscal year over the period 1991 to 2012. Returns are expressed in percentage. 
The blue bar corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 4”. Please refer to the table 
below for a better understanding of which portfolio is more efficient. In general, it can be noticed 
that our refinement of Piotroski F-score simulated by “Portfolio 4” shows ability to outperform 
“Portfolio 1”. 
Table 4.8-6 Statistical summary L (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 22 7 
L7 Port4 15 22 
   > L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 
 
32% 
L7 Port4 68% 
  
From Table 4.8-6 it can be seen that “Portfolio 4” outperforms significantly our “Portfolio 
1”, implying that the refinement strategy of Piotroski F-score is more efficient on a 7-month basis 
as overall “Portfolio 4” has generated 15 times out 22 greater returns than “Portfolio 1”; this 
corresponds to a percentage of 68%. This suggests that “Portfolio 4” is more efficient at providing 
investors with higher return on a 7-month basis than “Portfolio 1”. 
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4.8.2.3 Comparing our two long portfolios while focusing on returns (3-
month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-3 Long portfolios (3-month window) 
In Figure 4.8-3 we display our two long portfolios’ annual performance over a 3-month 
window for each fiscal year over the period 1991 to 2012. Returns are expressed in percentage. 
The blue bar corresponds to “Portfolio 1”, the red bar to “Portfolio 4”. Please refer to the table 
below for a better understanding of which portfolio is more efficient. Overall, both portfolios 
outperformed each other an equal number of times; however, when “Portfolio 4” outperforms 
“Portfolio 1” returns are significantly higher.  
Table 4.8-7 Statistical summary (3-month window) 
> L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L 3 Port1 22 11 
L3 Port4 11 22 
   > L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L 3 Port1 
 
50% 
L3 Port4 50% 
  
From Table 4.8-7 it can be seen that “Portfolio 4” has generated 11 times out 22 greater 
returns than “Portfolio 1”; this corresponds to a percentage of 50%. This suggests that “Portfolio 
4” is not more efficient at providing investors with higher return on a 3-month basis than 
“Portfolio 1” as both portfolios have the same number of statistical percentages.  
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4.8.3 Maximum drawdown (long portfolios) 
4.8.3.1 Maximum drawdown (12-month window)  
 
Figure 4.8-4 Maximum drawdown (12-month window) 
In this figure, 4.8-4, we present the maximum drawdown of our two portfolios over a 12-
month window for the period 1991 to 2012. Please refer to the statistics in the table below for a 
better understanding of which portfolio has the lowest drawdown. 
Table 4.8-8 Statistical summary L (12-month window) 
< 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 21 
L12 Port4 1 22 
   
< 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 
 
95% 
L12 Port4 5% 
  
In this table, 4.8-8, “Portfolio 1” has generated 21 times out of 22 years less drawdowns 
than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 95, suggesting that over the year 
“Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with less drawdown than “Portfolio 4”. 
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4.8.3.2 Maximum drawdown (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-5 Maximum drawdown (7-month window) 
In this figure, 4.8-5, we present the maximum drawdown of our two portfolios over a 7-
month window for the period 1991 to 2012. Please refer to the statistics in the table below for a 
better understanding of which portfolio has the lowest drawdown. 
Table 4.8-9 Statistical summary L (7-month window) 
< L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 22 21 
L7 Port4 1 22 
   < L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 
 
95% 
L7 Port4 5% 
  
In this table, 4.8-9, “Portfolio 1” has generated 21 times out of 22 years less drawdowns 
than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 95%, suggesting that over the year 
“Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with less drawdown than “Portfolio 4”. 
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4.8.3.3 Maximum drawdown (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-6 Maximum drawdown (3-month window) 
In this figure, 4.8-5, we present the maximum drawdown of our two portfolios over a 3-
month window for the period 1991 to 2012. Please refer to the statistics in the table below for a 
better understanding of which portfolio has the lowest drawdown.  
Table 4.8-10 Statistical summary (3-month window) 
< L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L3 Port1 22 21 
L3 Port4 1 22 
   < L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L3 Port1 
 
95% 
L3 Port4 5% 
  
In this table, 4.8-10, “Portfolio 1” has generated 21 times out of 22 years less drawdowns 
than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 95%, suggesting that over the year 
“Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with less drawdown than “Portfolio 4”. 
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4.8.4 Risk-adjusted measures (long portfolios) 
4.8.4.1  Sharpe ratio (12-month window)  
 
Figure 4.8-7 Sharpe ratio (12-month window) 
In this figure, 4.8-7, the Sharpe ratio is used to express how much return is achieved for 
the amount of risk taken in an investment; when interpreting Sharpe ratio investors look at the 
highest one as the higher the ratio the better the fund. Once again we try by using some forms of 
summary statistics to see which portfolio is better at generating higher Sharpe ratios.  
Table 4.8-11 Statistical summary L (12-month window) 
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 17 
L12 Port4 5 22 
   
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 
 
77% 
L12 Port4 23% 
  
In this table, 4.8-11, “Portfolio 1” has generated 17 times out of 22 years greater Sharpe 
ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 77%, suggesting that “Portfolio 1” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Sharpe ratios on a 12-month basis than 
“Portfolio 4”. 
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4.8.4.2 Sharpe ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-8 Sharpe ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-12 Statistical summary (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 22 14 
L7 Port4 8 22 
   > L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 
 
64% 
L7 Port4 36% 
  
 
In this table, 4.8-12, “Portfolio 1” has generated 14 times out of 22 years greater Sharpe 
ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 64%, suggesting that “Portfolio 1” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Sharpe ratios on a 7-month basis than “Portfolio 
4”. 
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4.8.4.3 Sharpe ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-9 Sharpe ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-13 Statistical summary (3-month window) 
> L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L3 Port1 22 15 
L3 Port4 7 22 
   > L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L3 Port1 
 
68% 
L3 Port4 32% 
  
In this table, 4.8-13, “Portfolio 1” has generated 15 times out of 22 years greater Sharpe 
ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 68%, suggesting that “Portfolio 1” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Sharpe ratios on a 7-month basis than “Portfolio 
4”. 
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4.8.4.4 Treynor ratio (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-10 Treynor ratio (12-month window) 
In this figure, 4.8-10, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit of 
risk using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted return. 
It is useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar 
returns. Please refer to the table below for comparative purposes between portfolios.  
Table 4.8-14 Statistical summary L (12-month window) 
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 9 
L12 Port4 13 22 
   
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 
 
41% 
L12 Port4 59% 
  
In this table, 4.8-14, “Portfolio 4” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater Treynor 
ratios than “Portfolio 1”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59%, suggesting that “Portfolio 4” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Treynor ratios on a 12-month basis than 
“Portfolio 1”. 
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4.8.4.5 Treynor ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-11 Treynor ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-15 Statistical summary L (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 22 7 
L7 Port4 15 22 
   > L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 
 
32% 
L7 Port4 68% 
  
In this table, 4.8-15, “Portfolio 4” has generated 15 times out of 22 years greater Treynor 
ratios than “Portfolio 1”; this corresponds to a percentage of 68%, suggesting that “Portfolio 4” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Treynor ratios on a 7-month basis than “Portfolio 
1”. 
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4.8.4.6 Treynor ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-12 Treynor ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-16 Statistical summary L (3-month window) 
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 10 
L12 Port4 12 22 
   > L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L3 Port1 
 
45% 
L3 Port4 55% 
  
In this table, 4.8-16, “Portfolio 4” has generated 12 times out of 22 years greater Treynor 
ratios than “Portfolio 1”; this corresponds to a percentage of 55%, suggesting that “Portfolio 4” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Treynor ratios on a 3-month basis than “Portfolio 
1”. 
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4.8.4.7 Information ratio (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-13 Information ratio (12-month window) 
In this figure, 4.8-13, the Information ratio is used to compare portfolios using the same 
investment style; the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a manager who has been 
more efficient at picking stocks. Please refer to the table below for comparative purposes 
between portfolios. 
Table 4.8-17 Statistical summary L (12-month window) 
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 17 
L12 Port4 5 22 
   
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 
 
77% 
L12 Port4 23% 
  
In this table, 4.8-17, “Portfolio 1” has generated 17 times out of 22 years greater 
Information ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 77%, suggesting that 
“Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher Information ratios on a 12-month 
basis than “Portfolio 1”. 
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4.8.4.8 Information ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-14 Information ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-18 Statistical summary L (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 22 14 
L7 Port4 8 22 
   > L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 
 
64% 
L7 Port4 36% 
  
In this table, 4.8-18, “Portfolio 1” has generated 14 times out of 22 years greater 
Information ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 64%, suggesting that 
“Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher Information ratios on a 7-month 
basis than “Portfolio 1”. 
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4.8.4.9 Information ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-15 Information ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-19 Statistical summary L (3-month window) 
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 15 
L12 Port4 7 22 
   > L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L3 Port1 
 
68% 
L3 Port4 32% 
  
In this table, 4.8-19, “Portfolio 1” has generated 15 times out of 22 years greater 
Information ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 68%, suggesting that 
“Portfolio 1” is more efficient at providing investors with higher Information ratios on a 3-month 
basis than “Portfolio 1”. 
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4.8.4.10 Sortino ratio (12-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-16 Sortino ratio (12-month window) 
 
In this figure, 4.8-16, the Sortino ratio, which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio 
with a measure of downside deviations, is used to evaluate which portfolio is better at generating 
higher Sortino ratio. Please refer to the table below for comparative purposes.  
Table 4.8-20 Statistical summary L (12-month window) 
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 16 
L12 Port4 6 22 
   
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 
 
73% 
L12 Port4 27% 
  
 
In this table, 4.8-20, “Portfolio 1” has generated 16 times out of 22 years greater Sortino 
ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 73%, suggesting that “Portfolio 1” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Sortino ratios on a 12-month basis than 
“Portfolio 1”. 
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4.8.4.11 Sortino ratio (7-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-17 Sortino ratio (7-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-21 Statistical summary L (7-month window) 
> L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 22 13 
L7 Port4 9 22 
   > L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 
L 7 Port1 
 
59% 
L7 Port4 41% 
  
In this table, 4.8-21, “Portfolio 1” has generated 13 times out of 22 years greater Sortino 
ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 59%, suggesting that “Portfolio 1” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Sortino ratios on a 7-month basis than “Portfolio 
1”. 
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4.8.4.12 Sortino ratio (3-month window) 
 
Figure 4.8-18 Sortino ratio (3-month window) 
 
Table 4.8-22 Statistical summary L (3-month window) 
> 
L 12 
Port1 
L 12 
Port4 
L 12 
Port1 22 16 
L12 Port4 6 22 
   > L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
L3 Port1 
 
73% 
L3 Port4 27% 
  
In this table, 4.8-22, “Portfolio 1” has generated 16 times out of 22 years greater Sortino 
ratios than “Portfolio 4”; this corresponds to a percentage of 73%, suggesting that “Portfolio 1” is 
more efficient at providing investors with higher Sortino ratios on a 3-month basis than “Portfolio 
1”. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the impact of the F-score on a long-short portfolio. Consistent 
with the literature, this chapter found that distinguishing between winners and losers can help an 
investor to shift the distribution return of his portfolio.  
The main goal of this chapter was to develop a market neutral approach to our Piotroski 
F-score by assessing results as we were looking for third parties to invest in our strategy. Using 
daily data from 1991 to 2012 we examined whether our portfolio was able to deliver subsequent 
return to investors.  
This portfolio was then back tested using different risk metrics used in the industry over 
the period 1991 to 2012; in order to do so we applied some risk-adjusted return measures. Our 
strategy has not been tested using transaction costs; however, we believe that, due to the high 
performance, this will not affect the strategy while producing positive returns.  
Furthermore, we are improving the research by dealing with the data-snooping bias by 
constructing some refinement of the Piotroski F-score where we consider that variables can be 
dropped to constitute a new sort of F-score and create on this basis portfolios where we compare 
results in terms of returns, drawdown and risk-adjusted measures, as is often the case in the 
industry. 
Finally, we highly believe the strategy can be used in the current environment and can 
help investors to increase their wealth.  
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4.10 Appendices  
 
4.10.1 Appendix A  
In Table 4.10-1 below we show the different returns expressed as a percentage earned by 
portfolios for the three frequencies’ periods.  
Table 4.10-1 Displays returns for the different time horizons on the long portfolio, the short portfolio, the market, the 
long-short portfolio and the excess return  
 
PORT 
 L 12  
PORT 
 L 7  
PORT 
 L 3  
PORT 
 S 12 
PORT 
 S 7  
PORT 
 S 3  
PORT 
 L/S 12 
PORT 
 L/S 7 
PORT 
 L/S 3 
MARK 
 12 
MARK 
 7 
MARK 
 3 
Excess  
Return 12 
Excess 
 Return 7 
Excess 
 Return 3 
1991 14.98% 9.02% 5.34% -14.09% -5.36% 7.63% 29.07% 14.38% -2.29% 11.48% 6.05% -0.15% 17.59% 8.33% -2.14% 
1992 10.86% 15.44% 14.19% -23.27% -26.52% -12.44% 34.13% 41.97% 26.63% 7.33% 9.92% 11.60% 26.81% 32.04% 15.02% 
1993 14.95% 8.36% 4.19% -9.51% -6.15% -3.57% 24.46% 14.51% 7.76% 10.76% 4.99% 1.84% 13.70% 9.51% 5.93% 
1994 29.43% 29.08% 37.01% -27.03% -23.79% -38.34% 56.46% 52.86% 75.35% 27.32% 28.16% 31.56% 29.14% 24.70% 43.79% 
1995 17.89% 13.77% 20.54% -21.14% -13.26% -16.12% 39.02% 27.03% 36.66% 20.57% 16.10% 18.01% 18.45% 10.94% 18.65% 
1996 29.73% 24.58% 39.01% -31.38% -32.60% -36.70% 61.10% 57.18% 75.71% 33.56% 26.59% 41.74% 27.55% 30.58% 33.97% 
1997 -4.66% -15.33% -1.25% 4.29% 22.23% 2.76% -8.94% -37.56% -4.01% 12.91% 1.09% 7.30% -21.85% -38.66% -11.31% 
1998 13.66% 12.14% 33.04% -31.19% -27.77% -53.41% 44.84% 39.92% 86.45% 24.63% 19.92% 30.98% 20.22% 19.99% 55.47% 
1999 17.15% 11.53% 23.51% -21.53% -12.44% -16.53% 38.68% 23.97% 40.04% -15.68% -9.91% 0.17% 54.37% 33.88% 39.87% 
2000 14.08% 8.21% 24.92% -22.40% -15.87% -37.90% 36.48% 24.08% 62.82% -6.71% -12.92% 2.70% 43.20% 37.00% 60.12% 
2001 -16.97% -22.72% -16.01% 13.59% 25.89% 9.34% -30.56% -48.61% -25.34% -15.64% -23.69% -28.00% -14.92% -24.92% 2.66% 
2002 38.84% 46.62% 55.10% -54.69% -67.80% -86.11% 93.53% 114.41% 141.21% 29.52% 35.60% 44.04% 64.00% 78.81% 97.16% 
2003 12.20% 10.06% 13.18% -13.74% -9.48% -15.08% 25.94% 19.54% 28.26% 8.97% 7.59% 9.66% 16.97% 11.95% 18.60% 
2004 19.18% 12.29% 26.60% -13.55% -8.33% -26.19% 32.73% 20.63% 52.79% 15.34% 10.24% 18.62% 17.39% 10.39% 34.17% 
2005 16.80% 12.01% 8.45% -13.93% -9.98% -10.87% 30.73% 22.00% 19.31% 15.23% 12.14% 3.46% 15.50% 9.86% 15.86% 
2006 0.08% 2.71% 9.47% 17.77% 17.34% -5.99% -17.69% -14.63% 15.46% 3.22% 13.03% 16.92% -20.91% -27.66% -1.46% 
2007 -27.40% -58.97% -8.18% 27.41% 75.86% 30.19% -54.81% -134.83% -38.37% -38.11% -68.48% -17.41% -16.70% -66.35% -20.96% 
2008 46.34% 51.84% 41.81% -63.15% -75.72% -80.51% 109.49% 127.56% 122.32% 37.34% 41.20% 32.38% 72.15% 86.36% 89.94% 
2009 21.32% 15.30% -11.46% -13.68% -8.94% 4.08% 35.01% 24.24% -15.54% 14.97% 10.78% -14.37% 20.04% 13.46% -1.16% 
2010 5.14% -0.91% 3.35% 3.11% 5.42% 0.51% 2.03% -6.33% 2.83% 5.01% 2.16% 2.37% -2.98% -8.49% 0.46% 
2011 14.94% 2.79% -4.82% -29.72% -13.63% -5.48% 44.66% 16.41% 0.66% 16.65% 9.31% 1.72% 28.01% 7.10% -1.06% 
2012 28.25% 25.83% 12.32% -27.77% -25.12% -19.21% 56.02% 50.96% 31.53% 23.14% 21.03% 11.72% 32.89% 29.92% 19.81% 
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4.10.2 Appendix B  
In Table 4.10-2 below we present the different maximum drawdown known by our 
portfolio for the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed 
above.  
Table 4.10-2 Displays the maximum drawdown numbers for the different time horizons on the long-short portfolio and 
the market  
 
Maximum 
Drawdown 
POR 
L/S 12 
POR 
L/S 7 
POR 
L/S 3 
MARK 
12 
MARK 
7 
MARK 
3 
1991 -9.13% -9.13% -9.13% -3.72% -3.72% -3.73% 
1992 -6.12% -5.08% -3.87% -2.74% -2.53% -2.52% 
1993 -12.98% -10.79% -7.97% -4.24% -4.24% -3.61% 
1994 -6.13% -6.13% -2.32% -2.63% -1.87% -1.34% 
1995 -12.89% -12.89% -6.57% -5.79% -5.79% -3.08% 
1996 -13.96% -13.96% -3.16% -8.82% -8.82% -2.28% 
1997 -62.12% -62.12% -13.22% -15.05% -15.05% -4.13% 
1998 -11.12% -11.12% -5.65% -6.62% -6.62% -3.99% 
1999 -15.83% -14.74% -12.56% -28.85% -13.17% -10.77% 
2000 -41.46% -41.46% -14.34% -28.16% -28.16% -7.81% 
2001 -67.94% -67.94% -21.78% -29.18% -29.18% -12.68% 
2002 -10.16% -10.00% -6.66% -4.68% -3.31% -2.30% 
2003 -11.87% -11.87% -10.96% -4.25% -4.25% -3.68% 
2004 -12.25% -12.25% -8.91% -3.53% -3.53% -3.31% 
2005 -12.75% -12.75% -12.75% -5.55% -5.55% -5.55% 
2006 -54.49% -30.05% -10.42% -13.26% -6.67% -3.01% 
2007 -143.94% -128.60% -22.44% -73.68% -62.28% -9.95% 
2008 -13.60% -13.60% -12.29% -6.21% -5.81% -5.81% 
2009 -22.10% -22.10% -22.10% -9.94% -9.94% -9.91% 
2010 -41.26% -41.26% -12.72% -14.58% -14.58% -5.06% 
2011 -10.46% -10.46% -10.46% -5.27% -5.27% -5.27% 
2012 -6.87% -6.87% -6.87% -3.78% -3.78% -3.78% 
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4.10.3 Appendix C  
In Table 4.10-3 below we present the different beta generated by our portfolios for the 
three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-3 Displays the beta numbers for the different time horizons on the long portfolio, the short portfolio and the 
long-short portfolio  
Beta 
PORT 
L12 
PORT 
L7 
PORT 
L3 
PORT 
S12 
PORT 
S7 
PORT 
S3 
POR 
L/S 12 
POR 
L/S 7 
POR 
L/S 3 
1991 1.13 1.11 1.09 -0.98 -1.02 -1.02 -0.14 -0.09 -0.07 
1992 0.96 0.90 0.92 -1.17 -1.15 -1.15 0.21 0.25 0.23 
1993 1.05 1.03 1.03 -1.07 -1.12 -1.17 0.02 0.09 0.14 
1994 0.82 0.88 0.87 -0.86 -0.93 -0.78 0.04 0.05 -0.09 
1995 0.87 0.93 0.92 -0.82 -0.89 -0.96 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 
1996 0.76 0.78 0.72 -0.84 -0.81 -0.71 0.08 0.03 -0.02 
1997 0.81 0.85 0.91 -0.95 -1.04 -0.91 0.14 0.19 0.00 
1998 0.49 0.45 0.29 -0.61 -0.53 -0.41 0.12 0.08 0.12 
1999 0.65 0.57 0.56 -0.77 -0.73 -0.68 0.12 0.16 0.13 
2000 1.07 1.09 1.13 -0.90 -0.90 -0.83 -0.17 -0.19 -0.29 
2001 0.96 0.97 0.91 -1.01 -1.01 -0.98 0.05 0.04 0.07 
2002 0.97 0.93 0.91 -1.48 -1.45 -1.44 0.52 0.51 0.53 
2003 1.24 1.24 1.23 -1.37 -1.41 -1.40 0.13 0.17 0.17 
2004 1.19 1.21 1.24 -1.29 -1.29 -1.31 0.10 0.08 0.07 
2005 1.16 1.24 1.22 -1.17 -1.19 -1.13 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 
2006 1.11 1.16 1.18 -1.23 -1.12 -1.15 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 
2007 1.06 0.97 1.07 -1.34 -1.27 -1.35 0.28 0.30 0.28 
2008 0.97 0.98 0.94 -1.46 -1.52 -1.55 0.50 0.55 0.60 
2009 1.13 1.16 1.17 -1.30 -1.29 -1.23 0.17 0.12 0.06 
2010 1.32 1.31 1.10 -1.23 -1.22 -1.19 -0.09 -0.10 0.09 
2011 1.13 1.11 1.13 -1.18 -1.20 -1.28 0.05 0.09 0.15 
2012 1.18 1.20 1.24 -1.15 -1.13 -1.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 
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4.10.4 Appendix D  
In Table 4.10-4 below we present the different ratios used to measure risks and the 
volatility known by our portfolio for the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of 
the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-4 Displays the different ratios used to measure risks and the volatility across the different time horizons on 
the long-short portfolio  
 
L/S 12 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
L/S 7 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
L/S 3 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
L/S 12  
IR 
L/S 7  
IR 
L/S 3  
IR 
L/S 12 
Sortino 
Ratio 
L/S 7 
Sortino 
Ratio 
L/S 3 
Sortino 
Ratio 
L/S 12 
Treynor 
Ratio 
L/S 7 
Treynor 
Ratio 
L/S 3 
Treynor 
Ratio 
L/S 
Vol 12 
L/S 
Vol 7 
L/S 
Vol 3 
1991 1.965 0.910 -0.138 1.963 0.909 -0.133 2.892 1.403 -0.208 0.114 0.044 -0.035 14.77% 15.76% 16.98% 
1992 2.501 3.077 1.905 2.497 3.066 1.888 3.705 4.734 2.736 0.137 0.180 0.104 13.63% 13.62% 13.95% 
1993 1.679 0.947 0.448 1.678 0.946 0.446 2.491 1.364 0.641 0.092 0.044 0.013 14.54% 15.26% 17.22% 
1994 4.522 4.588 6.696 4.514 4.570 6.627 5.612 6.382 10.687 0.305 0.265 0.412 12.47% 11.51% 10.83% 
1995 2.841 1.888 2.764 2.837 1.882 2.737 3.878 2.401 3.510 0.201 0.121 0.169 13.72% 14.29% 13.24% 
1996 3.223 2.960 4.958 3.216 2.949 4.907 3.473 2.810 6.803 0.350 0.329 0.494 18.94% 19.30% 15.26% 
1997 -0.330 -1.238 -0.219 -0.327 -1.231 -0.214 -0.462 -1.669 -0.332 -0.080 -0.224 -0.050 27.24% 30.38% 18.56% 
1998 2.375 2.456 5.511 2.371 2.447 5.454 4.271 4.524 9.990 0.360 0.356 1.154 18.86% 16.24% 15.68% 
1999 1.392 0.945 1.428 1.390 0.943 1.414 2.381 1.518 2.139 0.237 0.145 0.281 27.75% 25.31% 27.99% 
2000 1.288 0.771 1.923 1.286 0.769 1.904 2.168 1.278 3.394 0.159 0.096 0.295 28.30% 31.15% 32.64% 
2001 -0.868 -1.244 -0.874 -0.864 -1.237 -0.863 -1.479 -2.118 -1.707 -0.180 -0.272 -0.161 35.25% 39.12% 29.05% 
2002 3.586 4.117 4.561 3.578 4.099 4.512 5.642 6.148 6.649 0.361 0.460 0.579 26.07% 27.78% 30.95% 
2003 1.284 0.908 1.286 1.283 0.906 1.275 1.915 1.307 1.697 0.080 0.055 0.089 20.17% 21.47% 21.93% 
2004 1.797 1.074 2.646 1.795 1.072 2.619 2.979 1.767 4.386 0.112 0.063 0.188 18.19% 19.15% 19.93% 
2005 1.564 1.045 0.835 1.563 1.043 0.828 2.238 1.761 1.366 0.110 0.070 0.061 19.61% 20.99% 23.06% 
2006 -0.577 -0.611 0.874 -0.574 -0.604 0.867 -0.824 -0.805 1.251 -0.097 -0.086 0.045 30.74% 24.01% 17.64% 
2007 -0.739 -2.234 -1.304 -0.736 -2.223 -1.288 -1.046 -3.041 -2.098 -0.250 -0.622 -0.180 74.25% 60.37% 29.45% 
2008 3.130 3.108 2.427 3.123 3.094 2.401 4.502 4.758 3.702 0.430 0.490 0.471 34.97% 41.03% 50.39% 
2009 1.133 0.684 -0.384 1.132 0.682 -0.379 1.687 1.058 -0.575 0.123 0.079 -0.085 30.85% 35.38% 40.55% 
2010 0.049 -0.144 0.127 0.050 -0.142 0.128 0.066 -0.178 0.193 -0.012 -0.045 -0.009 40.13% 44.44% 21.94% 
2011 2.021 0.696 0.022 2.017 0.694 0.024 3.202 1.126 0.036 0.172 0.049 -0.018 22.08% 23.53% 27.45% 
2012 2.906 2.556 1.388 2.901 2.534 1.374 4.166 3.500 1.813 0.219 0.197 0.112 19.26% 19.92% 22.69% 
                Max 4.522 4.588 6.696 4.514 4.570 6.627 5.642 6.382 10.687 0.430 0.490 1.154 74.25% 60.37% 50.39% 
Min -0.868 -2.234 -1.304 -0.864 -2.223 -1.288 -1.479 -3.041 -2.098 -0.250 -0.622 -0.180 12.47% 11.51% 10.83% 
mean 1.670 1.239 1.676 1.668 1.235 1.660 2.430 1.819 2.549 0.134 0.082 0.179 25.54% 25.91% 23.52% 
median 1.738 0.946 1.337 1.736 0.944 1.324 2.692 1.461 1.755 0.130 0.074 0.096 21.13% 22.50% 21.94% 
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4.10.5 Appendix E  
In Table 4.10-5 below we present the correlation measured across by our portfolios for 
the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-5 Displays the correlation measured across the different time horizons on the long portfolio, short portfolio 
and the long-short portfolio 
 
PORT 
L12 
PORT 
L7 
PORT 
L3 
PORT 
S12 
PORT 
S7 
PORT 
S3 
POR 
L/S 12 
POR 
L/S 7 
POR 
L/S 3 
1991 0.80 0.79 0.81 -0.84 -0.86 -0.86 0.04 0.05 0.05 
1992 0.78 0.74 0.74 -0.65 -0.61 -0.70 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 
1993 0.83 0.83 0.84 -0.76 -0.81 -0.86 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 
1994 0.78 0.78 0.78 -0.76 -0.75 -0.68 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 
1995 0.83 0.84 0.86 -0.79 -0.83 -0.80 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 
1996 0.87 0.90 0.87 -0.84 -0.85 -0.80 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 
1997 0.88 0.91 0.87 -0.82 -0.87 -0.80 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 
1998 0.61 0.58 0.39 -0.69 -0.64 -0.52 0.08 0.11 0.13 
1999 0.79 0.77 0.82 -0.78 -0.75 -0.77 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 
2000 0.90 0.91 0.93 -0.85 -0.85 -0.84 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 
2001 0.93 0.93 0.86 -0.89 -0.90 -0.86 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
2002 0.92 0.92 0.93 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
2003 0.92 0.92 0.93 -0.85 -0.87 -0.90 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 
2004 0.92 0.92 0.93 -0.83 -0.86 -0.87 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 
2005 0.91 0.92 0.93 -0.90 -0.91 -0.92 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
2006 0.94 0.94 0.93 -0.88 -0.88 -0.87 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
2007 0.95 0.95 0.89 -0.93 -0.90 -0.86 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
2008 0.91 0.91 0.92 -0.93 -0.94 -0.94 0.01 0.01 0.02 
2009 0.95 0.96 0.97 -0.88 -0.89 -0.91 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 
2010 0.97 0.97 0.91 -0.93 -0.95 -0.88 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
2011 0.92 0.93 0.95 -0.86 -0.88 -0.92 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 
2012 0.89 0.95 0.96 -0.76 -0.83 -0.88 -0.13 -0.19 -0.08 
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4.10.6 Appendix F  
In Table 4.10-6 below we present the returns and volatility measured across by our long-
short portfolio for the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures 
discussed above.  
Table 4.10-6 Displays the returns and volatility measured across the different time horizons on the long-short portfolio 
against the market 
 
L/S 
Vol 12 
L/S 
Vol 7 
L/S 
Vol 3 
POR 
L/S 12 
POR 
L/S 7 
POR 
L/S 3 
Mark 
Vol 12 
Mark 
Vol 7 
Mark 
Vol 3 
Mark 
 Ret 12 
Mark 
 Ret 7 
Mark 
 Ret 3 
1991 14.77% 15.76% 16.98% 29.07% 14.38% -2.29% 6.33% 6.73% 7.40% 11.48% 6.05% -0.15% 
1992 13.63% 13.62% 13.95% 34.13% 41.97% 26.63% 5.10% 5.05% 5.58% 7.33% 9.92% 11.60% 
1993 14.54% 15.26% 17.22% 24.46% 14.51% 7.76% 6.08% 6.44% 7.27% 10.76% 4.99% 1.84% 
1994 12.47% 11.51% 10.83% 56.46% 52.86% 72.58% 6.28% 5.38% 5.48% 27.32% 28.16% 31.56% 
1995 13.72% 14.29% 13.24% 39.02% 27.03% 36.66% 7.04% 7.01% 6.25% 20.57% 16.10% 18.01% 
1996 18.94% 19.30% 15.26% 61.10% 57.18% 75.71% 10.73% 11.12% 9.35% 33.56% 26.59% 41.74% 
1997 27.24% 30.38% 18.56% -8.94% -37.56% -4.01% 13.69% 14.69% 9.05% 12.91% 1.09% 7.30% 
1998 18.86% 16.24% 15.68% 44.84% 39.92% 86.45% 12.19% 11.19% 11.29% 24.63% 19.92% 30.98% 
1999 27.75% 25.31% 27.99% 38.68% 23.97% 40.04% 16.37% 15.62% 18.71% -15.68% -9.91% 0.17% 
2000 28.30% 31.15% 32.64% 36.48% 24.08% 62.82% 13.14% 14.42% 15.35% -6.71% -12.92% 2.70% 
2001 35.25% 39.12% 29.05% -30.56% -48.61% -25.34% 16.79% 18.65% 13.84% -15.64% -23.69% -28.00% 
2002 26.07% 27.78% 30.95% 93.53% 114.41% 141.21% 9.59% 10.50% 11.91% 29.52% 35.60% 44.04% 
2003 20.17% 21.47% 21.93% 25.94% 19.54% 28.26% 7.14% 7.53% 7.85% 8.97% 7.59% 9.66% 
2004 18.19% 19.15% 19.93% 32.73% 20.63% 52.79% 6.76% 7.18% 7.33% 15.34% 10.24% 18.62% 
2005 19.61% 20.99% 23.06% 30.73% 22.00% 19.31% 7.92% 8.18% 9.39% 15.23% 12.14% 3.46% 
2006 30.74% 24.01% 17.64% -17.69% -14.63% 15.46% 12.34% 9.99% 7.12% 3.22% 13.03% 16.92% 
2007 74.25% 60.37% 29.45% -54.81% -134.83% -38.37% 29.83% 25.71% 11.36% -38.11% -68.48% -17.41% 
2008 34.97% 41.03% 50.39% 109.49% 127.56% 122.32% 13.66% 15.68% 19.37% 37.34% 41.20% 32.38% 
2009 30.85% 35.38% 40.55% 35.01% 24.24% -15.54% 11.98% 13.75% 16.27% 14.97% 10.78% -14.37% 
2010 40.13% 44.44% 21.94% 2.03% -6.33% 2.83% 15.35% 17.17% 9.10% 5.01% 2.16% 2.37% 
2011 22.08% 23.53% 27.45% 44.66% 16.41% 0.66% 8.92% 9.62% 10.93% 16.65% 9.31% 1.72% 
2012 19.26% 19.92% 22.69% 56.02% 50.96% 31.53% 7.43% 8.01% 9.15% 23.14% 21.03% 11.72% 
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4.10.7 Appendix G 
In Table 4.10-7 below we present the returns across our long-short portfolios for the three 
frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-7 Displays returns for the different time horizons on our three long-short portfolios 
 
L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
1991 29.07% 22.39% 24.19% 14.38% 6.61% 7.99% -2.29% -14.27% -17.52% 
1992 34.13% 31.79% 39.90% 41.97% 36.88% 59.16% 26.63% 18.99% 31.84% 
1993 24.46% 22.92% 15.22% 14.51% 11.47% -3.61% 7.76% 2.31% -9.25% 
1994 56.46% 53.31% 55.06% 52.86% 48.38% 48.06% 75.35% 69.15% 69.17% 
1995 39.02% 34.05% 31.42% 27.03% 25.19% 21.37% 36.66% 43.51% 33.49% 
1996 61.10% 58.64% 58.82% 57.18% 56.77% 57.06% 75.71% 73.86% 56.50% 
1997 -8.94% -10.09% -5.48% -37.56% -37.52% -33.79% -4.01% -11.13% -2.84% 
1998 44.84% 44.28% 45.87% 39.92% 33.56% 32.71% 86.45% 78.24% 87.85% 
1999 38.68% 35.89% 37.55% 23.97% 23.35% 32.74% 40.04% 32.08% 40.85% 
2000 36.48% 33.34% 36.94% 24.08% 29.04% 18.53% 62.82% 63.53% 67.95% 
2001 -30.56% -33.54% -29.53% -48.61% -56.70% -50.47% -25.34% -44.86% -72.17% 
2002 93.53% 97.05% 114.11% 114.41% 121.06% 124.05% 141.21% 142.63% 187.42% 
2003 25.94% 24.16% 28.48% 19.54% 15.11% 16.91% 28.26% 18.73% 11.31% 
2004 32.73% 30.96% 35.33% 20.63% 19.68% 23.45% 52.79% 54.58% 60.03% 
2005 30.73% 35.16% 31.46% 22.00% 23.16% 21.90% 19.31% 14.90% 15.05% 
2006 -17.69% -14.69% -8.72% -14.63% -18.29% -11.46% 15.46% 17.86% 30.47% 
2007 -54.81% -58.75% -70.07% -134.83% -142.38% -142.97% -38.37% -18.70% -17.16% 
2008 109.49% 110.78% 118.97% 127.56% 132.78% 146.80% 122.32% 133.71% 130.42% 
2009 35.01% 38.00% 42.98% 24.24% 26.85% 30.61% -15.54% -15.43% -16.91% 
2010 2.03% 3.90% -6.67% -6.33% -5.25% -19.02% 2.83% 10.03% -26.60% 
2011 44.66% 43.89% 30.68% 16.41% 17.27% 0.44% 0.66% -6.65% -27.29% 
2012 56.02% 62.04% 54.00% 50.96% 52.77% 42.91% 31.53% 33.76% 15.74% 
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4.10.8  Appendix H 
In Table 4.10-8 below we present the returns across our long portfolios for the three frequencies’ 
periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-8 Displays returns for the different time horizons for our three long portfolios 
 
L 12 Port1 L 12 Port2 L 12 Port3 L 7 Port1 L 7 Port2 L 7 Port3 L 3 Port1 L 3 Port2 L 3 Port3 
1991 14.98% 10.44% 13.76% 9.02% 2.01% 0.58% 5.34% -3.95% -11.78% 
1992 10.86% 9.34% 12.20% 15.44% 12.67% 17.10% 14.19% 4.43% 14.22% 
1993 14.95% 14.17% 11.53% 8.36% 6.35% 6.18% 4.19% 0.89% -7.39% 
1994 29.43% 28.61% 32.51% 29.08% 28.71% 32.47% 37.01% 35.88% 32.77% 
1995 17.89% 17.95% 12.80% 13.77% 14.37% 9.24% 20.54% 24.88% 20.32% 
1996 29.73% 30.27% 32.51% 24.58% 27.20% 28.23% 39.01% 38.40% 35.78% 
1997 -4.66% -5.98% -6.36% -15.33% -14.55% -12.13% -1.25% -2.75% -2.76% 
1998 13.66% 11.86% 12.28% 12.14% 9.58% 6.09% 33.04% 29.93% 15.25% 
1999 17.15% 21.54% 17.06% 11.53% 16.70% 22.06% 23.51% 25.19% 25.64% 
2000 14.08% 16.26% 17.57% 8.21% 11.96% 14.80% 24.92% 25.17% 20.84% 
2001 -16.97% -14.88% -14.35% -22.72% -20.32% -19.36% -16.01% -22.87% -21.68% 
2002 38.84% 39.11% 40.07% 46.62% 46.51% 43.57% 55.10% 57.06% 47.94% 
2003 12.20% 9.36% 13.06% 10.06% 7.10% 13.16% 13.18% 5.23% 10.37% 
2004 19.18% 20.57% 20.56% 12.29% 16.17% 20.69% 26.60% 34.31% 30.86% 
2005 16.80% 21.45% 17.40% 12.01% 15.64% 10.97% 8.45% 9.44% 2.83% 
2006 0.08% 0.15% 2.96% 2.71% -1.02% 3.01% 9.47% 11.41% 13.20% 
2007 -27.40% -28.50% -37.53% -58.97% -60.85% -65.86% -8.18% -10.51% -14.35% 
2008 46.34% 46.17% 33.42% 51.84% 53.90% 39.62% 41.81% 47.84% 36.26% 
2009 21.32% 20.95% 20.68% 15.30% 15.77% 9.76% -11.46% -11.02% -25.10% 
2010 5.14% 5.51% 7.73% -0.91% -0.21% -1.10% 3.35% 5.08% 4.68% 
2011 14.94% 14.14% 10.37% 2.79% 2.92% -0.80% -4.82% -10.09% -18.58% 
2012 28.25% 29.81% 30.42% 25.83% 28.66% 28.12% 12.32% 14.91% 9.80% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
252 
 
4.10.9 Appendix I 
In Table 4.10-9 below we present the returns across our short portfolios for the three 
frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-9 Displays returns for the different time horizons for our three short portfolios 
 
S 12 Port1 S 12 Port2 S 12 Port3 S 7 Port1 S 7 Port2 S 7 Port3 S 3 Port1 S 3 Port2 S 3 Port3 
1991 -14.09% -11.95% -10.43% -5.36% -4.60% -7.40% 7.63% 10.32% 5.75% 
1992 -23.27% -22.45% -27.69% -26.52% -24.21% -42.06% -12.44% -14.57% -17.62% 
1993 -9.51% -8.75% -3.68% -6.15% -5.13% 9.79% -3.57% -1.41% 1.86% 
1994 -27.03% -24.69% -22.54% -23.79% -19.67% -15.59% -38.34% -33.27% -36.40% 
1995 -21.14% -16.10% -18.62% -13.26% -10.82% -12.14% -16.12% -18.63% -13.17% 
1996 -31.38% -28.37% -26.31% -32.60% -29.58% -28.83% -36.70% -35.47% -20.72% 
1997 4.29% 4.12% -0.88% 22.23% 22.97% 21.66% 2.76% 8.38% 0.08% 
1998 -31.19% -32.41% -33.59% -27.77% -23.98% -26.62% -53.41% -48.31% -72.60% 
1999 -21.53% -14.36% -20.49% -12.44% -6.65% -10.69% -16.53% -6.89% -15.21% 
2000 -22.40% -17.08% -19.37% -15.87% -17.08% -3.74% -37.90% -38.35% -47.11% 
2001 13.59% 18.66% 15.18% 25.89% 36.38% 31.12% 9.34% 21.99% 50.50% 
2002 -54.69% -57.94% -74.05% -67.80% -74.55% -80.48% -86.11% -85.57% -139.48% 
2003 -13.74% -14.80% -15.42% -9.48% -8.01% -3.75% -15.08% -13.49% -0.94% 
2004 -13.55% -10.39% -14.78% -8.33% -3.51% -2.76% -26.19% -20.27% -29.18% 
2005 -13.93% -13.71% -14.06% -9.98% -7.52% -10.93% -10.87% -5.46% -12.22% 
2006 17.77% 14.85% 11.69% 17.34% 17.27% 14.48% -5.99% -6.45% -17.27% 
2007 27.41% 30.25% 32.54% 75.86% 81.53% 77.11% 30.19% 8.18% 2.81% 
2008 -63.15% -64.61% -85.55% -75.72% -78.88% -107.18% -80.51% -85.88% -94.16% 
2009 -13.68% -17.05% -22.29% -8.94% -11.08% -20.85% 4.08% 4.41% -8.20% 
2010 3.11% 1.61% 14.39% 5.42% 5.04% 17.92% 0.51% -4.95% 31.28% 
2011 -29.72% -29.75% -20.30% -13.63% -14.35% -1.23% -5.48% -3.45% 8.72% 
2012 -27.77% -32.23% -23.59% -25.12% -24.11% -14.79% -19.21% -18.85% -5.94% 
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4.10.10 Appendix J 
In Table 4.10-10 below we present the maximum drawdown across our long-short portfolios for 
the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-10 Displays the maximum drawdown expressed in percentage for our three long-short portfolios 
 
L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
1991 -9.13% -12.20% -13.66% -9.13% -12.20% -13.66% -9.13% -12.20% -13.66% 
1992 -6.12% -5.62% -16.94% -5.08% -5.62% -6.55% -3.87% -5.62% -6.55% 
1993 -12.98% -11.12% -15.16% -10.79% -9.76% -11.58% -7.97% -8.29% -9.92% 
1994 -6.13% -6.77% -9.07% -6.13% -6.77% -9.07% -2.32% -2.00% -3.84% 
1995 -12.89% -14.17% -13.23% -12.89% -14.17% -13.23% -6.57% -7.15% -5.75% 
1996 -13.96% -14.87% -14.71% -13.96% -14.87% -14.71% -3.16% -3.30% -6.09% 
1997 -62.12% -59.37% -48.99% -62.12% -59.37% -48.99% -13.22% -15.01% -13.01% 
1998 -11.12% -13.13% -13.94% -11.12% -13.13% -13.94% -5.65% -5.84% -9.24% 
1999 -15.83% -16.54% -17.67% -14.74% -15.84% -15.93% -12.56% -13.60% -14.72% 
2000 -41.46% -41.32% -52.99% -41.46% -41.32% -52.99% -14.34% -14.81% -14.54% 
2001 -67.94% -75.51% -70.81% -67.94% -75.51% -70.81% -21.78% -28.80% -37.40% 
2002 -10.16% -11.46% -17.10% -10.00% -9.63% -17.10% -6.66% -6.45% -8.00% 
2003 -11.87% -13.91% -14.02% -11.87% -13.91% -14.02% -10.96% -12.76% -12.41% 
2004 -12.25% -11.94% -12.21% -12.25% -11.94% -12.21% -8.91% -9.07% -10.35% 
2005 -12.75% -14.80% -16.72% -12.75% -14.80% -16.72% -12.75% -14.80% -16.72% 
2006 -54.49% -48.79% -44.20% -30.05% -30.50% -30.64% -10.42% -9.40% -8.20% 
2007 -143.94% -145.00% -156.41% -128.60% -133.48% -131.90% -22.44% -15.16% -12.76% 
2008 -13.60% -14.10% -16.97% -13.60% -12.65% -13.90% -12.29% -12.56% -13.90% 
2009 -22.10% -20.35% -22.36% -22.10% -20.35% -22.36% -22.10% -20.35% -22.36% 
2010 -41.26% -40.55% -49.05% -41.26% -40.55% -49.05% -12.72% -12.05% -18.77% 
2011 -10.46% -12.27% -17.58% -10.46% -12.27% -17.58% -10.46% -12.27% -17.58% 
2012 -6.87% -8.09% -11.92% -6.87% -8.09% -9.58% -6.87% -8.09% -9.58% 
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4.10.11 Appendix K 
In Table 4.10-11 below we present the Sharpe ratio across our long-short portfolios for the three 
frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-11 Displays the Sharpe ratio for our three long-short portfolios 
 
L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
1991 1.965 1.467 1.448 0.910 0.398 0.462 -0.138 -0.833 -0.928 
1992 2.501 2.454 2.088 3.077 2.798 3.071 1.905 1.433 1.713 
1993 1.679 1.612 0.967 0.947 0.764 -0.221 0.448 0.134 -0.492 
1994 4.522 4.302 3.862 4.588 4.195 3.534 6.696 6.581 5.295 
1995 2.841 2.468 2.190 1.888 1.745 1.445 2.764 3.241 2.335 
1996 3.223 3.187 2.857 2.960 2.991 2.697 4.958 5.091 3.248 
1997 -0.330 -0.382 -0.213 -1.238 -1.277 -1.199 -0.219 -0.560 -0.133 
1998 2.375 2.393 2.167 2.456 2.032 1.674 5.511 4.872 4.309 
1999 1.392 1.263 1.278 0.945 0.902 1.161 1.428 1.113 1.332 
2000 1.288 1.121 1.148 0.771 0.890 0.520 1.923 1.810 1.807 
2001 -0.868 -0.901 -0.760 -1.244 -1.370 -1.180 -0.874 -1.409 -1.901 
2002 3.586 3.678 3.620 4.117 4.375 3.608 4.561 4.676 4.734 
2003 1.284 1.185 1.361 0.908 0.692 0.758 1.286 0.844 0.501 
2004 1.797 1.737 1.858 1.074 1.043 1.161 2.646 2.786 2.871 
2005 1.564 1.761 1.575 1.045 1.065 1.018 0.835 0.617 0.638 
2006 -0.577 -0.530 -0.299 -0.611 -0.830 -0.495 0.874 1.049 1.652 
2007 -0.739 -0.875 -1.039 -2.234 -2.585 -2.617 -1.304 -0.684 -0.615 
2008 3.130 3.329 3.338 3.108 3.470 3.648 2.427 2.853 2.652 
2009 1.133 1.244 1.283 0.684 0.768 0.799 -0.384 -0.388 -0.405 
2010 0.049 0.099 -0.166 -0.144 -0.120 -0.428 0.127 0.451 -1.098 
2011 2.021 2.003 1.411 0.696 0.729 0.019 0.022 -0.245 -1.042 
2012 2.906 3.108 2.334 2.556 2.562 1.887 1.388 1.429 0.609 
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4.10.12 Appendix L 
In Table 4.10-12 below we present the Treynor ratio across our long-short portfolios for the three 
frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-12 Displays the Treynor ratio for our three long-short portfolios 
 
L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
1991 0.114 0.080 0.221 0.044 0.005 0.073 -0.035 -0.098 -0.162 
1992 0.137 0.149 0.508 0.180 0.183 0.830 0.104 0.086 0.371 
1993 0.092 0.101 0.120 0.044 0.042 -0.062 0.013 -0.003 -0.116 
1994 0.305 0.297 0.517 0.265 0.249 0.441 0.412 0.416 0.685 
1995 0.201 0.170 0.272 0.121 0.105 0.160 0.169 0.198 0.279 
1996 0.350 0.285 0.520 0.329 0.275 0.490 0.494 0.399 0.534 
1997 -0.080 -0.090 -0.107 -0.224 -0.232 -0.376 -0.050 -0.086 -0.083 
1998 0.360 0.367 0.398 0.356 0.307 0.281 1.154 1.177 0.890 
1999 0.237 0.213 0.349 0.145 0.139 0.317 0.281 0.209 0.369 
2000 0.159 0.133 0.269 0.096 0.111 0.108 0.295 0.274 0.523 
2001 -0.180 -0.182 -0.282 -0.272 -0.294 -0.459 -0.161 -0.236 -0.638 
2002 0.361 0.373 0.998 0.460 0.487 1.092 0.579 0.592 1.730 
2003 0.080 0.086 0.234 0.055 0.051 0.133 0.089 0.065 0.084 
2004 0.112 0.119 0.285 0.063 0.073 0.182 0.188 0.207 0.482 
2005 0.110 0.135 0.238 0.070 0.080 0.157 0.061 0.048 0.101 
2006 -0.097 -0.089 -0.113 -0.086 -0.108 -0.137 0.045 0.057 0.215 
2007 -0.250 -0.282 -0.602 -0.622 -0.690 -1.196 -0.180 -0.101 -0.186 
2008 0.430 0.469 0.954 0.490 0.560 1.185 0.471 0.570 1.040 
2009 0.123 0.156 0.363 0.079 0.109 0.258 -0.085 -0.065 -0.140 
2010 -0.012 0.015 -0.054 -0.045 -0.021 -0.151 -0.009 0.042 -0.218 
2011 0.172 0.187 0.262 0.049 0.072 0.003 -0.018 -0.027 -0.222 
2012 0.219 0.187 0.262 0.197 0.072 0.003 0.112 -0.027 -0.222 
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4.10.13 Appendix M 
In Table 4.10-13 below we present the Information ratio across our long-short portfolios for the 
three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-13 Displays the Information ratio for our three long-short portfolios 
 
L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
1991 1.963 1.467 1.444 0.909 0.399 0.460 -0.133 -0.821 -0.917 
1992 2.497 2.450 2.084 3.066 2.787 3.059 1.888 1.420 1.696 
1993 1.678 1.610 0.966 0.946 0.763 -0.219 0.446 0.134 -0.485 
1994 4.514 4.293 3.854 4.570 4.179 3.520 6.627 6.512 5.240 
1995 2.837 2.466 2.188 1.882 1.740 1.442 2.737 3.209 2.313 
1996 3.216 3.181 2.851 2.949 2.980 2.686 4.907 5.038 3.215 
1997 -0.327 -0.379 -0.210 -1.231 -1.269 -1.191 -0.214 -0.551 -0.129 
1998 2.371 2.389 2.164 2.447 2.026 1.669 5.454 4.821 4.264 
1999 1.390 1.261 1.276 0.943 0.900 1.157 1.414 1.102 1.319 
2000 1.286 1.119 1.147 0.769 0.888 0.520 1.904 1.792 1.788 
2001 -0.864 -0.898 -0.757 -1.237 -1.363 -1.174 -0.863 -1.392 -1.879 
2002 3.578 3.668 3.610 4.099 4.355 3.592 4.512 4.625 4.682 
2003 1.283 1.183 1.358 0.906 0.689 0.755 1.275 0.835 0.496 
2004 1.795 1.733 1.854 1.072 1.038 1.156 2.619 2.756 2.840 
2005 1.563 1.758 1.572 1.043 1.062 1.014 0.828 0.611 0.632 
2006 -0.574 -0.527 -0.296 -0.604 -0.824 -0.491 0.867 1.041 1.636 
2007 -0.736 -0.872 -1.035 -2.223 -2.572 -2.604 -1.288 -0.675 -0.607 
2008 3.123 3.320 3.330 3.094 3.454 3.632 2.401 2.822 2.623 
2009 1.132 1.240 1.280 0.682 0.764 0.796 -0.379 -0.384 -0.401 
2010 0.050 0.099 -0.165 -0.142 -0.120 -0.425 0.128 0.446 -1.086 
2011 2.017 1.997 1.407 0.694 0.726 0.019 0.024 -0.243 -1.030 
2012 2.901 3.099 2.327 2.534 2.550 1.878 1.374 1.413 0.602 
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4.10.14 Appendix N 
In Table 4.10-14 below we present the Information ratio across our long-short portfolios for the 
three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 4.10-14 Displays the Sortino ratio for our three long-short portfolios 
 
L/S 12 Port1 L/S 12 Port2 L/S 12 Port3 L/S 7 Port1 L/S 7 Port2 L/S 7 Port3 L/S 3 Port1 L/S 3 Port2 L/S 3 Port3 
1991 2.892 2.119 2.238 1.403 0.595 0.751 -0.208 -1.308 -1.513 
1992 3.705 3.649 3.072 4.734 4.288 4.721 2.736 2.118 2.564 
1993 2.491 2.475 1.500 1.364 1.144 -0.330 0.641 0.203 -0.763 
1994 5.612 5.560 5.581 6.382 5.932 5.593 10.687 11.349 9.320 
1995 3.878 3.426 3.223 2.401 2.248 2.060 3.510 4.572 3.354 
1996 3.473 3.495 3.168 2.810 2.893 2.700 6.803 7.364 5.194 
1997 -0.462 -0.547 -0.300 -1.669 -1.753 -1.670 -0.332 -0.911 -0.232 
1998 4.271 4.040 3.641 4.524 3.532 2.913 9.990 8.980 6.748 
1999 2.381 2.143 2.243 1.518 1.462 1.986 2.139 1.687 2.242 
2000 2.168 1.852 1.855 1.278 1.427 0.829 3.394 3.048 2.989 
2001 -1.479 -1.534 -1.387 -2.118 -2.311 -2.175 -1.707 -2.784 -3.835 
2002 5.642 5.781 5.952 6.148 6.445 5.643 6.649 6.756 7.212 
2003 1.915 1.763 2.037 1.307 1.004 1.102 1.697 1.171 0.715 
2004 2.979 2.893 3.114 1.767 1.739 1.995 4.386 4.842 4.866 
2005 2.238 2.506 2.341 1.761 1.802 1.799 1.366 1.040 1.137 
2006 -0.824 -0.760 -0.423 -0.805 -1.101 -0.652 1.251 1.468 2.519 
2007 -1.046 -1.211 -1.433 -3.041 -3.387 -3.374 -2.098 -1.076 -0.913 
2008 4.502 4.792 4.942 4.758 5.291 5.564 3.702 4.375 4.157 
2009 1.687 1.863 1.997 1.058 1.199 1.309 -0.575 -0.581 -0.632 
2010 0.066 0.132 -0.224 -0.178 -0.151 -0.553 0.193 0.754 -1.579 
2011 3.202 3.132 2.324 1.126 1.178 0.033 0.036 -0.360 -1.801 
2012 4.166 4.048 3.332 3.500 3.361 2.507 1.813 1.728 0.726 
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4.10.15 Appendix O 
In Table 4.10-15 below we present the number of stocks across our long and short portfolios. 
Table 4.10-15 Displays number of stocks per year when screening by portfolio type 
 
S Port 1 L Port 1 S Port 2 L Port 2 S Port 3 L Port 3 L Port 4 
1991 603 92 535 66 158 30 6 
1992 242 191 219 117 33 78 5 
1993 223 192 223 117 60 50 8 
1994 732 185 625 132 178 99 3 
1995 551 245 484 150 114 88 10 
1996 389 278 376 176 108 100 10 
1997 422 294 387 176 68 127 12 
1998 454 277 425 190 150 91 11 
1999 380 288 341 174 112 80 11 
2000 548 196 469 130 176 62 11 
2001 482 201 448 128 122 76 8 
2002 414 338 365 242 97 102 6 
2003 329 311 290 221 83 120 12 
2004 383 285 356 180 151 83 6 
2005 526 245 404 146 101 80 8 
2006 397 328 322 217 96 110 3 
2007 403 252 304 189 145 52 3 
2008 459 182 368 129 150 36 3 
2009 236 369 206 289 47 166 10 
2010 287 327 245 218 60 149 4 
2011 365 233 316 136 67 81 3 
2012 280 299 242 216 48 147 5 
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4.10.16 Appendix P 
In Table 4.10-16 we present the returns earned by our long “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 4”. 
Table 4.10-16 Displays returns for our long “Portfolio 1” and long “Portfolio 4” on the different windows 
 
L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
1991 14.98% -5.82% 9.02% -6.17% 5.34% -54.55% 
1992 10.86% -19.06% 15.44% -25.03% 14.19% -75.46% 
1993 14.95% -21.38% 8.36% -23.55% 4.19% -26.99% 
1994 29.43% 3.15% 29.08% 33.99% 37.01% 98.18% 
1995 17.89% 2.18% 13.77% 9.84% 20.54% 6.11% 
1996 29.73% 41.03% 24.58% 30.94% 39.01% 33.99% 
1997 -4.66% 7.12% -15.33% -8.88% -1.25% 24.82% 
1998 13.66% 17.41% 12.14% 4.16% 33.04% 1.48% 
1999 17.15% 6.44% 11.53% 27.15% 23.51% 50.04% 
2000 14.08% 17.97% 8.21% 52.18% 24.92% 29.00% 
2001 -16.97% -12.04% -22.72% -13.31% -16.01% -53.70% 
2002 38.84% 46.07% 46.62% 75.23% 55.10% 97.98% 
2003 12.20% -23.18% 10.06% -8.94% 13.18% -6.32% 
2004 19.18% 22.92% 12.29% 16.13% 26.60% 22.41% 
2005 16.80% 24.93% 12.01% 25.50% 8.45% 37.90% 
2006 0.08% 8.35% 2.71% 9.79% 9.47% 33.71% 
2007 -27.40% -31.92% -58.97% -54.58% -8.18% -11.92% 
2008 46.34% 76.44% 51.84% 102.76% 41.81% 80.64% 
2009 21.32% 3.03% 15.30% 7.67% -11.46% -4.11% 
2010 5.14% 6.98% -0.91% 9.32% 3.35% 5.74% 
2011 14.94% 37.79% 2.79% 16.82% -4.82% -27.13% 
2012 28.25% 23.92% 25.83% 35.64% 12.32% 39.79% 
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4.10.17 Appendix Q 
In Table 4.10-17 we present the maximum drawdown earned by our long “Portfolio 1” and 
“Portfolio 4”. 
Table 4.10-17 Displays the maximum drawdown for our long “Portfolio 1” and long “Portfolio 4” on the different 
windows 
 
L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
1991 -5.38% -34.00% -5.38% -34.00% -5.38% -29.17% 
1992 -3.65% -51.90% -2.43% -40.50% -2.43% -40.52% 
1993 -5.53% -50.60% -5.53% -28.10% -4.71% -22.00% 
1994 -2.15% -83.90% -1.74% -52.40% -1.02% -14.69% 
1995 -6.62% -13.60% -6.62% -11.80% -2.43% -7.30% 
1996 -7.47% -12.80% -7.47% -11.70% -1.43% -6.09% 
1997 -25.60% -54.20% -25.60% -54.20% -6.22% -33.80% 
1998 -7.80% -25.10% -7.80% -12.30% -3.05% -9.41% 
1999 -8.34% -28.40% -5.85% -19.50% -5.49% -10.08% 
2000 -25.78% -31.30% -25.78% -31.30% -11.01% -31.30% 
2001 -30.27% -36.00% -30.27% -36.00% -9.99% -32.24% 
2002 -4.40% -17.40% -3.48% -15.90% -1.86% -15.93% 
2003 -5.88% -62.80% -5.22% -27.90% -5.03% -12.87% 
2004 -4.57% -10.10% -4.57% -10.10% -4.47% -10.10% 
2005 -8.63% -11.00% -8.63% -9.10% -8.63% -9.08% 
2006 -14.51% -33.00% -12.30% -25.50% -5.69% -6.58% 
2007 -65.34% -79.00% -56.69% -67.20% -7.89% -11.29% 
2008 -5.76% -18.60% -5.76% -12.90% -5.76% -12.93% 
2009 -10.80% -15.60% -10.80% -11.50% -10.80% -10.65% 
2010 -19.40% -16.50% -19.40% -16.50% -5.39% -6.07% 
2011 -6.73% -37.20% -6.73% -37.20% -6.73% -34.46% 
2012 -4.11% -9.80% -4.04% -8.20% -4.04% -6.60% 
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4.10.18 Appendix R 
In Table 4.10-18 we present the Sharpe ratio earned by our long “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 4”. 
Table 4.10-18 Displays the Sharpe ratio for our long “Portfolio 1” and long “Portfolio 4” on the different windows 
 
L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
1991 1.685 -0.211 0.948 -0.213 0.534 -1.850 
1992 1.726 -0.711 2.499 -0.883 2.044 -1.963 
1993 1.948 -0.851 1.038 -0.913 0.465 -0.948 
1994 4.439 0.058 4.803 0.680 6.007 2.440 
1995 2.410 0.120 1.758 0.486 3.078 0.336 
1996 3.156 1.832 2.542 1.459 4.987 1.831 
1997 -0.375 0.200 -1.121 -0.217 -0.137 0.644 
1998 1.372 0.748 1.397 0.206 3.850 0.085 
1999 1.274 0.204 0.986 0.919 1.832 1.898 
2000 0.900 0.433 0.475 1.165 1.334 0.589 
2001 -0.975 -0.433 -1.168 -0.422 -1.102 -1.862 
2002 3.844 1.437 4.366 1.950 4.712 2.188 
2003 1.266 -0.849 0.989 -0.445 1.258 -0.313 
2004 2.181 1.246 1.305 0.801 2.722 0.945 
2005 1.665 1.327 1.082 1.226 0.680 1.894 
2006 0.002 0.282 0.216 0.382 1.041 2.042 
2007 -0.827 -0.518 -2.226 -0.955 -0.608 -0.622 
2008 3.197 2.269 3.095 2.629 2.094 1.756 
2009 1.485 0.162 0.914 0.389 -0.583 -0.173 
2010 0.244 0.354 -0.041 0.433 0.301 0.455 
2011 1.367 1.195 0.239 0.450 -0.376 -0.855 
2012 2.870 1.404 2.529 2.507 1.039 2.944 
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4.10.19 Appendix S 
In Table 4.10-19 we present the Treynor ratio earned by our long “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 4”. 
Table 4.10-19 Displays the Treynor ratio for our long “Portfolio 1” and long “Portfolio 4” on the different windows 
 
L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
1991 0.089 -0.171 0.036 -0.169 0.003 -0.756 
1992 0.061 -0.726 0.116 -0.762 0.100 -1.831 
1993 0.095 -0.532 0.033 -0.539 -0.008 -0.827 
1994 0.296 -0.013 0.274 0.523 0.367 1.777 
1995 0.148 -0.075 0.094 0.098 0.169 0.015 
1996 0.325 0.811 0.251 0.513 0.470 0.718 
1997 -0.120 0.042 -0.238 -0.305 -0.069 0.438 
1998 0.175 0.375 0.159 -0.018 0.952 -0.083 
1999 0.187 0.036 0.114 0.756 0.331 1.758 
2000 0.085 0.137 0.029 0.512 0.177 0.245 
2001 -0.228 -0.203 -0.287 -0.202 -0.231 -0.676 
2002 0.351 0.817 0.445 1.471 0.550 1.677 
2003 0.058 -0.404 0.041 -0.162 0.067 -0.100 
2004 0.119 0.243 0.060 0.161 0.175 0.214 
2005 0.102 0.289 0.057 0.289 0.028 0.432 
2006 -0.044 0.044 -0.020 0.067 0.038 0.359 
2007 -0.306 -0.435 -0.656 -0.812 -0.124 -0.248 
2008 0.428 0.826 0.480 1.112 0.390 0.901 
2009 0.144 0.035 0.089 0.091 -0.140 -0.045 
2010 0.001 0.077 -0.045 0.103 -0.015 0.076 
2011 0.088 0.439 -0.020 0.186 -0.087 -0.270 
2012 0.197 0.439 0.173 0.186 0.059 -0.270 
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4.10.20 Appendix T 
In Table 4.10-20 we present the Information ratio earned by our long “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 
4”. 
Table 4.10-20 Displays the Information ratio for our long “Portfolio 1” and long “Portfolio 4” on the different 
windows 
 
L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
1991 1.686 -0.209 0.949 -0.210 0.534 -1.828 
1992 1.729 -0.708 2.495 -0.877 2.029 -1.940 
1993 1.949 -0.848 1.039 -0.907 0.466 -0.936 
1994 4.434 0.058 4.788 0.678 5.949 2.414 
1995 2.410 0.122 1.756 0.486 3.052 0.335 
1996 3.153 1.830 2.535 1.454 4.939 1.814 
1997 -0.370 0.200 -1.112 -0.215 -0.131 0.639 
1998 1.373 0.748 1.396 0.207 3.813 0.087 
1999 1.274 0.205 0.986 0.916 1.816 1.879 
2000 0.901 0.433 0.476 1.161 1.322 0.584 
2001 -0.970 -0.431 -1.160 -0.419 -1.087 -1.841 
2002 3.838 1.434 4.350 1.941 4.664 2.164 
2003 1.267 -0.846 0.989 -0.442 1.249 -0.309 
2004 2.181 1.242 1.304 0.798 2.697 0.935 
2005 1.665 1.325 1.082 1.222 0.677 1.874 
2006 0.006 0.283 0.218 0.382 1.035 2.023 
2007 -0.823 -0.516 -2.214 -0.950 -0.598 -0.612 
2008 3.192 2.263 3.084 2.617 2.073 1.737 
2009 1.485 0.161 0.913 0.388 -0.574 -0.171 
2010 0.246 0.353 -0.039 0.431 0.302 0.450 
2011 1.368 1.192 0.242 0.447 -0.368 -0.846 
2012 2.867 1.400 2.510 2.495 1.032 2.912 
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4.10.21 Appendix U 
In Table 4.10-21 we present the Sortino ratio earned by our long “Portfolio 1” and “Portfolio 4”. 
Table 4.10-21 Displays the Sortino ratio for our long “Portfolio 1” and long “Portfolio 4” on the different windows 
 
L 12 Port1 L 12 Port4 L 7 Port1 L 7 Port4 L 3 Port1 L 3 Port4 
1991 2.484 -0.304 1.393 -0.281 0.903 -2.667 
1992 2.621 -0.712 4.071 -0.773 3.364 -1.711 
1993 3.040 -1.137 1.643 -1.160 0.751 -1.122 
1994 6.850 0.080 8.906 0.866 13.638 3.302 
1995 3.484 0.216 2.403 0.924 3.940 0.560 
1996 3.673 2.898 2.693 2.011 7.265 2.998 
1997 -0.533 0.239 -1.549 -0.256 -0.209 0.891 
1998 2.578 1.295 2.538 0.278 7.300 0.130 
1999 2.358 0.342 1.736 1.412 2.999 2.612 
2000 1.517 0.769 0.795 2.051 2.412 0.964 
2001 -1.654 -0.623 -1.983 -0.688 -2.203 -2.979 
2002 6.494 2.234 6.922 3.165 7.600 3.929 
2003 1.956 -0.977 1.490 -0.625 1.750 -0.526 
2004 3.697 1.674 2.245 1.050 4.292 1.115 
2005 2.434 2.007 1.787 1.840 1.085 3.232 
2006 0.008 0.311 0.281 0.333 1.433 2.401 
2007 -1.136 -0.651 -2.853 -1.188 -0.878 -0.883 
2008 4.851 3.605 4.845 4.428 3.216 2.953 
2009 2.119 0.223 1.349 0.509 -0.863 -0.249 
2010 0.325 0.423 -0.050 0.495 0.431 0.576 
2011 2.154 2.317 0.406 0.941 -0.606 -1.500 
2012 3.942 1.651 3.375 4.599 1.351 5.728 
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Chapter five – Return on equity (ROE) 
momentum strategy 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Several studies such as Penman (1991) have documented that return on equity (ROE) is 
not particularly a useful measure for delivering alpha as it contains little information related to 
future stock returns. However, controversial points of view disperse here as ROE is presumably 
one of the favourite measures used by practitioners when assessing a stock in which to invest.  
By definition, ROE is a summary of the profitability of the firm over a period of time. 
Similarly, someone could have used return on assets (ROA), which is also a measure of 
profitability for all contributors of capital. It is defined as earnings before interest taxes divided by 
total assets. However, in this study we focus only on ROE, which is defined as net income divided 
by shareholder’s equity – see later formula.  
As stated, ROE is a factor to determine a firm’s growth rate of earnings. Practitioners as 
well as academicians have recently started to assume that future ROE will approximate its past 
value; solely a high ROE does not imply necessarily that the future ROE will be high. On the other 
hand, a declining ROE is an indication that the firm’s new investment has delivered a lower ROE 
than past investment.  
In this chapter, we show how an investor can use ROE as input into stock valuation 
analysis. By focusing on our ROE momentum strategy, we are able to show that the ROE can be a 
useful measure when forming a portfolio. This is new and has not been done in the past, the 
novelty of our work is in fact to use a financial measure to form a momentum strategy. Using 
three-year ROE as a trading strategy we are able to report subsequent return for investor’s willing 
to benefit from our strategy.  
Every fiscal year we screen the S&P 1500 index. Using a momentum methodology we give 
a binary signal (0 or 1) for each stock based on the ROE criteria if this one is greater during three 
following years. We then propose a “BUY” portfolio based on the stocks highlighted by our model 
in order to give investors a chance to assess the relevance of the criteria we have selected.  
We believe that this strategy can help investors and portfolio managers to understand 
the dynamics of the stocks in their portfolio and to form better investment ideas, as it appears 
that the ROE enables them to pick stock with higher returns.  
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows, the first part of the chapter give some 
insight into the literature review around ROE, stock returns and momentum. The second part 
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summarizes the methodology principles as well as the risk-adjusted performances used to 
describe our results. Finally, the third part presents the empirical results gained from 
implementing the strategy based on stocks selected by our model.  
5.2 Literature Review 
 
We review in this part the different studies on return on equity (ROE) momentum, 
including some insight into the premise of momentum strategies, ROE as a profitability measure, 
ROE and stock returns, some literature on portfolios formed on the basis of ROE and, finally, we 
try to focus on literature that has used ROE as a momentum strategy. 
5.2.1 Momentum strategies 
Several studies have documented the use of momentum strategies applied to different 
anomalies. Here we give a brief summary of some of them.  
DeBont and Thaler (1985) were among the first to document a long-term over-reaction in 
stock returns; they argued that stocks that had performed poorly over the previous three to five 
years were more likely to outperform over the next three to five years.  
Strategies based on earnings surprises are often referred to as momentum strategies as, 
more often than not, they lead to purchases of stocks which have outperformed the market over 
the previous six months. Chan et al. (1996) showed that stocks with positive earnings momentum 
have regularly outperformed the US market since 1977 and attributed the momentum effect 
around earnings announcement. For instance, they suggest that sorting stocks by prior six-month 
returns yields investors a return of 8.8% over the subsequent six months. Also, ranking stocks by a 
moving average based on revisions in consensus estimates produces a 7.7% return over the 
subsequent six months.  
Previously, Levy (1967) claimed that investors who buy stocks with a current price that is 
subsequently higher than the average stock price realized over the past 27 weeks are able to 
benefit from abnormal returns. Also, the author argued that superior profits can be realized by 
investing in stocks which historically have been strong in price movement solely; investors should 
determine the riskiness of the strategy employed using various technical measures.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) studied the momentum effect focusing on the US market 
over the period 1965 to 1989. They considered a strategy that buys stocks based on their return 
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over the past first, second, third and fourth quarters and suggested that stocks that generate 
higher than average returns in one period also generate higher than average returns in the 
following period. This shows that there is a form of momentum in stock prices. In fact, they 
argued that past winners consistently generate higher returns around their earnings 
announcements in the seven months following the portfolio formation, in contrast with past 
losers. They reported that investors can realize a compounded excess return of 12.01% per year 
on average using their strategy.  
Similarly, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) demonstrated that, while the performance of 
individual stocks is highly unpredictable, portfolios of best-performing stocks in the recent past 
period appear to outperform other stocks which were lagging in the past period, and argued that 
the momentum effect presumably represents the strongest evidence against the market 
efficiency hypothesis. 
As part of his analysis on the role of momentum strategies to be applied in different 
countries, Rouwenhorst (1998) found that momentum strategies were profitable for equities in 
12 European markets over the period 1980-1995. This result suggests that a diversified portfolio 
of past winners outperformed a portfolio of past losers by 1% on average per month. Griffin et al. 
(2003) examined momentum profits in different countries and found that momentum yields to 
subsequent return in most of those countries when investors are seeking to form a portfolio 
based on a momentum strategy. They also investigated the relation between momentum returns 
and macroeconomic risk and suggested that if macroeconomic risk is driving momentum then 
momentum should be country specific. Additionally, Meade and Beasley (2011) showed that 
momentum effects exist for a global range of stock markets and suggested that macroeconomic 
risks that are driving momentum return are country specific. They investigated the S&P 1200 
using data from DataStream from January 1999 to September 2006 and offered a Sortino ratio-
type portfolio which generates profits in excess of the market. 
In a similar manner, Chan et al. (2000) examined the profitability of momentum strategies 
implemented in international stock market indices. The literature has suggested over the past few 
years that stock returns are predictable based on historical price. Firstly, they implemented the 
momentum strategy on individual stocks, then they examined whether the profitability of 
momentum strategy is affected by exchange rate movement and, finally, they examined whether 
trading volume affects the profitability of momentum strategies. Their results are both 
statistically and economically significant when using momentum strategies based on past returns. 
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Also, there is some research that stipulates that size, book to market or even beta might 
have an impact on momentum strategies. For instance, Hong et al. (2000) documented the 
importance of size or market capitalization on the magnitude of momentum returns and showed 
that small firms tend to have a decline in momentum profits. Likewise, Siganos (2013) looked at 
different characteristics of the firms to explore the momentum patterns such as book to market, 
size, beta, age, profit margin, current ratio, return on common equity, and return on capital. 
Using UK data from August 1988 to July 2006 extracted from DataStream, the results are 
suggestive of some form of pattern display in momentum strategies: that the momentum effect is 
driven by prior winners that keep performing well while prior losers keep performing poorly.  
In summary, the momentum effect is driven mainly by prior winners which keep 
performing well instead of prior losers which tend to perform poorly.  
5.2.2 Return on equity (ROE)/profitability 
Several studies have made evident that ROE is a measure of profitability. The change in 
rate in ROE is helpful to understand whether the company will change its status.  
Hergert (1983) investigated whether ROE is a reliable measure of corporate investment. 
The author said: “Return on equity plays a crucial role in formulating and implementing a firm’s 
strategy” (p. 103, Will Corporate Performance Decline in an Improving Economy?).  
In contrast, Lee and Li (2012) analyzed the effect of diversification on firm performance 
and used ROE as a measure of performance. Their results suggest that ROE is positively associated 
when a firm’s performance is poor and negatively associated when a firm’s performance is good. 
Also, they found that a firm’s size has a positively significant effect on ROE, as well as debt ratio 
and a firm’s ROE. As stated: “The link between the debt ratio and return on equity becomes 
significantly negative for quantiles between 0.05 and 0.25, consistent with the notion that a firm’s 
positive leverage to earnings is weakened by the negative impact of debt ratio on earnings when 
the potential effect of bankruptcy cost on  return on equity. Firms should pay more attention to 
their financial leverage when bankruptcy costs are present” (p. 2163, Diversification and Risk-
adjusted Performance: A Quantile Regression Approach.) 
However, Wet and Toit (2007) argued that ROE is a misleading measure of corporate 
financial performance; indeed, earnings can be manipulated and ROE will continue to rise with 
more financial leverage (as long as the returns earned on the borrowed funds exceed the cost of 
borrowing). Also, ROE may be subject to inflation (inflation has a negative impact on profit 
margin) and in the long term may reduce ROE. To emphasize our thoughts, companies with poor 
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past returns and high ROE tend to manipulate their earnings; because this manipulation is only 
gradual the market fails to fully understand and stock return are in consequence not great. Also, 
past returns and high ROE are a sign that the company’s true profitability has already peaked and 
will deteriorate in the future. 
Therefore, there might be a controversial point of view suggesting that ROE of value 
stocks is more sensitive to the ROE of the market than is the ROE of growth stocks, and also 
stipulating that the ROE of growth stocks is more sensitive to the market’s price earnings – see, 
for instance, Campbell et al. (2009). 
Using data from CRSP and Compustat from January 1972 to December 2010, Chen and Lin 
(2011) measured ROE as net income before extraordinary items divided by one-quarter-lagged 
book equity. They found that there is asymmetrical mean reversion behaviour in ROE. The 
research investigates whether investor earnings optimism has an impact on the earnings 
management policy and in consequence on the ROE, and suggests that managers might 
manipulate reported earnings.  
Additionally, Baker and Wurgler (2006), using monthly stock returns between 1963 and 
2001, looked at patterns in stock returns and studied the effect of investor sentiment on stock 
returns and examined whether movement in ROE should be explained by change in investor’s 
sentiment instead of the firm’s operating environment.  
On the other hand, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) investigated the relation between institutional 
ownership, financial health and the market valuation on earnings. Their results found that firms 
with a significant level of institutional ownership are healthier than firms with a low one and 
stipulated that high institutional ownership has higher ROE and ROA in the current year and 
subsequent three years whereas low institutional ownership displays low ROE and ROA in the 
current year and subsequent three years. In addition, Hessel and Norman (1992) found that firms 
with at least 65% of institutional ownership are more profitable in terms of ROE and ROA as they 
invest more in R&D. 
In summary, several studies have focused on the aspect of ROE as a profitability measure. 
Profitability plays an essential role as it does not only measure the firm’s ability to generate value 
from the invested capital but as well the firms are likely to adjust the operating performances. 
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5.2.3 Return on equity (ROE) and stock returns  
A number of past studies have shown the link between accounting variables and stock 
price returns. Also, there is some significant evidence that ROE and stock returns might be linked 
as many investors look at ROE when targeting future return performances. Indeed, ROE is a useful 
indication of profitability, which in itself is a key determinant of stock prices.  
Penman (1991) examined how ROE is good at pricing stock returns. Using data over the 
period 1969 to 1986, one of the main questions described in the paper is to what extent ROE 
captures stock returns. After multiple regressions, the results suggested a positive relation 
between stock return and ROE; also, firms with high (low) current ROE tend to have high (low) 
ROE in the future. This is crucial for our research as we are looking for an increase in ROE over 
three years to form a signal. Finally, Penman highlighted the fact that ROE is better at predicting 
stock return than that used as a proxy for risk as there is a conflict in the literature regarding the 
use of the variable. In addition, Ohlson (1995) described stocks prices in terms of ROE.  
Recently, Baginski and Wahlen (2003) addressed the question of whether accounting 
numbers can help to assess firm risk and test whether systematic risk and total volatility in 
residual income can help to explain the cross section of price differentials. “If price differentials 
captures the fundamental discount for risk in share prices, and if abnormal return on equity beta 
or the standard deviation of abnormal return on equity are reliable surrogates for priced risk 
factors then we expect price differentials to increase with residual income risk” (p. 329, Residual 
Income Risk, Intrinsic Values, and Share Prices). After forming a portfolio, results indicate that 
volatility in ROE is positively and strongly associated with price differentials. Here we highlight 
this point to reinforce our view that ROE and stock prices might be linked.  
More recently, Ahsan (2012) used ROE to predict stock returns and found that investors 
can create a portfolio based on ROE. In fact, the study shows that a portfolio based on ROE can 
generate subsequent returns; however, higher ROE does not signify necessarily higher returns.  
Following our discussion on the use of ROE to help explain the cross section in stock 
returns, Clubb and Naffi (2007) explained the relationship between stock returns and the role of 
ROE. It is stated in their article: “We note that the identity linking return on equity, stock returns 
and changes in the book-to-market ratio implies that expected stock returns for a period can be 
explained by a comparison of expected return on equity and expected change in the book-to-
market ratio during the period” (p. 2, The Usefulness of Book to Market and ROE Expectations for 
Explaining UK stock Returns). 
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Chen and Zhang (2007) suggested that, based on their regression model, on average a 
ROE increase of 1% will increase stock prices by 0.45% implicitly, implying that stock returns and 
ROE are positively linked across the whole sample using data over the period 1983 to 2001. Also, 
the effect differs whether the firm is exhibiting a high level or a low level of profitability. For 
instance, the authors found that a 1% increase in ROE is associated with a 0.19% increase for low 
ROE firms. By contrast, Beccalli et al. (2006) suggested that ROE does not help to explain the 
variation in stock prices. 
In summary, the reasoning from these studies is that ROE can be used by investors to 
predict stock returns as it appears that they are both positively linked.  
5.2.4 Portfolio formed on the basis of return on equity (ROE) 
A number of empirical studies have compared the benefits of using ROE when forming a 
portfolio. 
For instance, Chen et al. (2011) examined the difference in return between a high ROE 
portfolio and the return of a low ROE portfolio. They found that profitability ROE is positively 
associated with return on stocks as such that winners exhibit higher profitability and earn higher 
expected return than losers.  
Also, Branch and Gale (1983), using Compustat data from 1968 to 1981, explored the 
factors that determine stock prices and particularly examined stock price to profitability and 
formed the idea that “Companies with low current returns on equity generally have very low 
price to book P/Bs while those with higher return on equity have higher P/Bs” (p. 4, Linking 
Corporate Stock Price Performance to Strategy Formulation). Likewise, Fairfield (1994) stated that 
P/B is a function of the expected level of future ROE; in fact, the P/B ratios correlate positively 
with ROE. The author presents the usefulness of the P/B-ROE valuation model and suggests that 
this model can anticipate next year’s changes in ROE.  
Similarly, Wilcox and Philips (2005) focused on the P/B-ROE approach as an estimation to 
predict future stock returns. As outlined: “The P/B-ROE model is simple, if its expected return on 
equity is higher in the first stage than in the second, where it supports an equilibrium price/book 
ratio, its current P/B must be expected to decline, offsetting its high profitability so as to provide 
only the required shareholder return. If its expected return on equity is expected to be higher in 
the second stage, its P/B must be expected to rise until then to supplement its current depressed 
profitability and achieve the required shareholder return.” (p. 58, The P/B-ROE Valuation Model 
Revisited). 
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Bagella et al. (2000) analyzed the determinants of cross-sectional stock returns and found 
that portfolio strategies based on low values of EPS, book to market, market value and on ROE 
significantly outperform the market. By investigating the UK stock market for the period July 1971 
to June 1997, the authors showed astonishing results as their strategies outperformed the 
benchmark index over 26-year average monthly returns. In this study, return on equity is defined 
as net profit after tax, minority interests and preference dividends divided by equity capital and 
reserves minus intangibles plus total deferred tax. 
Ahsan (2012) stated that portfolios are able to return subsequent return to investors, and 
the study shows that portfolios based on ROE can generate subsequent return; however, the 
author is not able to formulate whether the outperformance occurs more in stocks displaying 
high ROE or low ROE.  
Accordingly, Neuhauser (2013) investigated how investors react to firms’ ROE as an 
investment strategy and hypothesized the idea that investors under-react to ROE information. To 
do so he designed and assessed a portfolio of high ROE stocks. The author covers the period 1973 
to 2004 by investigating the US market. The results show that portfolios formed on the basis of 
high ROE are able to generate subsequent return even after controlling for Fama and French’s 
(1993) risk factors. The author said: “If investor’s under-react to earnings they may under-react to 
ROE as well since ROE =EPS/BV” (p. 3, Do Investors Under-React to ROE?) 
Overall, there might be a story when creating a portfolio on the basis of ROE. 
5.2.5 Return on equity (ROE) as a momentum strategy 
Only a small number of studies have examined the impact of ROE as a momentum 
strategy. We try in this part to provide support for our strategy. 
Figelman (2007) examined the interaction of stock return momentum with various 
earnings measures, specifically the ROE. The author considered measures such as return on 
equity, change in ROE and earnings quality. The research was carried out over the period 1970 to 
2004 in the S&P 500 universe and analyzed a one-month and six-month holding period when 
forming portfolios. The author believes that momentum is caused by slow dissemination of news 
and stipulates: “Slow dissemination of news implies that different investors obtain new 
information at different times, which causes the stock price to reflect this news only gradually”. 
(p. 71, Interaction of Stock Returns Momentum with Earnings Measures). 
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Additionally, Tziogkidis and Zachouris (2009) examined the performance of variable-
orientated momentum strategies. To do so they used 20 variables in the US market over the 
period 2002 to 2006. Their results suggest that investors can benefit from past trend performance 
if they take into account firms’ specific information. Particularly, they suggest that EPS, low P/E 
and ROE are variables that contribute the most in producing some good momentum portfolio 
performances. The authors reported that: “Return on Equity produced relatively large and 
statistically significant regardless of holding period or momentum” (p. 16, Momentum Equity 
Strategies: Are Certain Firm-Specific Variables Crucial in Achieving Superior Performance in Short-
term Holding Periods?), suggesting that momentum strategy on ROE might deliver different 
returns if they are held in different time windows.  
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) found that low turnover winners (losers) have greater (less) 
momentum, whereas high turnover winners (losers) have less (greater momentum). They also 
suggested that low turnover stocks have experienced a decline in ROE over the past three years 
compared with high turnover stocks. In other words, this is expressed by the view that a change 
in asset turnover is reflected in the change of ROE. As stated: “The pattern is symmetrical: high 
volume winners have experienced an increase in return on equity whereas low volume winners 
have experienced an increase in return on equity” (p. 2049, Price and Trading Volume).  
Finally, Gazmeh et al. (2013) investigated the use of profitability momentum strategy in 
the Tehran Stock Exchange covering the period 2006 to 2010. Their results suggest that firms that 
had experienced an increase in ROE in the past three to 12 months may continue to outperform 
whereas stock unable to increase their ROE may display bad stock returns. The study addressed 
the importance of using ROE as an investment strategy and considered that ROE can potentially 
indicate that firms with good past performances in the three to 12 months may continue to 
outperform firms which had bad performances over the same period for the next three to twelve  
months.  
All the research presented above investigates the claim of some ROE in cross section with 
stock returns. In general, the authors find that the ROE is exposed to different risk but the 
question is whether the pattern identified in the ROE is likely to persist over time or the pattern is 
just another form of survivorship bias. They answer the question by examining different aspects 
of ROE and, despite the fact that there is not an extensive literature review on the use of ROE as a 
momentum strategy, we truly believe that this investment idea can be supportive for investors 
willing to dig into further research.  
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5.3 Methodology – principles  
 
The stock selection method that we propose in this model is based on the principle that 
investors should be looking every year for three consecutive increases in a row in return on equity 
(ROE).  
We have decided to collect the data from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat North 
America database which provides fundamentals data on all listed NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ 
common stocks. The Standard & Poor’s North American data is unique in the sense that it is 
standardized to ensure comparability by removing reporting variability and bias to ensure that 
comparability exists among similar types of data. Data is collected from shareholders’ reports, 10-
K reports and other reliable sources. Items include, as an example, annual and quarterly income 
statement, balance sheet, cash flow data, company name.  
When it comes to building the momentum ROE to identify potential winners, we first 
construct the return on equity variable, which is illustrated as:  
 
𝑹𝑶𝑬 =
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓′𝒔 𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚
 
Where Shareholder’s equity is calculated as the company’s total assets minus total 
liabilities.  
To understand the factors affecting firms’ ROE, the literature often refers to DuPont85 
analysis of the return on equity (ROE) ratio, which is displayed in the form:  
 
𝑹𝑶𝑬 = 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏 𝑿 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝑿 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 
                                                          
85
 Du Pont model initiated by Du Pont; see for instance Kline and Hissler “The DuPont Chart system for 
Appraising Operating performance”, NACA Bulletin (August 1953). 
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 𝑹𝑶𝑬 =
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖 
𝒙
𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖
𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔
𝒙
𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔
𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚
 
 
The DuPont Model was developed in 1919 by a finance executive at E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Co. If ROE is unsatisfactory by some measure, then the DuPont analysis conveys 
where to start looking for the reasons. For example, if a company’s equity value declines sharply, 
its equity multiplier rises. Thus, in some cases the ROE does not really represent an improvement 
in financial performance at all.  
Profit margin is a useful measure to assess the firm’s competitive position; however, this 
depends merely on the sector as for some companies low margins generates high return. An 
increase in profit margin will increase the firm’s ability to generate funds internally. 
Asset turnover is used to measure the operating efficiency of the firm. This ratio is a 
capital structure/financial leverage ratio indicating the degree to which assets are internally 
financed. A higher ratio indicates more outstanding financing. The ratio equals one plus the 
debt/equity ratio where the debt is defined as total liabilities. It indicates the efficiency of the 
firm’s use of assets. An increase in the firm’s total asset turnover increases the sales generated 
for each unit in asset.  
Asset leverage measures the financial strategy by giving information of total assets 
financed by shareholders; when assessing ROE it is important to understand to what extent 
leverage is used. For instance, if ROE is boosted by leverage therefore investors should consider 
the risk taken. An increase in the debt-equity ratio increases the firm’s financial leverage 
Considering the Du Pont analysis, it appears that the ROE could be leveraged up by 
increasing the amount of debt in the firm. However, increasing debt also increases interest 
expense, which reduces profit margins and acts to reduce ROE. As well, weakness in operating 
will show up a diminished return on assets, which will translate into a lower ROE. 
In other words, the two factors capable of contributing to an increase in return on equity 
are an increase in asset turnover and an increase in leverage. Also, companies that create a lot of 
shareholder equity and deliver high returns are generally self-funding and do not need additional 
debt or equity investment whereas, if a company’s profit margins are shrinking and turnover is 
slowing, incorporating long-term debt to add some working capital will reverse the declining ROE. 
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In consequence, ROE reveals how much a company is earning from net assets. Stocks with high 
debt, low margins and slow rates of asset turnover are said to exhibit higher risk.  
By focusing on improving return on equity from one year to another the stock return is 
likely to increase as earnings grow and margin recovery is taking place. We focus therefore on 
stocks whose ROE is set to strengthen. After excluding financials using the SIC code provided by 
Compustat, the model consists of a binary signal, either 1 for a “BUY” or 0 for “no signal”. Table 
5.3-1 below provides an example of this. 
 
Table 5.3-1 Momentum strategy 
Sector  
Company 
Name Date  ROE Signal 
    
Industrial 
General 
Electric 
CO 31/12/2010 0.099220599 
 
 
 
    
  
31/12/2011 0.110408519 
     
 
 
31/12/2012 0.114260139 1 
    
         Information 
Technology 
Microsoft 
Corp 30/06/2010 0.406280455 
     
  
30/06/2011 0.405549813 
 
 
 
    
  
30/06/2012 0.25583533 0 
    
    
 
    
         
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
       
         
 
 
         
Buy as increase 
during three 
following years  No signals  
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5.4 Risk-adjusted performances measures 
 
Higher returns are usually associated with higher risks. In this part we describe in detail 
measures used to evaluate the strategy such as Information ratio, Jensen Alpha, Maximum 
drawdown, Treynor ratio and the Sortino ratio. 
 
Jensen Alpha: 
The Jensen alpha is a widely used risk-adjusted performance measure that represents the 
average return of a portfolio in relation to the expected market return, which is based on the 
CAPM (capital asset pricing model). The higher the alpha, the better the portfolio has performed 
above the market. The measure was developed by Michael Jensen in 1968 to investigate whether 
fund managers were able to consistently outperform the market.  
Jensen’s measure is calculated as:  
∝𝑝= 𝑟?̅? − [𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑟?̅̅̅? −  𝑟𝑓)] 
Where 𝑟?̅? is the expected total portfolio return, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑝 is the beta of 
the portfolio and 𝑟?̅̅̅? is the expected market return.  
Information ratio: 
The Information ratio is a widely used measure among academicians and practitioners 
which provides investors with an idea of how the strategy is performing; an annualized 
Information ratio of 2 means that the strategy is performing well almost every month.  
Information ratio is calculated as:  
 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑅
𝜎
 
Where R is the average return obtained from the strategy and σ is the standard deviation 
of return of the strategy. Both are calculated using the same time frame, in our case 252 trading 
days.  
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Sharpe ratio: 
The Sharpe ratio is the best-known risk-adjusted return ratio introduced by Sharpe (1966) 
and differs from the Information ratio by adding a risk-free rate in the numerator.  
The Sharpe ratio is a reward to variability ratio and is defined for any portfolio as:  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑅 − 𝑟
𝜎
 
Where R is the expected return on portfolio, σ is the standard deviation of return or the 
variance of the portfolio and r is the risk-free rate.  
The Sharpe ratio measures the slope of the risk-free assets and is widely used to compare 
alternative strategies such as stock picking or market timing with passive strategies such as 
tracking the S&P 500 and to compare the performance of different portfolio strategies.  
 
Maximum drawdown: 
The maximum drawdown is another indicator of the risk taken by a portfolio. It measures 
the largest single drop in the value of a portfolio an investor can suffer if s/he enters the market 
at the worst time. Maximum drawdown is an ex-ante proxy for downside risk that computes the 
largest drawdown over all intervals of time that can be formed within a specified interval of time.  
It is defined as:  
𝑀𝑖𝑛 [𝑟𝑡 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (∑ 𝑟𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
)] 
 
Treynor Index: 
The Treynor ratio was first introduced by Treynor (1965) in an attempt to measure how 
well an investment has compensated its investors given its level of risk. The higher the Treynor 
ratio the better the performance of the portfolio or stock being analyzed. It is a widely used 
measure of market-related risk in a stock or collection of stocks.  
It is defined as:  
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𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝑅𝑖 − 𝑟
𝛽𝑖
 
It is a measure of the ex-ante excess return per unit of risk but this time the risk is 
measured by the incremental portfolio risk given by the portfolio-beta. Similar to the Sharpe 
ratio, the Treynor ratio is used to compare performance of different alternative portfolios and the 
best portfolio is defined with the highest Treynor ratio.   
Sortino ratio: 
The Sortino ratio is a modification of the Sharpe ratio in the sense that, instead of 
considering the general volatility in a portfolio, the Sortino ratio focuses only on the downside 
volatility. A large Sortino ratio indicates that there is a low chance of a large loss occurring in the 
portfolio.  
It is defined as:  
𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑅 − 𝑟
𝜎𝑑
 
Where R is the expected return on portfolio, σd is the standard deviation of negative 
asset return and r is the risk-free rate.  
5.5 Empirical results 
 
We start this part by demonstrating how we combine a list of stocks generated by our 
return on equity (ROE) model and CRSP for stock and market index return information. The code 
starts by matching our company list with the CRSP Permco86 identifier using primary issue 
identifier Linkscore to resolve duplicate links. Then we get daily stock data and add market return. 
Keeping only common stock identified by CRSP as share code (10, 11), we calculate daily over a 
one-year period starting 90 days after fiscal period year-end to ensure that the necessary annual 
financial information is available to investors at the time of portfolio formation; this corresponds 
roughly to the annual report filing date, expected to be within 90 days of the fiscal period end.  
                                                          
86
 A unique permanent identifier assigned by CRSP to all companies with issues on a CRSP file. This number 
is permanent for all securities issued by this company regardless of name changes. 
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Also, returns are calculated including distributions as a value-weighted return. CRSP87 
tracks all securities listed on the NYSE, AMEX, ARCA and NASDAQ exchanges and results were 
obtained for the period 1991 to 2012. 
The objective of this part is to achieve a long portfolio by investing in companies based on 
our return on equity (ROE) momentum model. To do so we are creating a long portfolio every 
fiscal year with stocks that have received a 1 as a signal and hold the portfolio over three 
windows, i.e. a 3-month, 7-month and 12-month horizon for investors willing to benefit from our 
strategy. For each year our portfolio is constituted of the number of stocks displayed in the table 
below (see also Appendix G). 
Table 5.5-1 Number of stocks every year  
Year No Of 
Stocks 
1992 107 
1993 236 
1994 278 
1995 266 
1996 262 
1997 330 
1998 258 
1999 258 
2000 289 
2001 156 
2002 197 
2003 311 
2004 430 
2005 470 
2006 409 
2007 355 
2008 253 
2009 119 
2010 302 
2011 511 
2012 308 
 
 
                                                          
87
 CRSP provides the date of delisting return and the classification code of the event type. “After a security 
has been removed from the exchange, CRSP calculate a delisting return of this security by comparing the 
security’s value after it delists with its price on the last day of trading. The value after delisting can be an 
off-exchange price, an off-exchange bid-ask spread, or the sum of a series of distribution payments”. In 
order to avoid biases, incorporating delisting returns would help to assess components of any portfolio 
more accurately. 
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The reference benchmark for our long portfolio is the S&P 1500, which is only used for 
indicative purposes. 
 
 
Figure 5.5-1 Investment performance from 1992 to 2012 formulated on a 12-month window 
The graph in Figure 5.5-1 above represents the cumulative performance over 21 years in 
dollars. It shows the value, as of beginning of fiscal year 1992, of a $1,000 investment made on 
our portfolio when we are holding stocks on a 12-month basis. For comparative purposes, the 
performance of the S&P 1500 index is used as a benchmark.  
 We show that the strategy has outperformed the benchmark over the long term, by 
delivering an alpha investment. This long portfolio has demonstrated skills across the market 
cycle. This past performances should not be taken as an indication of future performance, which 
will vary according to market conditions; as we demonstrate later, the strategy appears to 
underperform during pre-crisis times. Over the past 21 years an investor who invested $1,000 in 
our portfolio would be worth more or less $40,000.  
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5.5.1 Excess return  
In this part, we describe the excess return obtained when forming a long portfolio. Three 
time windows are presented, twelve months, seven months and three months.  
 
Figure 5.5-2 Long portfolio versus the market across a 12-month window 
In Figure 5.5-2, we display the long portfolio annual performance in returns for each fiscal 
year over the period shown in the chart, i.e. from 1992 to 2012. It is expressed as a percentage. 
Here the S&P 1500 is used as a benchmark which is reflected in the chart in red. The chart shows 
as well that, during the period on display, the strategy is not returning positive excess returns to 
investors for eight periods out of twenty-one. In other words, this means that investors would 
have above a 62% chance that we will return money if they were investing in our strategy over a 
12-month window. 
The strategy performed particularly well in 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2008 with gains of 
+22.09%, +20.14%, 34.03% and 45.08% respectively compared with -17.27%, -4.98%, 27.31% and 
36.19% for the benchmark S&P 1500. In 2012 the strategy has outperformed with 30.46% 
compared with 22.84% for the benchmark S&P 1500. The excess return earned above the market 
is about 7.62% on average over 12 months. (Refer to Appendix A.) 
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Figure 5.5-3 Long portfolio versus the market across a 7-month window 
In Figure 5.5-3 we display the long-short portfolio 7-month annualized performance in 
returns for each fiscal year over the period shown in the chart, i.e. from 1992 to 2012. It is 
expressed as a percentage. Here the S&P 1500 is used as a benchmark which is reflected in the 
chart in red. The chart shows as well that, during the period on display, the strategy is not 
returning positive excess returns to investors for nine periods out of twenty-one. In other words, 
this means that investors would have above a 57% chance that we will return money if they were 
investing in our strategy over a 7-month window. 
The strategy performed particularly well in 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2008 with gains of 
+24.86%, +19.29%, 41.80% and 51.97% respectively compared with -12.86%, -4.55%, 34.82% and 
40.04% for the benchmark S&P 1500. In 2012 the strategy has outperformed with 25.93% 
compared with 20.13% for the benchmark S&P 1500. The excess return earned above the market 
is about 5.80% on average over seven months. (Refer to Appendix A.) 
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Figure 5.5-4 Long portfolio versus the market across a 3-month window 
In Figure 5.5-4 we display the long-short portfolio 3-month annualized performance in 
returns for each fiscal year over the period shown in the chart, i.e. from 1992 to 2012. It is 
expressed as a percentage. Here the S&P 1500 is used as a benchmark which is reflected in the 
chart in red. The chart shows as well that, during the period on display, the strategy is not 
returning positive excess returns to investors for six periods out of twenty-one. In other words, 
this means that investors would have above a 71% chance that we will return money if they were 
investing in our strategy over a 3-month window.  
This suggests that perhaps the best investment horizon might be three months as we 
have the chance to deliver excess returns.  
The strategy performed particularly well in 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2008 with gains of 
+26.82%, +38.20%, 55.23% and 37.12% respectively compared with -2.76%, -8.23%, 44.40% and 
27.13% for the benchmark S&P 1500. In 2012 the strategy has outperformed with 13.37% 
compared with 12.17% for the benchmark S&P 1500. The excess return earned above the market 
is about 1.20% on average over three months. (Refer to Appendix A.) 
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5.5.2 Drawdown 
In this part, we present the maximum drawdown over the different time horizons. 
 
Figure 5.5-5 Maximum drawdown (12-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-5, we present the maximum drawdown of our strategy over a 12-month 
horizon window for the period 1992 to 2012. Maximum drawdown is by definition the maximum 
percentage loss. The worst drawdown for our portfolio is -62.5% in 2007 compared to -68.7% for 
the benchmark, here the S&P 1500, which is identified in the chart by “MARK 12”. Therefore, 
even during crisis times our strategy is less risky.  
The second largest drawdown of our strategy occurs in 2001 with a drawdown of -32.4% 
compared to the benchmark of -26.1% the same year. The third largest drawdown is in 
1997: -22.3% compared to -13.3% respectively for the benchmark. (Refer to Appendix B.) 
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Figure 5.5-6 Maximum drawdown (7-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-6, we present the maximum drawdown of our strategy over a 7-month 
horizon window for the period 1992 to 2012. Maximum drawdown is by definition the maximum 
percentage loss. The worst drawdown for our portfolio is -62.5% in 2007 compared to -64.8% for 
the benchmark, here the S&P 1500, which is identified in the chart by “MARK 7”. The second 
largest drawdown of our strategy occurs in 1997 with a drawdown of -22.3% compared to the 
benchmark of -13.3% the same year. The third largest drawdown is in 2001: -21.0% compared 
to -25.2% respectively for the benchmark. (Refer to Appendix B.) 
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Figure 5.5-7 Maximum drawdown (3-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-7, we present the maximum drawdown of our strategy over a 3-month 
horizon window for the period 1992 to 2012. Maximum drawdown is by definition the maximum 
percentage loss. The worst drawdown for our portfolio is -9.0% in 2005 compared to -5.0% for the 
benchmark, here the S&P 1500, which is identified in the chart by “MARK 3”. The second largest 
drawdown of our strategy occurs in 2009 with a drawdown of -8.9% compared to the benchmark 
of -7.9% the same year. The third largest drawdown is in 2001: -8.8% compared to -10.4% 
respectively for the benchmark.  
To some extent as the maximum drawdown occurs gradually we would have been able to 
leave the strategy at this point in time in order to limit the downside risk. (Refer to Appendix B.) 
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5.5.3 Beta 
In this part, we describe beta over the different time horizons. 
 
Figure 5.5-8 Beta (12-month window) 
In the above chart in Figure 5.5-8 we present beta computed for a 12-month horizon 
window for our long portfolio, which is denoted in “blue”.  
By definition beta is the measurement of volatility of a portfolio in relation to the market. 
A portfolio with a beta of one will tend to move in line with the market; by contrast, a portfolio 
with a beta higher than one will be more volatile; inversely, a portfolio with a beta of less than 
one will be less volatile than the market.  
For example, in 2010 the beta on the long portfolio of 1.25 shows that the portfolio has 
performed 25% better than the benchmark, here the S&P 1500. The reverse if the market is 
falling. By contrast, in 1998 the beta on the long portfolio of 0.51 shows that the portfolio is 
expected to perform 49% worse than the market during up markets and 49% better during down 
markets.  
Long portfolio managers are looking to generate higher market-adjusted return. As an 
illustration, in 2011 we manage to get a 3.47% excess return with a beta of 1.19. In 2007, we 
manage to get an excess return of 11.76% with a beta of 7%, suggesting that this year we manage 
to generate higher alpha or also better risk-adjusted return than in 2011. (Refer to Appendix C.) 
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Figure 5.5-9 Beta (7-month window) 
In the chart above in Figure 5.5-9 we present beta computed for a 7-month horizon 
window for our long portfolio, which is denoted in “blue”.  
For example, in 2010 the beta on the long portfolio of 1.26 shows that the portfolio has 
performed 26% better than the benchmark, here the S&P 1500. The reverse if the market is 
falling. By contrast, in 1998 the beta on the long portfolio of 0.46 shows that the portfolio is 
expected to perform 54% worse than the market during up markets and 54% better during down 
markets.  
Long portfolio managers are looking to generate higher market-adjusted return. As an 
illustration, in 2011 we manage to get 2.16% excess return with a beta of 20%. In 2007, we 
manage to get an excess return of 9.03% with a beta of 5%, suggesting that this year we manage 
to generate higher alpha or also better risk-adjusted return than in 2011. (Refer to Appendix C.) 
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Figure 5.5-10 Beta (3-month window) 
In the chart above in Figure 5.5-10 we present beta computed for a 3-month horizon 
window for our long portfolio, which is denoted in “blue”.  
For example, in 2010 the beta on the long portfolio of 1.15 shows that the portfolio has 
performed 15% better than the benchmark, here the S&P 1500. The reverse if the market is 
falling. By contrast, in 1998 the beta on the long portfolio of 0.36 shows that the portfolio is 
expected to perform 64% worse than the market during up markets and 64% better during down 
markets.  
Long portfolio managers are looking to generate higher market-adjusted return. As an 
illustration, in 2011 we manage to get 0.72% excess return with a beta of 20%. In 2007, we 
manage to get an excess return of 17.83% with a beta of 3%, suggesting that this year we manage 
to generate higher alpha or also better risk-adjusted return than in 2011. (Refer to Appendix C.) 
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5.5.4 Sharpe ratio/ Information ratio/ Sortino ratio/ Treynor 
ratio/ Jensen’s alpha 
In this part, we analyze the different ratios over the different time horizons.  
 
Figure 5.5-11 Sharpe ratio (12-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-11, the Sharpe ratio is used to express how much return is achieved for the 
amount of risk taken in an investment; when interpreting Sharpe ratio investors look at the 
highest one as the higher the ratio the better the fund. 
As an illustration, Figure 5.5-12 shows the Sharpe ratios calculated for our long portfolio 
over the different years on a 12-month annualized window. For demonstration purposes, in 2012 
the portfolio is offering a reward of 3.225% per annum per unit of volatility, which corresponds to 
a Sharpe ratio of 3.225; by contrast, a Sharpe ratio below 1 as identified in 2010 (0.520) indicates 
a return on investment that is less than the risk taken. Also, a Sharpe ratio just above 1 will 
indicate a return proportional for the risk taken as, for example, in 1992 (1.172). In this chart, the 
Sharpe ratio ranges from -0.860 in 2001 to 3.547 in 2002. The mean and the median are both 
around 1.65. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 5.5-12 Information ratio (12-month window) 
Figure 5.5-12 shows the Information ratio, which is another measure of risk; it indicates 
how successful the portfolio has been at taking risk relative to the benchmark. When comparing 
funds using the same investment style, the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a 
manager who has been more efficient at picking stocks. For example, in 2007 the Information 
ratio is negative, -0.738, highlighting our poor ability during crisis times to identify good stocks. In 
this chart, the Information ratio ranges from -0.854 in 2001 to 3.542 in 2002. The mean and the 
median are both around 1.65. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 5.5-13 The Sortino ratio (12-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-13, the Sortino ratio, which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio with a 
measure of downside deviations, confirms the superiority of our strategy over the different years. 
In this chart, the Sortino ratio ranges from -1.483 in 2001 to 5.573 in 2002. The mean and the 
median are both around 2.4. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 5.5-14  Treynor Ratio (12-month window) 
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In Figure 5.5-14, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit of risk 
using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted return. It is 
useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar returns. In 
this chart, the Treynor ratio ranges from -0.262 in 2007 to 0.404 in 2008. The mean and the 
median are both around 0.130. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 5.5-15 Jensen’s alpha (12-month window) 
Figure 5.5-15 shows Jensen’s alpha, which is another risk-adjusted measure, confirming 
the superiority of our strategy in delivering positive alpha over the years. In this chart, the 
Jensen’s alphas range from 31.50 to -14.11. The mean and the median are 2.30 (3.93) 
respectively. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 5.5-15 Sharpe ratio (7-month window) 
As an illustration, Figure 5.5-16 shows the Sharpe ratios calculated for our long portfolio 
over the different years on a 7-month annualized window. For demonstration purposes, in 2012 
the portfolio is offering a reward of 2.646% per annum per unit of volatility, which corresponds to 
a Sharpe ratio of 2.646; by contrast, a Sharpe ratio below 1 as identified in 2006 (0.175) indicates 
a return on investment that is less than the risk taken. Also, a Sharpe ratio just above 1 will 
indicate a return proportional for the risk taken as, for example, in 2005 (1.352). In this chart, the 
Sharpe ratio ranges from -1.257 in 2007 to 4.287 in 2002. The mean and the median are both 
around 1.2. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 5.5-16 Information ratio (7-month window) 
Figure 5.5-17 shows the Information ratio, which is another measure of risk; it indicates 
how successful the portfolio has been at taking risk relative to the benchmark. When comparing 
funds using the same investment style the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a 
manager who has been more efficient at picking stocks. For example, in 2007 the Information 
ratio is negative, -1.251, highlighting our poor ability during crisis times to identify good stocks. In 
this chart, the Information ratio ranges from -1.251 in 2007 to 4.276 in 2002. The mean and the 
median are both around 1.2. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.000
-1.000
0.000
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
Information ratio 
(7-month window) 
L 7
IR
  
298 
 
 
Figure 5.5-17 Sortino ratio (7-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-18, the Sortino ratio, which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio with a 
measure of downside deviations, confirms the superiority of our strategy over the different years. 
In this chart, the Sortino ratio ranges from -1.683 in 2007 to 6.638 in 2002. The mean and the 
median are both around 2. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 5.5-19 Treynor ratio (7-month window) 
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Finally, in Figure 5.5-19, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit 
of risk using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted 
return. It is useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar 
return. In this chart, the Treynor ratio ranges from -0.417 in 2007 to 0.475 in 2008. The mean and 
the median are both around 0.080. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 5.5-18  Jensen’s alpha (7-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-20, Jensen’s alpha is another risk-adjusted measure confirming the 
superiority of our strategy in delivering positive alpha over the years. In this chart, the Jensen’s 
alphas range from 31.57 to -19.84. The mean and the median are 1.79 (1.98) respectively. (Refer 
to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 5.5-19 Sharpe ratio (3-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-21, we present the Sharpe ratios calculated for our long portfolio over the 
different years on a 3-month annualized window. For demonstration purposes, in 2012 the 
portfolio is offering a reward of 1.143% per annum per unit of volatility, which corresponds to a 
Sharpe ratio of 1.143; by contrast, a Sharpe ratio below 1 as identified in 2005 (0.699) indicates a 
return on investment that is less than the risk taken. Also, a Sharpe ratio just above 1 will indicate 
a return proportional for the risk taken as, for example, in 2003 (1.499). In this chart, the Sharpe 
ratio ranges from -1.084 in 2009 to 5.595 in 1994. The mean and the median are both around 1.6. 
(Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 5.5-20 Information ratio (3-month window) 
Figure 5.5-22 shows the Information ratio, which is another measure of risk; it indicates 
how successful the portfolio has been at taking risk relative to the benchmark. When comparing 
funds using same investment style the Information ratio is a useful approach to identify a 
manager who has been more efficient at picking stocks. For example, in 2007 the Information 
ratio is negative, -0.554, highlighting our poor ability during crisis times to identify good stocks. In 
this chart, the Information ratio ranges from -1.068 in 2009 to 5.541 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 1.5. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
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Figure 5.5-21 Sortino ratio (3-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-23, the Sortino ratio, which replaces the volatility in the Sharpe ratio with a 
measure of downside deviations, confirms the superiority of our strategy over the different years. 
In this chart, the Sortino ratio ranges from -1.635 in 2009 to 10.986 in 1994. The mean and the 
median are both around 2.5. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 5.5-22 Treynor ratio (3-month window) 
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In Figure 5.5-24, the Treynor ratio measures the efficiency of a portfolio per unit of risk 
using beta as the measure of risk; a higher Treynor ratio means a better risk-adjusted return. It is 
useful in comparing portfolios that invest in similar market sectors and achieve similar return. In 
this chart, the Treynor ratio ranges from -0.213 in 2009 to 0.887 in 1998. The mean and the 
median are both around 0.140. (Refer to Appendix D.) 
 
Figure 5.5-23 Jensen’s alpha (3-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-25, Jensen’s alpha is another risk-adjusted measure confirming the 
superiority of our strategy in delivering positive alpha over the years. In this chart, the Jensen’s 
alphas range from 30.68 to -19.84. The mean and the median are 3.44 (7.43) respectively. (Refer 
to Appendix D.) 
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5.5.5 Correlation 
In this part, we present a chart and a summary results table obtained for the correlation 
of our long portfolio against the market.  
Correlation is a useful metric when measuring how the returns of two investments move 
in relation to each other; we display below a chart on a 3-month window with the correlation for 
the long portfolio. The results display a symmetrical correlation for both long and short portfolio. 
The same can be observed on a 7-month or a 12-month window.  
 
Figure 5.5-24 Correlation (3-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-26, we display the correlation chart for our 3-month annualized window. It 
presents the correlations between our portfolios and the S&P 1500. The correlation overall is 
quite high with, for example, in 2012 the portfolio exhibiting a positive correlation of 0.96 with 
the S&P 1500. The correlation is indicating that the portfolio moves in line with the S&P 1500, 
offering little diversification for investors willing to use our portfolio in a fund. (Refer to Appendix 
E.) 
5.5.6 Volatility  
We show in this part graphics representing the return on our long portfolio against the 
market and the volatility for both. This helps us to understand to what extent our strategy is more 
volatile by comparing returns for the risk taken. The results show that for not a much higher 
volatility our strategy is able to generate higher return than the market.  
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Figure 5.5-25 Return and volatility for long portfolio against market (12-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-27, we present annualized returns and annualized volatility on a 12-month 
window horizon. The results are showing that for not a much greater volatility we are able to 
generate higher return. For illustration purposes, during periods of high market volatility 
investors are likely to see return to be negative, for instance in 2007, in 2001 or in 1997.  
In the following figure, 5.5-28, we represent a scatter diagram with, in the y-axis, the 
return of our long portfolio against the market and on the x-axis the volatility of our long portfolio 
against the volatility of the market on a 12-month annualized window. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
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Figure 5.5-26 Scatter diagram return and volatility (12-month window) 
Figure 5.5-28 displays the risk return scatterplot to illustrate the risk versus the return of 
our long-short portfolio. The return is on the y-axis while the risk is on the x-axis. Here the risk is 
defined as the standard deviation (volatility). The scatterplot shows as well the risk return of the 
benchmark for illustration purposes. From the scatterplot investors will be able to understand 
that for the same level of risk our strategy is delivering higher return, as suggested by the 
concentration on around 10% standard deviation. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
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Figure 5.5-29 Return and volatility for long portfolio against market (7-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-29, we present annualized returns and annualized volatility on a 7-month 
window horizon. The results are showing that for not a much greater volatility we are able to 
generate higher return. For illustration purposes, during periods of high market volatility 
investors are likely to see return to be negative, for instance in 2007, in 2001 or in 1997.  
As an example, in 2007 the portfolio has a negative return of -38.65% for a volatility of 
30.78% whilst the market has a negative return of -47.68% for a volatility of 28.48%, meaning that 
our strategy relative to the market is not very risky even during crisis times.  
In the following figure, 5.5-30, we represent a scatter diagram with, in the y-axis, the 
return of our long-short portfolio against the market and on the x-axis the volatility of our long-
short portfolio against the volatility of the market on a 7-month annualized window. (Refer to 
Appendix F.) 
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Figure 5.5-27 Scatter diagram return and volatility (7-month window) 
The chart in Figure 5.5-30 displays the risk return scatterplot to illustrate the risk versus 
the return of our long-short portfolio. The return is on the y-axis while the risk is on the x-axis. 
Here the risk is defined as the standard deviation (volatility). The scatterplot shows as well the 
risk return of the benchmark for illustration purposes. From the scatterplot, investors will be able 
to understand that for the same level of risk our strategy is delivering higher return, as suggested 
by the concentration on around 10% standard deviation. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
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Figure 5.5-28 Return and volatility for long portfolio against market (3-month window) 
In Figure 5.5-31, we present annualized returns and annualized volatility on a 3-month 
window horizon. The results are showing that for not a much greater volatility we are able to 
generate higher return. For illustration purposes, during periods of high market volatility 
investors are likely to see return to be negative, for instance in 2007, in 2001 or in 1997.  
As an example, in 2007 the portfolio has a negative return of -7.14% for a volatility of 
12.76% whilst the market has a negative return of -24.97% for a volatility 11.43%, meaning that 
our strategy relative to the market is not very risky even during crisis times.  
In the following figure, 5.5-32, we represent a scatter diagram with, in the y-axis, the 
return of our long-short portfolio against the market and on the x-axis the volatility of our long-
short portfolio against the volatility of the market on a 3-month annualized window. (Refer to 
Appendix F.) 
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Figure 5.5-29 Scatter diagram return and volatility (3-month window) 
Figure 5.5-32 displays the risk return scatterplot to illustrate the risk versus the return of 
our long-short portfolio. The return is on the y-axis while the risk is on the x-axis. Here the risk is 
defined as the standard deviation (volatility). The scatterplot shows as well the risk return of the 
benchmark for illustration purposes. From the scatterplot, investors will be able to understand 
that for the same level of risk our strategy is delivering higher return, as suggested by the 
concentration on around 10% standard deviation. (Refer to Appendix F.) 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the impact of return on equity as a momentum strategy. 
Consistent with the literature, this chapter finds that the momentum return on equity trading 
strategy is profitable as examined. The literature highlights the connection between return on 
equity and momentum strategies and this chapter extends the literature by examining the impact 
of return on equity as a momentum strategy in the US market.  
Therefore, the main goal of this chapter was to develop a momentum strategy using 
return on equity (ROE) as a variable. Using daily data from 1992 to 2012, we examined whether 
our long portfolio is able to deliver subsequent return to investors. This portfolio was then back 
tested using different risk metrics used in the industry over the period 1992 to 2012; in order to 
do so we applied some risk-adjusted return measures. Our strategy has not been tested using 
transaction costs; however, we believe that, due to the high performance, this will not affect the 
strategy while producing positive returns. Finally, we highly believe the strategy can be used in 
the current environment and can help investors to increase their wealth.  
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5.7 Appendices  
5.7.1 Appendix A  
In Table 5.7-1 below we present the different returns expressed as a percentage earned 
by our long portfolio for the three frequencies’ periods. As well, we display return for the 
benchmark S&P 1500.  
Table 5.7-1 Displays return for the different time horizons on the long portfolio, the market and the excess return 
 
PORT 
L 12 
PORT 
L 7 
PORT 
L 3 
Mark 
12 
Mark 
7 
Mark 
3 
Excess  
Return 12 
Excess  
Return 7 
Excess  
Return 3 
1992 9.69% 9.09% 23.34% 6.45% 6.70% 9.46% 3.25% 2.40% 13.88% 
1993 12.16% 6.46% -1.47% 11.41% 5.47% 1.44% 0.76% 0.99% -2.91% 
1994 24.68% 23.15% 34.30% 27.82% 28.86% 31.84% -3.14% -5.71% 2.46% 
1995 19.76% 17.04% 24.01% 20.63% 18.67% 19.24% -0.88% -1.63% 4.76% 
1996 32.09% 27.04% 33.81% 34.04% 30.36% 41.57% -1.95% -3.32% -7.77% 
1997 -2.98% -8.62% -3.96% 13.45% 12.80% 7.57% -16.43% -21.42% -11.52% 
1998 16.19% 12.45% 36.92% 24.29% 22.50% 30.15% -8.10% -10.05% 6.77% 
1999 22.09% 24.86% 26.82% -17.27% -12.96% -2.76% 39.36% 37.82% 29.58% 
2000 20.04% 19.29% 38.20% -4.98% -4.55% 8.23% 25.01% 23.83% 29.97% 
2001 -15.55% -11.38% 9.03% -14.33% -18.11% -17.95% -1.22% 6.72% 26.97% 
2002 34.03% 41.80% 55.23% 27.31% 34.82% 44.40% 6.72% 6.97% 10.83% 
2003 9.26% 12.16% 16.13% 9.18% 13.23% 12.19% 0.08% -1.08% 3.95% 
2004 20.37% 18.75% 29.26% 15.41% 14.09% 19.12% 4.96% 4.66% 10.13% 
2005 14.64% 12.67% 9.04% 15.48% 14.82% 5.01% -0.84% -2.15% 4.03% 
2006 2.61% 2.97% 9.54% 3.07% 8.99% 15.56% -0.47% -6.03% -6.03% 
2007 -23.00% -38.65% -7.14% -34.76% -47.68% -24.97% 11.76% 9.03% 17.83% 
2008 45.08% 51.97% 37.12% 36.19% 40.04% 27.13% 8.89% 11.92% 9.99% 
2009 15.77% 11.71% -14.70% 14.37% 12.84% -8.17% 1.40% -1.13% -6.53% 
2010 10.64% 2.18% -6.06% 5.77% 0.17% -3.71% 4.87% 2.01% -2.34% 
2011 19.74% 13.37% 4.98% 16.27% 11.22% 4.26% 3.47% 2.16% 0.72% 
2012 30.46% 25.93% 13.37% 22.84% 20.13% 12.17% 7.62% 5.80% 1.20% 
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5.7.2 Appendix B  
In Table 5.7-2 below we present the different maximum drawdown known by our 
portfolio for the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed 
above.  
Table 5.7-2 Displays the maximum drawdown numbers for the different time horizons on the long portfolio and the 
market  
Maximum  
drawdown 
PORT  
L12 
PORT   
L7 
PORT  
L3 
MARK 
 12 
MARK  
7 
MARK  
3 
1992 -4.8% -4.0% -3.1% -3.3% -3.3% -2.9% 
1993 -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% -3.7% -3.7% -3.7% 
1994 -4.5% -4.5% -1.5% -2.5% -2.3% -1.3% 
1995 -5.6% -5.6% -3.4% -6.1% -6.1% -3.1% 
1996 -7.3% -7.3% -2.0% -8.9% -8.9% -2.5% 
1997 -22.3% -22.3% -5.6% -13.3% -13.3% -4.5% 
1998 -8.5% -8.5% -2.8% -4.8% -4.6% -2.7% 
1999 -6.6% -6.3% -4.5% -30.0% -18.8% -10.4% 
2000 -20.2% -20.2% -6.5% -29.7% -29.7% -7.4% 
2001 -32.4% -21.0% -8.8% -26.1% -25.2% -10.4% 
2002 -5.3% -3.4% -2.3% -5.0% -3.2% -2.5% 
2003 -9.0% -9.0% -5.1% -4.2% -3.9% -3.4% 
2004 -6.5% -6.5% -5.8% -3.8% -3.8% -3.4% 
2005 -9.0% -9.0% -9.0% -5.0% -5.0% -5.0% 
2006 -14.9% -11.8% -4.8% -13.9% -7.6% -3.2% 
2007 -62.5% -62.5% -8.3% -68.7% -64.8% -12.1% 
2008 -6.3% -6.3% -6.3% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% 
2009 -10.6% -10.6% -8.9% -7.9% -7.9% -7.9% 
2010 -20.2% -20.2% -6.6% -16.1% -16.1% -5.9% 
2011 -5.1% -5.1% -4.9% -4.6% -13.2% -4.4% 
2012 -3.9% -3.9% -3.9% -3.7% -3.7% -3.7% 
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5.7.3 Appendix C  
In Table 5.7-3 below we present the different beta generated by our portfolios for the 
three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 5.7-3 Displays the beta numbers for the different time horizons on the long portfolio  
Beta 
PORT  
L12 
PORT  
L7 
PORT  
L3 
1992 1.11 1.09 1.14 
1993 1.09 1.10 1.09 
1994 0.97 1.00 0.97 
1995 0.85 0.86 0.87 
1996 0.74 0.73 0.69 
1997 0.83 0.85 0.90 
1998 0.51 0.46 0.36 
1999 0.55 0.53 0.44 
2000 0.93 0.92 0.87 
2001 0.94 0.94 0.94 
2002 0.95 0.94 0.87 
2003 1.30 1.32 1.29 
2004 1.39 1.43 1.39 
2005 1.33 1.42 1.38 
2006 1.07 1.06 1.14 
2007 1.07 1.05 1.03 
2008 0.99 0.99 0.97 
2009 0.94 0.94 0.93 
2010 1.25 1.26 1.15 
2011 1.19 1.20 1.20 
2012 1.20 1.19 1.25 
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5.7.4 Appendix D  
In Table 5.7-4 below we present the different ratios used to measure risks and the 
volatility known by our portfolio for the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of 
the figures discussed above.  
Table 5.7-4 Displays the different ratios used to measure risks and the volatility across the different time horizons on 
the long portfolio 
 
L 12 
Sharpe 
ratio 
L 7 
Sharpe 
ratio 
L 3 
Sharpe 
ratio 
L 12 
IR 
L 7 
IR 
L 3 
IR 
L 12 
Sortino 
ratio 
L 7 
Sortino 
ratio 
L 3 
Sortino 
ratio 
L 12  
Treynor 
ratio 
L 7  
Treynor 
ratio 
L 3 
Treynor 
ratio 
Jensen’s  
12 
Jensen’s  
7 
Jensen’s  
3 
1992 1.172 1.109 2.589 1.175 1.111 2.566 1.711 1.610 3.298 0.042 0.038 0.160 2.53 1.79 12.38 
1993 1.699 0.847 -0.179 1.701 0.851 -0.171 2.570 1.275 -0.265 0.066 0.013 -0.059 -0.25 0.47 -3.01 
1994 3.452 3.546 5.595 3.450 3.540 5.541 5.149 5.668 10.986 0.203 0.182 0.303 -2.23 -5.55 3.44 
1995 2.645 2.258 3.337 2.644 2.257 3.307 3.857 3.100 6.544 0.174 0.139 0.219 2.26 0.88 7.24 
1996 3.417 2.810 4.139 3.413 2.805 4.100 4.155 3.237 6.097 0.365 0.303 0.416 6.79 4.93 4.92 
1997 -0.248 -0.691 -0.444 -0.243 -0.684 -0.434 -0.373 -0.993 -0.736 -0.096 -0.159 -0.099 -14.11 -19.48 -10.66 
1998 1.803 1.619 4.954 1.804 1.620 4.906 3.216 2.932 9.135 0.220 0.162 0.887 3.78 2.06 25.74 
1999 1.842 2.126 2.380 1.841 2.122 2.358 3.191 4.242 4.113 0.310 0.375 0.491 31.5 31.57 27.71 
2000 1.348 1.253 2.361 1.348 1.252 2.338 2.097 1.881 3.881 0.163 0.156 0.381 24.56 23.36 30.68 
2001 -0.860 -0.610 0.558 -0.854 -0.605 0.555 -1.483 -1.064 1.042 -0.219 -0.175 0.043 -2.11 5.56 25.60 
2002 3.547 4.287 5.286 3.542 4.276 5.233 5.573 6.638 7.570 0.306 0.392 0.580 8.07 9.06 16.58 
2003 0.918 1.162 1.499 0.920 1.162 1.487 1.427 1.740 2.234 0.033 0.054 0.086 -2.63 -5.24 0.40 
2004 2.015 1.777 2.718 2.014 1.775 2.693 3.283 2.937 4.579 0.110 0.096 0.175 -1.113 -19.84 2.69 
2005 1.352 1.133 0.699 1.352 1.134 0.695 1.979 1.765 1.094 0.072 0.054 0.029 -5.99 -8.37 2.13 
2006 0.175 0.222 1.076 0.178 0.225 1.070 0.260 0.312 1.610 -0.022 -0.019 0.040 -0.68 -6.51 -8.10 
2007 -0.741 -1.257 -0.564 -0.738 -1.251 -0.554 -1.036 -1.683 -0.879 -0.262 -0.417 -0.118 14.1 11.17 18.44 
2008 3.068 3.257 1.781 3.063 3.248 1.764 4.521 4.900 2.894 0.404 0.475 0.330 9.10 12.31 10.62 
2009 1.438 1.013 -1.084 1.438 1.014 -1.068 2.179 1.585 -1.635 0.115 0.071 -0.213 2.30 -0.33 -7.04 
2010 0.520 0.094 -0.508 0.521 0.096 -0.498 0.706 0.134 -0.809 0.045 -0.022 -0.096 3.39 1.95 -1.76 
2011 1.832 1.184 0.385 1.832 1.184 0.384 2.906 1.974 0.617 0.124 0.070 0.000 0.35 -0.04 -0.11 
2012 3.225 2.646 1.143 3.221 2.641 1.134 4.437 3.635 1.439 0.212 0.176 0.067 3.09 1.93 -1.79 
                Max 3.547 4.287 5.595 3.542 4.276 5.541 5.573 6.638 10.986 0.404 0.475 0.887 31.50 31.57 30.68 
Min -0.860 -1.257 -1.084 -0.854 -1.251 -1.068 -1.483 -1.683 -1.635 -0.262 -0.417 -0.213 -14.11 -19.84 -19.84 
Mean 1.601 1.418 1.796 1.601 1.418 1.781 2.396 2.182 2.991 0.113 0.094 0.173 2.30 1.79 3.44 
Median 1.699 1.184 1.499 1.701 1.184 1.487 2.570 1.881 2.234 0.115 0.071 0.086 3.93 1.98 7.43 
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5.7.5 Appendix E  
In Table 5.7-5 below we present the correlation measured across by our portfolio for the 
three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures discussed above.  
Table 5.7-5 Displays the correlation measured across the different time horizons on the portfolio 
Correl 
PORT  
L12 
PORT  
L7 
PORT  
L3 
1992 0.73 0.72 0.75 
1993 0.89 0.89 0.90 
1994 0.82 0.83 0.85 
1995 0.84 0.84 0.80 
1996 0.88 0.88 0.83 
1997 0.88 0.90 0.87 
1998 0.61 0.58 0.47 
1999 0.73 0.71 0.71 
2000 0.87 0.87 0.87 
2001 0.89 0.90 0.84 
2002 0.88 0.88 0.90 
2003 0.93 0.93 0.94 
2004 0.92 0.93 0.94 
2005 0.94 0.94 0.95 
2006 0.93 0.93 0.95 
2007 0.97 0.97 0.93 
2008 0.93 0.93 0.93 
2009 0.89 0.91 0.93 
2010 0.96 0.97 0.91 
2011 0.95 0.95 0.97 
2012 0.92 0.94 0.96 
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5.7.6 Appendix F  
In Table 5.7-6 below we present the returns and volatility measured across by our long-
short portfolio for the three frequencies’ periods. This represents a summary of the figures 
discussed above.  
Table 5.7-6 Displays the returns and volatility measured across the different time horizons on the long-short portfolio 
against the market 
 
Vol L 
12 
Vol L 
7 
Vol L 
3 
PORT 
Ret 
L 12 
PORT 
Ret 
L 7 
PORT 
Ret 
L 3 
Mark 
Vol 12 
Mark 
Vol 7 
Mark 
Vol 3 
Mark 
Ret 12 
Mark 
Ret 7 
Mark 
Ret 3 
1992 8.23% 8.16% 8.99% 9.69% 9.09% 23.34% 5.44% 5.39% 5.90% 6.45% 6.70% 9.46% 
1993 7.13% 7.57% 8.51% 12.16% 6.46% -1.47% 5.82% 6.18% 6.96% 11.41% 5.47% 1.44% 
1994 7.13% 6.51% 6.12% 24.68% 23.15% 34.30% 6.08% 5.43% 5.39% 27.82% 28.86% 31.84% 
1995 7.45% 7.52% 7.18% 19.76% 17.04% 24.01% 7.43% 7.32% 6.64% 20.63% 18.67% 19.24% 
1996 9.38% 9.61% 8.16% 32.09% 27.04% 33.81% 11.09% 11.66% 9.82% 34.04% 30.36% 41.57% 
1997 12.20% 12.55% 9.02% -2.98% -8.62% -3.96% 12.86% 13.20% 8.75% 13.45% 12.80% 7.57% 
1998 8.95% 7.66% 7.44% 16.19% 12.45% 36.92% 10.74% 9.57% 9.74% 24.29% 22.50% 30.15% 
1999 11.96% 11.67% 11.25% 22.09% 24.86% 26.82% 15.80% 15.73% 18.00% -17.27% -12.96% -2.76% 
2000 14.83% 15.35% 16.15% 20.04% 19.29% 38.20% 14.01% 14.65% 16.15% -4.98% -4.55% 8.23% 
2001 18.15% 18.74% 16.09% -15.55% -11.38% 9.03% 17.26% 17.98% 14.45% -14.33% -18.11% -17.95% 
2002 9.58% 9.74% 10.44% 34.03% 41.80% 55.23% 8.90% 9.15% 10.85% 27.31% 34.82% 44.40% 
2003 10.03% 10.42% 10.73% 9.26% 12.16% 16.13% 7.18% 7.36% 7.79% 9.18% 13.23% 12.19% 
2004 10.08% 10.53% 10.75% 20.37% 18.75% 29.26% 6.65% 6.81% 7.24% 15.41% 14.09% 19.12% 
2005 10.80% 11.14% 12.86% 14.64% 12.67% 9.04% 7.59% 7.39% 8.91% 15.48% 14.82% 5.01% 
2006 14.62% 13.16% 8.81% 2.61% 2.97% 9.54% 12.73% 11.58% 7.35% 3.07% 8.99% 15.56% 
2007 31.10% 30.78% 12.76% -23.00% -38.65% -7.14% 28.11% 28.48% 11.43% -34.76% -47.68% -24.97% 
2008 14.68% 15.94% 20.81% 45.08% 51.97% 37.12% 13.72% 14.92% 19.94% 36.19% 40.04% 27.13% 
2009 10.93% 11.51% 13.60% 15.77% 11.71% -14.70% 10.44% 11.10% 13.68% 14.37% 12.84% -8.17% 
2010 20.35% 22.60% 12.02% 10.64% 2.18% -6.06% 15.63% 17.46% 9.54% 5.77% 0.17% -3.71% 
2011 10.75% 11.25% 12.83% 19.74% 13.37% 4.98% 8.54% 8.91% 10.34% 16.27% 11.22% 4.26% 
2012 9.43% 9.78% 11.66% 30.46% 25.93% 13.37% 7.27% 7.68% 8.94% 22.84% 20.13% 12.17% 
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5.7.7 Appendix G  
Table 5.7-7 Displays the number of stocks every year for the momentum strategy 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1992 108 46 20 11 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 
 
236 139 61 24 15 7 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 
  
278 129 49 23 8 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 
   
266 110 53 21 10 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 
    
262 122 50 21 10 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 
     
330 124 53 25 9 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 
      
258 117 41 13 7 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 
       
258 90 23 9 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 
        
289 70 31 15 9 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 
         
156 67 27 16 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 
          
197 72 43 19 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 
           
311 166 87 37 17 3 0 0 0 0 
2004 
            
430 226 108 48 9 0 0 0 0 
2005 
             
470 227 101 32 3 1 1 1 
2006 
              
409 185 62 10 4 4 4 
2007 
               
355 118 22 10 7 5 
2008 
                
253 40 18 12 8 
2009 
                 
119 57 34 18 
2010 
                  
302 148 65 
2011 
                   
511 193 
2012 
                    
308 
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Table 5.7-8 Displays the percentage of stocks every year for the momentum strategy 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1992 43% 19% 10% 6% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1993 
 
59% 26% 10% 6% 3% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1994 
  
46% 18% 8% 3% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1995 
   
41% 20% 8% 4% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1996 
    
47% 19% 8% 4% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1997 
     
38% 16% 8% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1998 
      
45% 16% 5% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1999 
       
35% 9% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2000 
        
24% 11% 5% 3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2001 
         
43% 17% 10% 4% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2002 
          
37% 22% 10% 4% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2003 
           
53% 28% 12% 5% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2004 
            
53% 25% 11% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2005 
             
48% 21% 7% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
2006 
              
45% 15% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
2007 
               
33% 6% 3% 2% 1% 
2008 
                
16% 7% 5% 3% 
2009 
                 
48% 29% 15% 
2010 
                  
49% 22% 
2011 
                   
38% 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER WORK 
The rational of this thesis was to develop a value investing strategy to be able to 
distinguish winners from losers and if efficient as stated by Piotroski(2000) this should shift the 
distribution earn by an investors.  
Using data from Compustat and CRSP from 1991 to 2012, we examined the use of the F-
Score on the S&P 1500 screening for stocks in order to form some investment strategies. The 
different portfolios were then backtested using both statistical and risk-adjusted measures but 
also in terms of performances. In order to do so we applied a realistic way of forming a long and a 
short portfolio and assessed the performances on different windows horizons.  
Not allowing for transactions costs is not affecting our trading strategies due to the high 
performances as we retained positive returns. Our long-short portfolio appears to be the most 
interesting and fit within the contextual environment.  
Portfolio combination i.e. value and momentum, despite interesting performances failed 
to produce higher return than our initial strategies i.e. our so called market neutral portfolio.  
Further work is also needed to compare the results with a simple strategies such as price 
to earnings for example and also adding more criteria’s when using the f-score to perhaps get a 
better screening such as for example distance to default or dividend yield.  
Also some improvement can be made by making the process more robust or faster by 
using programming languages as C++ or java in order to make the investment for the investor as 
quickly as possible.  
Finally adding transaction costs could be part of a refinement in order to have a more 
realistic trading strategy and can account for all the assumptions.  
However, despite the limitations of this thesis, we clearly developed a reasonably 
accurate investment tool that can help investors to identify winners from losers in a universe of 
stocks and subsequently simulated a profitable portfolio that outperformed the market.  
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